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Abstract
I ask how the public-private distinction impacts legality, particularly with respect to the “public
sphere”; I use “public nudity” as a vehicle through which to understand the larger legal
implications of the public-private distinction. Given that public nudity is only offensive (and
subsequently illegal) because of how the body is constructed, opinions on when and whether it
can be prohibited reveal the various liberal positions on the limits of the public sphere. To show
how the naked body is constructed as nude (a social stigma associated with being unclothed,) I
adopt a Foucauldian account of modern power, which clashes with liberal theorists’ focus on
“power as law” (what Foucault calls a “juridico-discursive” theory of power.) I temporarily set
aside this tension, re-adopting a juridico-discursive theory of power in order to explore the
relationship between law, the public sphere, and liberal theory. Given these findings, I formulate
a tentative conclusion, which relies on liberal assumptions about power as law. I subsequently
deconstruct these assumptions, undermining the foundation for liberals’ presumed public-private
divide altogether. I conclude by questioning how to reconceive the public-private distinction
given liberal theory’s unfounded assumptions about power, autonomy, and the role of law.
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Introduction
My first reflective naked experience occurred during a trip to Japan the summer before
my first year of college. “Bathhouses,” which were really a series of mineral water pools, are a
common place of leisure in Japanese culture, and my family and I wanted to experience one.
When we arrived, we were informed that there were two separate bathing areas: one for men and
one for women; when we went to the locker room, my father and I found that no one wore
bathing shorts to the pool. The idea that being unclothed in front of others was acceptable
seemed foreign to me: my entire life, I had been taught that one’s body was private and that one
should cover up in front of others at all times, to the point of going out of one’s way to do so.
While the initial feeling of being unclothed in front of others (and seeing others unclothed) was a
bit uncomfortable, I quickly came to realize that being free of clothes was, in some sense,
liberating; in a place where others were similarly unclothed, and being unclothed did not carry
any connotations, exposing myself came to feel natural and comfortable.
A number of years later, I had the opportunity to attend an unclothed party, this time,
with both men and women. I found the social dynamics to be identical to those at a normal party,
perhaps even more sexually tame—the fact that everyone was unclothed did not make the party
explicitly vulgar or sexual. Nonetheless, when explaining the situation to some friends (who did
not attend), they seemed puzzled by my experience. They immediately wondered how such a
situation could be un-sexual. My claim that being unclothed and seeing others similarly situated
was not necessarily sexual or vulgar sounded foreign to them.
Both experiences led me to question how society constructs the unclothed body. If people
are born without clothing, how is it that the body becomes taboo and ideas of “modesty” or
4

“body privacy” develop as unquestionable concrete social codes. Moreover, why is it that
societies that seemingly hold freedom of action and expression among their highest values, often
use coercive legal force to ensure that members hide their bare self? I wondered how such
coercive force, which restricts freedom for the alleged greater good of society, is justified within
the legal context of individual rights. What is it about being unclothed that is provocative enough
to warrant using legal force to restrain it?
I initially wanted to focus my thesis on why the unclothed body is circumscribed in
public. When I began to do research, however, I gradually realized that my query forms part of a
larger question about the limits of legal autonomy/agency in the public sphere. I began to
research the Constitutional history of legal autonomy, both in public and private. The second half
of the twentieth century saw a massive transformation in private individual rights; the
constitutional “right to privacy” ensured individuals almost complete autonomy/agency in the
private sphere. But given that actions can be restricted to protect public sensibilities (for instance,
since public nudity can be proscribed,) this legal freedom to do as one wishes does not entirely
carry into the public sphere. There is a difference, at the level of law, between the public and
private spheres in terms of which actions governments can restrict.
This thesis gets at the heart of the public-private divide, using public nudity as a case
study. Governments justify public nudity restrictions on the grounds that such laws protect public
sensibilities—a theory which rests on the assumption that protecting the public from offense
justifies restricting others’ ability to act as they wish. Consequently, examining whether liberal
theorists, who by definition believe in the right to privacy, agree with public nudity restrictions
provides a window into the larger debate over the limits of the public sphere. Throughout this
thesis, I examine public nudity in the larger context of public autonomy, using this case to
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generalize about larger questions regarding law and the public sphere. Looking at whether public
nudity can be restricted is a vehicle by which to examine my overall question in this thesis: How
should the public-private distinction, particularly with respect to the “public sphere,” impact
which actions can be proscribed?
The first chapter examines the historical development of the right to privacy along with
the intra-liberal debate over the limits of the public sphere. In order to understand public nudity
laws, it is crucial to understand why individuals are offended by the unclothed body. Chapter
Two uses sociological literature on the body to show the constructed difference between
nakedness, one’s intrinsic state of undress, and nudity, a state of indecency associated with the
“body taboo.” I further explain, using a Foucauldian “analytics of power,” how the body is
constructed as nude and how, consequently, laws outlawing public nudity stem from and
reinforce the body taboo. Foucault’s account of power differs from that of liberal theorists
described in the first chapter. While liberal theorists presume an autonomous subject regulated
through prohibitive laws (what Foucault calls a “juridico-discursive” theory of power,)
Foucault’s modern power (or bio-power) operates below the law, constructing the individual and
their perception of the world. These two accounts of power are seemingly at odds, a tension
which I address in Chapter Five.
Chapters Three and Four employ a liberal account of power (juridico-discursive) in order
to explore the limits of individual autonomy in the public sphere, both at a theoretical and legal
level. Since liberals are split as to the limits of the public sphere, Chapter Three seeks to find
which of the three liberal positions most closely accords with the tenets of liberal doctrine. Given
the answer to this question, Chapter Four explores four Supreme Court cases dealing with public
nudity, asking whether the U.S Constitution’s approach to the public sphere is in line with liberal
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doctrine (as determined in the previous chapter.) These two chapters provide the bulk of my
evidence, analyzing the relationship between liberal theory and U.S law.
In Chapter Five, I use the findings from the third and fourth chapters to formulate a
“liberal conclusion” (how liberal theorists, given their understanding of power, would conclude)
to my question; I go on to assess this conclusion using the Foucauldian analytics of power
applied to the body in Chapter Two. Liberal theorists presume an intrinsic public-private
distinction: there is a real difference between how individuals ought to act in public vs. in
private. Moreover, liberal theorists assume that liberating an individual from unnecessarily
constraining laws is sufficient to ensure their autonomy. But according to a Foucault, the
individual is constructed below the level of law; that is, eliminating unnecessarily constraining
laws does not liberate the individual from the power which constructs them. I address this
tension, assessing the liberal public-private distinction from a Foucauldian perspective. I
conclude by asking how we might structure laws in order to maximize agency within the field of
power relations that regulate the individual.

7

1: The Legal Limits of Private and Public Autonomy
Defining the limits of individual autonomy is a central question in legal philosophy. In a
broader sense, the issue of autonomy speaks to the relationship between the individual and
society. What is the proper balance between individual rights, which society cannot intrude on,
and duties, which compel an individual to act in a certain way?
Although the United States Constitution is supposedly rooted in inalienable rights, the
dominant interpretation of these rights has evolved over the years. For instance, until 1962, all
states in the U.S had laws prohibiting same-sex sex; these laws rested on the assumption that
“sodomy” was a “crime against nature” and could be prohibited accordingly1; individuals’ right
to autonomy was trumped by a duty to obey certain social norms. Nonetheless, these laws were
gradually repealed over the course of the 20th Century, and were ultimately interpreted as
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, marking a shift in the relationship between law and
social norms.2
What about acting in the presence of others? When one is in the public sphere, is an
individual’s right to autonomy, if there is such thing, compromised? For instance, should LGBT
groups be allowed to have a pride parade in Jerusalem even if it offends religious leaders?3
Should an interracial couple in the antebellum South have had the right to stroll hand-in-hand

1

Janet E Halley, “Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v. Hardwick.” Virginia Law
Review, vol. 79, no. 7, 1993, p. 1721., doi:10.2307/1073385; Geoffrey Stone, “Strange Freaks of Nature.” In Sex and
the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and the Law from Americas Origins to the Twenty-First Century, (Liverlight
Publishing 2017) 212-22.
2
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003.) I return to the issue of sodomy laws later in this chapter; for now, I
merely use their evolution as an example of how understandings of rights can change over time.
3
Pinto, Meital. "What Are Offences to Feelings Really About? A New Regulative Principle for the Multicultural
Era." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 4 (2010): 695-723.
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down the street, likely offending the majority of the public?4 These questions may require
governments to adjudicate between autonomy and others’ desire not to be offended.
Such queries speak to the relationship between society and the individual. And the nature
of this association has been constantly re-negotiated throughout American history. In order to
better comprehend this relationship, it is first necessary to understand the evolution of legal
autonomy. To this end, the first section of this chapter focuses on the scope of state police power
in the 19th century United States, charting the dominance of legal moralism—the belief that law
could and should enforce a certain morality; I also briefly discuss its critics at the time. Having
described a context in which all immoral actions, both in private and public, fell under the scope
of state police power, the second section explores the expansion of private autonomy in the
second half of the twentieth century; this expansion was part of a move toward a “liberal
conception of law,” which holds that governments cannot prohibit private harmless actions on
their immorality alone. Having investigated the limits of private sovereignty, I go on to examine
the limits of individual autonomy in public; the third section explores how legal autonomy in
public has expanded since the 1960’s, and charts the intra-liberal debate on public autonomy.
What was, in the private sphere, a two-sided dispute between legal moralists and liberals
becomes quadripartite, given that the liberal position fractures into three separate camps. These
debates lead me to my research question, which concerns the limits of individual autonomy in
the public sphere.5
I. The Age of Public Morals: Limited Public and Private Autonomy

4

Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987,) 25.
5
I use the terms “public individual autonomy,” “individual autonomy in public” and “public autonomy”
interchangeably. Both refer to an individual’s ability to act freely in the public sphere.
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In order to understand the development of private and public autonomy, it is crucial to
comprehend the backdrop against which they emerged. William Novak’s book The People’s
Welfare details the nature of law in the 19th Century United States, which prioritized the
community’s welfare over individual rights through an expansive notion of state police power.6
Novak explains how individual sovereignty, both in public and private, was believed to be
subservient to society’s interests.
By the early 19th Century, American society, influenced by the Second Great Awakening,
increasingly adopted a protectionist attitude toward law. Rebelling against the enlightenment
emphasis on individual freedom, a number of early 19th Century thinkers like Lewis Hockeimer,
James Williams, and Nathaniel Chipman rejected what they saw as the “selfish” philosophies of
Hobbes and Locke. These writers viewed “society, government, association, and ultimately law
[as] not only…necessary but natural, keenly suited to human appetites.”7 Unlike the
enlightenment’s humanist focus, this legal philosophy emphasized the importance of society in
realizing man’s ambitions. After all, it was reasoned, “man was a fundamentally social or
relational being; man's natural state was not to be found outside of community or in isolation
from others but in society.”8 Not surprisingly, this school of thought emphasized man’s duties to
society rather than the individual rights that he retained by living in it. Novak identifies four key
features of this new philosophy:
(1) a focus on man as a social being in society; (2) a relative and relational theory of
individual rights; (3) a pragmatic, historical methodology enshrined in a dynamic,
pre-Enlightenment conception of the rule of common law; and (4) an overall concern
with the people's welfare obtainable within a well-regulated society.9

6

William J Novak, The Peoples Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996.)
7
Ibid, 32.
8
Ibid, 29.
9
Ibid, 26.
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Law’s function evolved to reflect this conception of man; within local communities, law’s role
was increasingly seen not solely as a means by which to mediate private disputes and protect
property, but rather as a means to ensure the good of the collective, and through it, individual
happiness. In this age, the police came to play a major role in society, their job being to ensure
“…the loftiest ambitions and powers of government—the general pursuit of public good and
people’s happiness.”10 Although the U.S Constitution entrenched a profoundly individualistic
notion of law, it was understood that an older pre-Enlightenment moral code of common law still
held sway. Common law was responsible for creating the archetype of a proper society, which
was secured through the policing of public morals in local communities. Only through a wellfunctioning, morally upright society could the individual, a social being, realize their maximum
potential.
As previously touched on, public morals increasingly fell within the scope of law; once
again, since the community’s welfare superseded private interests, it was believed that society
had every right to punish individuals whose actions proved a public nuisance or in other ways
betrayed society’s values. Accordingly, sodomy, vagrancy, prostitution, and adultery were
aggressively prosecuted by local communities. It is worth noting, however, that that these
“public morals” actively entrenched a particular interpretation of “social good,” which
suppressed the interests of those who thought and acted differently.
Public spaces, similar to private ones, were fervently policed under the veil of “public
nuisance,” since (it was believed that) protecting the community from nuisance superseded
individual autonomy. “Public nuisances consisted of…troublesome behavior or uses of property,

10

Ibid, 52.

11

but so as to injure the whole community…Livery stables, slaughterhouses, disorderly inns,
bawdy houses, and malarial ponds were all considered public nuisances at common law.”11
Judges upheld these definitions as well, often ruling on the axiom that “like peace, order, and
safety, morality belonged to that group of public concerns that defined the essence of nineteenthcentury government obligation.”12 The more public the behavior, the more likely it was to be
regulated; but society reserved the right to regulate any actions which it found immoral. For
instance, public indecency was more likely to be policed than nudity in one’s own home; and
given that public nudity hinged on participation in public, it was prosecuted most aggressively.13
To the average nineteenth century American, and certainly to the courts, the idea that the state
had no right to dictate whether a person was clothed in public would have been all but
inconceivable.14
In sum, nineteenth century legal philosophy, rooted in common law traditions, blurred the
lines between public and private, and between “individual rights” and “the public good.”
Individual rights were clearly subservient to entrenched public interest, and regulating private
behavior was seen as a natural function of the state. In short, all aspects of life fell under the
power of the state, whose job it was to secure a moral community in order to promote the
people’s welfare.
It was in this age that John Stewart Mill wrote On Liberty.15 Writing in 1859, Mill
believed that in “developed societies,” the greatest threat to freedom was not the threat of

11

Ibid, 61; also see State v. Buckley, 5 Del. 508 (1854,) 508
Ibid, 156.
13
Ibid, 158; State v. Rose 32 mo 560 (1862); State v. Roper, Miller v. People 5 barb 203 (NY., 1849.)
14
Ibid 156.
15
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (Andrews UK, 2011.) ProQuest Ebook Central,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bates/detail.action?docID=770561.
12
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coercive action by a sovereign. Rather, as European countries moved toward democracy, “there
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the
tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as
rules of conduct on those who dissent from them.”16 To this end, Mill famously articulated his
harm principle, the idea that among adults in “civilized” societies, “The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others.”17
Mill approached this argument from a utilitarian point of view: if “the worth of a state is
the worth of the individuals composing it,” a state will be stronger if its individuals are happier;
this will only occur if its citizens are allowed to pursue life as they see fit.18 Moreover, diversity
of opinion works to society’s benefit, since it promotes “mental expansion” and may suggest
new, more suitable, ways of living. To be clear, Mill’s harm principle did not use the language of
individual rights championed by many of his twentieth century contemporaries;19 Mill claimed
that individuals should be sovereign over their own actions because autonomy benefitted society
as a whole.
So what is the balance between the individual and society? Mill contended that
individuals have a right to warn others that their conduct is dangerous but have no right to tell
them that “he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.”20
Moreover, he held that “there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents

16

Ibid, 21.
Ibid, 26.
18
Ibid, 138-139
19
“It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract
right, as a thing independent of utility.” Ibid, 27
20
Ibid, 95.
17
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themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted”, but which, “if done publicly, are a violation of
good manners and, coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightly be
prohibited.”21 But which public acts does Mill refer to? Future liberal scholars, notably Joel
Feinberg, would attempt to define the limits of individual freedom, balancing it against society’s
demands. I discuss Feinberg and public autonomy in greater detail later in this chapter; for now,
it is important to note that Mill’s philosophy leaves open the question of what the limits of public
autonomy are.
Although Mill’s philosophy, which Novak contends characterized much legal doctrine in
the 19th Century United States, aimed to promote the common good, the two philosophies
sharply differed in their approach to law. The latter philosophy was shared by Mill’s rival, James
Fitzjames Stephen, who argued that morality was a necessary component of law if society was to
achieve liberty; for Stephen, allowing unlimited individual freedom would inevitably lead to
tyranny.22 Stephen’s ideas mark the traditional understanding of law in Mill’s age; it was Mill,
not Stephen, who, in the United States, would have been considered reactionary. While On
Liberty was well-received in its time and continues to be a classic liberal text, but it was not until
the middle of the twentieth century that Mill’s ideas would begin to be adopted in American law.
II. Toward Private Autonomy
Nineteenth and early twentieth century law was largely characterized by legal moralism.
But in the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S government’s hold on the private sphere was
challenged and all but supplanted with the right to privacy. This section describes the
development of this right both in American law and legal theory. Sub-Section A describes how

21
22

Ibid, 94.
James Fitzjames Stephen, and Stuart D. Warner. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Liberty Fund, Incorporated, 2014.)
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the limits of private autonomy were debated in the Hart-Devlin debates, while Sub-Section B
discusses the development of the right to privacy (which dealt a blow to legal moralism’s
understanding of the private sphere); Sub-Section C charts how the right to privacy was applied
to eliminate prohibitions on obscenity and (private consumption of) pornography, while SubSection D charts contemporary legal perspectives on private autonomy. Throughout this section,
it is important to keep in mind that the debates concerning sodomy and pornography’s legality
reflected the clash between two competing ideologies: legal moralism and liberalism; while the
former held that governments could regulate private behaviors which society disapproved of, the
latter philosophy championed a “right to privacy,” which prevented the government from
regulating whom individuals had sex with or whether they viewed images of it. While it is
widely acknowledged that liberals largely won, debates between moralists and liberals continue
to take place today. 23
A. Hart-Devlin Debates and the Right to Privacy
The early clashes between legal moralism (and first half of the twentieth) and liberalism
were famously exhibited by the Hart-Devlin debates. The debates began when the Wolfenden
Committee was chartered by the British Parliament to determine whether sodomy (same-sex sex)
should be decriminalized, ultimately holding that it should and recommending "individual
freedom of actions in matters of private morality"24; Parliament’s decision to investigate whether
to erase prohibitions on sodomy was not an attempt to survey public opinion (which most likely
would have been morally opposed to same-sex sex)—it was rooted in the fundamental question

23

Ronald Dworkin “Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals.” Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 3611, 1 (Jan.
1966.)
24
“Wolfenden Report.” The British Library, www.bl.uk.learning/timeline/item107413.html.
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of whether the public’s conception of morality should affect which actions are allowed.25 H.L.A
Hart, a legal scholar, and Patrick Devlin, a judge, debated the committee’s findings.
Devlin, adopting an idealist concept of law, argued that societies, although they should be
hesitant to regulate private behavior, had a right to do so.
There is disintegration when no common morality is observed and history shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration, so that society is
justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its
government... the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of
subversive activities.26
Devlin was a proponent of legal moralism in an increasingly liberal age, holding that the law had
a right to regulate actions which “rational men” considered harmful to society; if certain
behavioral norms were not enforced, the bonds that held society together would weaken.
In contrast, H.L.A Hart, argued for a liberal concept of individual rights, contending that
“law as it is and law as it ought to be” (our existing rules and an ideal moral concept of society)
are separate.27 Largely basing his argument on Mill’s harm principle, he claimed that laws do not
need to reflect an established morality. This belief flows from his conception of the nature of
law. Hart was a champion of Legal Positivism, a philosophy which viewed law as a socially
constructed code designed to promote the functioning of society.28 In The Concept of Law, Hart
rejected the legal philosophy known as “Natural Law” which dictates that laws stem from moral
principles. Although laws often conform with society’s virtues, “it is in no sense a necessary
truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality.”29 Hart believed that laws, at

25

Ronald M. Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals" Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 3611
(1966.)
26
Patrick Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals." Lecture, Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence, March 18, 1959.
27
H. L. A Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals." Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 1983,
49-87.
28
H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994.)
29
Ibid, 185-186
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their core, are a union of two types of rules: “rules of the game” (primary rules) and rules on how
the primary rules are made (secondary rules); the most important secondary rule is the “rule of
recognition,” which refers to a recognized means by which society decides what is legal. This
suggests that law does not emanate from a predetermined morality; rather it is a constructed code
revolving around a set means by which to adjudicate it, such as a constitution. Primary and
secondary rules may stem from individuals’ moral sense of what is right, but a community’s
moral dislike of a particular action cannot justify outlawing the act if the rule of recognition
would otherwise allow it.
Refuting Devlin’s aforementioned claim (that laws serve to protect society’s integrity,)
Hart held that countless societies have withstood changes in moral values and are consequently
equipped to do so. He also questioned why the majority’s morality should prevent individuals
from acting as they wish. Hart’s quandary with Devlin over the legality of same-sex sex marked
an important turning point in American law. Hart’s ideas were influential in the Model Penal
Code, a code formally adopted by the American Law Institute in 1962 (and which states were
encouraged to embrace) which, among other things, abolished prohibitions on sodomy; this
reflected the growth and [gradual] espousal of individual autonomy, at least in the private
sphere.30 While same-sex sex was far from universally accepted, states began to move away from
sodomy laws. With regards to actions done in the presence of others, however, Hart was far more
willing to allow governments to exercise regulations in order to protect public sensibilities.
B. The Right to Privacy

30

Melinda D. Kane, “Timing Matters: Shifts in the Casual Determinants of Sodomy Law Decriminalization, 19611998.” Social Problems, vol. 54, no. 2, (2007): 211—239. Also see D’Emilio, John. Sexual Politics, Sexual
Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1998.)
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Defining the limits of government restriction and the bounds of the private and public
spheres corresponded with this increased focus on individual rights. In Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965,) the Supreme Court ruled that Connecticut’s ban on contraception violated a
constitutional right to marital privacy.31 This right was subsequently affirmed in Stanley vs.
Georgia (1969,) when Thurgood Marshall wrote that “If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch."32 Perhaps most famously, in Roe v. Wade (1973,) the
Supreme Court declared that the right to privacy ensured a right to abortion.33 While Bowers v.
Hardwick (1986) was a reminder that governments could still outlaw private actions which
society considered immoral,34 the idea that the government had no right to regulate decisions
between consenting adults would triumph in 2003, when Lawrence v. Texas extended the right to
privacy established in the aforementioned cases to deem sodomy laws unconstitutional.35 Over
the second half of the twentieth century, the Court altered the reach and focus of law. While
private actions could once be regulated under the umbrella of public morals, the aforementioned
cases created an invisible, impenetrable line, within which governments could not interfere to
promote the public good. Liberal scholars such as David Richards saw the right to privacy as the

31

Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. at 565 (1969.)
33
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S at 154 (1973.)
34
“The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent
makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared
inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on
this basis” Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. at 196 (1986.)
35
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558 (2003.)
32
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“principled interpretive elaboration of a longstanding constitutional skepticism about state
enforcement of certain conceptions of perfectionist public morality.”36
But the right to privacy was not without its critics; scholars such as Robert Bork believed
that the Court had engaged in principled judgments when deciding which actions governments
could restrict; principled judgments were, for Bork, an unconstitutional method of adjudication.37
Writing in the 1980’s, Bork, an originalist, believed that courts had a requirement to neutrally
apply the Constitution; the right to privacy, established in Griswold v. Connecticut, was one
example of such discriminatory legal application.38 Moreover, Bork argues that privacy rights
have inconsistent principles of adjudication, a fact which illustrates how contemporary
interpretations of the constitution cannot be neutral.39 It is worth quoting Bork at length here.
…if a neutral judge must demonstrate why principle X applies to cases A and B but not to
case C (which is, I believe, the requirement laid down by Professors Wechsler and Jaffe,)
he must, by the same token, also explain why the principle is defined as X rather than as
X minus, which would cover A but not cases B and C, or as X plus, which would cover all
cases, A, B and C. Similarly, he must explain why X is a proper principle of limitation on
majority power at all. Why should he not choose non-X? If he may not choose lawlessly
between cases in applying principle X, he may certainly not choose lawlessly in defining
X or in choosing X, for principles are after all only organizations of cases into groups. To
choose the principle and define it is to decide the cases.
It follows that the choice of "fundamental values" by the Court cannot be justified. Where
constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no
principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick
close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new
rights.40
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For Bork, the late 20th Century Court (particularly the “Warren Court”)’s turn toward private
individual autonomy reflected a form of non-neutral adjudication; the Constitution, which
requires neutral application of the law, affords governments all but complete ability to regulate
private actions. Bork’s originalist philosophy, promoted by the Reagan administration, may have
marked a new tactic for moralist Conservatives in combatting the Warren Court’s enshrined
notion of private autonomy.41
C.

Obscenity and Pornography: Liberal Activists’ Next Frontier
The the gradual abolition of sodomy laws and the legal adoption of a private sphere were

part of a larger turn toward liberalism in American law; 42 this shift was also manifest in the
changing legality of pornography.43 Materials deemed obscene were previously restrictable,
since the government could regulate materials which might harm public morality; pornography,
erotic literature, and nude dancing establishments often qualified under these laws, and the idea
that freedom of speech applied to sexually explicit content was often disregarded by the Supreme
Court.44 Louis Henkin, who contended that the constitution included a liberal right to autonomy,
argued that there was no legal basis for obscenity laws.45 Henkin contends that obscenity laws
are not rooted in a drive to protect individuals from each other but rather in a religious-based
drive to protect people from themselves; obscenity, in short, is not crime but sin. Laws rooted in
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a specific, religious-based conception of the good, Henkin argues, are at odds with the
Constitution.
When Henkin wrote his article (in 1963,) the Supreme Court had already begun to define
what was and was not obscene. In 1957, the Supreme Court ruled in Roth v. US that materials
deemed “obscene” are not protected by the First Amendment. But Roth did not allow
governments to merely choose what was obscene; the Court established a test for determining
which material was obscene and subsequently restrictable.46 By defining obscenity, Roth put the
Court in the business of determining what qualified under this definition, a burden that would
overwhelm the Court over the next three decades, as they struggled to define what was and was
not appropriate.47
Perhaps this narrowing definition of obscenity reflected changing attitudes toward
“morally offensive material”; but it also increased the Court’s role in protecting individual rights.
Throughout the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s, liberals and libertarians sought to chart a “methodological
course aimed at changing the climate of ideas to one that would be more sympathetic to the idea
that judges should be more engaged in defending constitutional liberties than most conservatives
at the time, fearing judicial activism, were inclined to support.” 48 Legal libertarian doctrine
required an activist Court, not for the purpose of securing a “well-regulated society” but in order
to protect individual rights.
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The debate over “obscenity’s” legality was largely manifest in the debate over
pornography.49 Conservative philosophers (many of whom shared Devlin’s belief that society
always had a right to regulate private conduct which might offend the community’s morality)
tended to support prohibitions on pornography.50 In contrast, liberal legal theorists, such as
Ronald Dworkin, famously defended the right to pornography, holding that prohibiting it would
violate porn actors and pornographers’ rights to equal liberty (by discriminating against their
profession.)51 Given that, according to Dworkin, pornography does not constitute a direct harm
to any person, its prohibition is discriminatory and ungrounded.52 Dworkin’s position on
pornography flows from his legal philosophy. While Dworkin, like Hart, was opposed to the idea
that a community’s offense at a certain behavior was sufficient to prohibit it, their legal
philosophies sharply differed. As previously mentioned, Hart was a proponent of Legal
Positivism, the belief that laws are rooted in normative rules which were specific to individual
societies, about how to structure society, not moral ideas about the good. Dworkin was not a
proponent of Natural Law (Legal Positivism’s philosophical nemesis) but believed in a “third
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way,” or a middle ground between the two sides. Legal Interpretivism, Dworkin’s philosophy,
held that the lawmaking process was grounded in morality, since judges often invoke community
ethics when adjudicating the law; to Dworkin, the “rule of recognition” does not separate a
community’s law from the moral rules which gave rise to it. Thus, in order to protect individual
autonomy, Dworkin stressed the need for iron-clad rights, on which governments cannot
infringe.
In accordance with his belief that pornography prohibitions violated the rights of
pornographers and pornography consumers, Dworkin claimed that “we need rights, as a distinct
element in political theory, only when some decision that injures some people nevertheless finds
prima facie support in the claim that it will make the community as a whole better off…”53 Much
like Mill, Dworkin shared a concern over the “tyranny of the majority,” which can impose its
will on those whose actions it dislikes. But unlike Mill, Dworkin held individual rights, not
utility, as the ultimate justification for restraining the government’s power. Fitting with the
increasingly liberal interpretation of law, advocates of legal pornography won the day, with antipornography statutes being ruled unconstitutional on a number of occasions.54
D.

Contemporary Private Autonomy

The dominant legal conception of private autonomy has certainly shifted since the
nineteenth century.55 Once criminalized acts such as same-sex sex, viewership of pornography,
and adultery are now widely practiced. Moreover, “from the standpoint of free speech, we have
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seen a revolution in the realm of sexual expression.”56. In this sense, Dworkin would be content
that “The widely held assumption today is typically that which Supreme Court justices Hugo
Black and William Douglass explained in their dissent to Roth v. US: there was never a
legitimate constitutional justification for treating sexual expression as less ‘valuable’ a right than
other forms of expression.”57 The Hart-Devlin debates set the stage for a massive transformation
in constitutional interpretation in the second half of the twentieth century; in short, Hart won.58
Joel Feinberg, a liberal scholar writing in the 1980’s, admits that on the surface, the
narrowing definition of obscenity may suggest that the Court has adopted the harm principle as a
means to adjudicate questions regarding the private sphere.59 But he points out that the the Court
has not extended the right to privacy to “couples living in ‘open adultery’, or to certain selfregarding but idiosyncratic life-styles, or to the use and cultivation of marijuana even in the
‘sanctity’ of one's own home…”60 Seeking to explain this partial adoption of harm, Feinberg
cites Justice Berger’s opinion that the Court employed the right to privacy, “‘only [with respect
to] personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in the concept of ordered
liberty…’ The boundary line, in short, tends to follow, however erratically, the line of those
liberties which are most fecund...” The Court’s limits to autonomy are narrower than Feinberg’s,
who would permit all non-offensive (and some offensive) and non-harmful actions.
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Steven Gey shares this wide conception of autonomy rights. Writing in 1995, Gey
criticized the (pre-Lawrence) Court for ruling that the Constitution allows for laws based on
morality alone.61 Gey believes the opposite and advocates for a Constitutional principle that
would require every government action to have a primary amoral purpose and effect. This would
ensure that “political control of purportedly immoral beliefs, expression, and behavior would be
permitted only if the immorality threatens some direct and particularized harm to others.”62
But even if the right to privacy (albeit limited) has proliferated, legal moralism is by no
means extinct. Various contemporary scholars continue to tout the merits of Devlin’s philosophy,
holding that laws can and should be based on morals. Gerald Dworkin (not to be confused with
Ronald Dworkin) agrees with Devlin that morality is and should be a deciding factor in
lawmaking.63 He specifically appeals to Devlin’s argument that morality can be a deciding factor
in determining law, even if in many situations a society may decide not to criminalize certain
immoral actions. Moreover, he argues that liberals such as H.L.A Hart and Joel Feinberg
unwittingly support this position insofar as they propose legal restrictions in situations where
direct harms do not apply.64 Dworkin concludes that while not all morally laudable actions ought
to be illegal, an action’s immorality is sufficient to bring it within the purview of the law.
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But legal moralism remains alive even after Lawrence v. Texas solidified the
Constitutional right to privacy.65 Rick Kozell, a conservative legal theorist, argues that moral
claims lie at the heart of law: “Despite the vast differences that have existed between
civilizations throughout human history, nearly all have shared one thing in common: they have
all relied upon moral judgments as the foundation for their most important and most fundamental
governing principles.”66 He focuses his argument on the Court’s decision in Lawrence, which
declared sodomy laws unconstitutional; specifically, he argues against the “moral insufficiency
doctrine” (a principle formulated in Lawrence,) which dictates that morality is not a sufficient
basis for criminalization.67 Kozell believes that the moral insufficiency doctrine is an incorrect
reading of Lawrence, partially because it did not explicitly overturn countless cases embracing
the use of majoritarian morals in lawmaking. Given said precedent, morality remains a
constitutionally valid reason to support a law. Kozell does not differentiate between the public
and private spheres, arguing that majoritarian morals are and should be sufficient grounds for
restricting autonomy (both in private and public.)
Private individual autonomy has greatly expanded since the mid-twentieth century.
Public morality as a justification for regulating the private sphere, has largely been supplanted by
the right to privacy; legal moralism saw its greatest blow in the “moral insufficiency doctrine”
established in Lawrence. While the Court’s position may be closer to liberalism than to legal
moralism, it has not completely adopted a harm-based conception of law, and moralists continue
to contend that laws ought to be grounded in morality. Liberalism is winning the debate
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regarding private autonomy, its main attack against moralists centering around the idea that nonharmful actions cannot be restricted. But when those acts leave the private sphere, potentially
affecting others’ interests, the liberal position is not as cohesive.
III. Individual Autonomy in Public
In the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court adopted a constitutional right to privacy
and gradually expanded it to cover more private actions; this established limits to state regulation
of private actions. But what about those actions which are not private? Liberal theorists presume
an inherent distinction between the public and private spheres. While in private, the individual
has all but complete autonomy (they act as an individual,) the individual in public must act as a
“citizen”; that is, the individual, upon entering the public sphere, is subject to certain constraints
in order to ensure the good of society.68 For certain public actions, governments often employ
what has been called “mandatory privacy” regulations, a legal requirement that individuals keep
certain actions in the private sphere (those actions are prohibited in the public sphere);
mandatory privacy regulations are often employed with regards to actions that others find
offensive or unappeasing.69 Scholarly positions on the limits of public autonomy are far more
complex than in private: the main debate is not merely between legal moralists and liberals but
also within the latter, with liberal opinions ranging on a spectrum from most to least restrictive.
This section proceeds accordingly: I first explore how the Supreme Court has expanded the
public sphere through two landmark court cases, ruling that a community’s desire to regulate
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potentially-offensive messages is not a sufficient justification for proscribing certain actions.
This expanded public sphere leaves open the question of when and which public actions can be
restricted. In order to explore this issue in greater depth, I review the liberal literature on when
the state is entitled to enforce mandatory privacy restrictions.
A. The Supreme Court and Public Offense
First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone marks two Supreme Court cases that redefined
the limits of public autonomy: Cohen v. California (1971) and Erzodnik v. Jacksonville (1975.)70
In Cohen, the Court ruled that offensive language, insofar as it was not directed at anyone and
was a means to assert a political message, could not be banned in public.71 When Paul Cohen
entered a Los Angeles Courthouse wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft,” he
was subsequently arrested for “disturbing the peace.” Justice John Marshall Harlan boiled down
the issue to one of morality, not of harm, when he claimed that the real issue being examined was
whether California can excise, as ‘offensive conduct’, one particular scurrilous epithet
from the public discourse, either upon the theory...that its use is inherently likely to cause
violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians
of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary.
The Court ruled that Cohen had a right to wear his jacket in public, since protecting the public
from offense did not outweigh Cohen’s right to free expression; if individuals were offended by
the display of the word “Fuck,” it was their responsibility to look away. The burden of protecting
oneself and one’s children from offense shifted from the actor to the viewer, a major departure
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from moralist lawmaking.72 Essentially, Cohen established that an individual’s right to display a
political statement trumped another’s right not to be offended.
The Court further extended Cohen’s principle to publically-displayed nude images in
Erzodnik v. Jacksonville (1975.) A Jacksonville drive-in theatre was convicted of violating a
local law which declared that movie theatres could not show movies containing nude images if
the screen was visible from the public street. But the Supreme Court ruled that since nudity was
not obscene, and since the law was not narrowly tailored to increase public safety, it
discriminated against the nude image. As in Cohen, the court ruled that it was the passerby’s
responsibility to “divert his gaze” if they were morally offended by nudity. The implications of
Erzodnik cannot be overstated: Erzodnik established that the perception that nudity was immoral
was not sufficient to outlaw its display in public.73 The majority’s redefinition of the public
sphere was vehemently opposed by the dissent. Justice White explained his frustration that this
understanding of the public sphere allowed for limited protection from offense. “If this broadside
is to be taken literally, the State may not forbid ‘expressive’ nudity on the public streets, in the
public parks, or any other public place, since other persons in those places at that time have a
‘limited privacy interest,’ and may merely look the other way.”74 Whereas anything harmful to
public sensibilities was once restrictable under the umbrella of public morals, governments
increasingly needed to prove explicit harms in order to restrict public autonomy.
Stone notes that Cohen and Erzodnik “make clear that perhaps in exceptional
circumstances, the government cannot constitutionally ban non-obscene sexual images or words
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in public in order to protect the sensibilities of either adults or children…”75 While cases like
Erzodnik and Cohen may suggest a greater legal openness to taboo language or publically
displayed nude images, Stone explains how this legal tolerance has not extended to all nonobscene actions, namely public nudity (although Justice White believed that based on Erzodnik,
public nudity could be constructed as a legal right.)76 The Court has argued that public nudity
can be outlawed because it constitutes a harm to public sensibilities.77 One explanation is that the
Court continues to be guided by moral conceptions of the good; bans on public nudity assume
that people should be clothed in public, and that the blow to autonomy is less important than
protecting the public from offense.78 This apparent contradiction (which is the subject of chapter
four) leaves one hungry for a legal principle that articulates when governments can restrict public
actions; in order to locate such a principle, we must first examine how different theorists have
outlined the limits of public autonomy.
B. Theoretical Approaches to Public Autonomy
Scholarly opinions on the legal limits of the private sphere fall into a binary: legal moralists
and liberals fundamentally disagree on whether governments have a right to regulate “immoral”
private actions. But with respect to the public sphere, the liberal position is split; while to
moralists, an action’s publicity does not alter its restrictability, the liberal position fractures into
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three different camps. The binary becomes a quadripartite spectrum, ranging from legal
moralists, who believe that an action’s immorality is sufficient to justify restricting it, to
permissive liberals, which, as the name suggests, are willing to permit all rational actions in
public.
As mentioned above, legal moralists like Stephen, Devlin, Bork, Kozell, and Gerald
Dworkin believe that governments can restrict all actions which the community finds immoral. 79
For moralists, the public-private distinction does not exist, given that unpopular actions can be
regulated regardless of where they take place.80 Most proponents of the harm principle would
deny the tenets of legal moralism—that an action’s immorality is sufficient to justify restricting
it. Liberal theorists presume a public-private distinction. The private sphere, for liberals, is a
space in which the individual has all but complete autonomy insofar as their actions do not hurt
others. But liberal scholars are divided as to what the limits of public autonomy should be,
particularly on how much offense can weigh in legal judgments. The first group of liberals, who
do not hold individual rights as the ultimate justification for personal autonomy (unlike the two
latter groups,) believe that as soon as an action enters the public sphere, the community’s offense
is sufficient to justify regulation; I refer to these scholars as “restrictive liberals,” given that they
easily defer to offense claims when adjudicating which actions can be restricted. The second
group of liberals, whom I call “interest-balancing liberals,” agree that certain actions can be
restricted to protect the community from offense, but draw clear limits on which actions qualify.
“Permissive liberals,” largely critical of the aforementioned groups, believe that restrictive and
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interest-balancing liberals place too much weight on public sentiment, given that the perceived
offensiveness of certain actions is often rooted in the way that said acts are constructed; they
consequently believe that all actions that are not irrational or intrinsically offensive, regardless of
what individuals think, ought to be permitted.
Restrictive liberals believe that as soon as an action enters the public sphere, the offense
that it causes is a restrictable harm; the offense is sufficient to warrant outlawing it. As
previously mentioned, John Stewart Mill, who coined the harm principle, believed that an
action’s immorality was not sufficient to justify its proscription. Nonetheless, Mill argued that as
soon as an action enters the public sphere, it immediately becomes the concern of society. While
Mill believes that private harmless actions are outside of the purview of social regulation, he
draws a clear distinction between the private and public spheres: “there are many acts which,
being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but
which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and, coming thus within the category of
offences against others, may rightly be prohibited.”81 Perhaps it the Harm Principle’s utilitarian
foundation, the belief that society’s welfare is the ultimate justification for individual autonomy,
that guides Mill’s reluctance to allow offensive actions in public.
H.L.A Hart draws a similar public-private distinction to Mill. While Hart argued
adamantly for the legalization of private same-sex sex on the grounds that it was harmless, he
adopts a wholly different perspective toward the public sphere. For instance, Hart argues in favor
of prohibitions on public homosexual sex. “Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not
immoral, but if it takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. Homosexual intercourse
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between consenting adults in private is immoral according to conventional morality, though not
an affront to public decency, though it would be both if it took place in public.”82 This belief that
public sex should be outlawed to protect public sensibilities is supported by philosophers like
Joel Feinberg (who I discuss later.) But what sets Hart’s perspective apart from Feinberg’s is that
while Feinberg makes an effort to balance offences in public, Hart seems to imply that any
actions that society finds offensive can always be banned from the public sphere. This is most
evident in his belief that societies have a right to prohibit bigamous marriages on the grounds
that such marriages might offend the majority of society; since marriage is a public act, a society
with a deep religious commitment to monogamous marriage has a right to prohibit bigamy not
because it is immoral but because it is offensive.83 Hart declares that immorality does not justify
illegality; but this conception of individual autonomy almost completely falters when the action
occurs in public. In the same way as Mill’s utilitarian focus undercuts his willingness to allow
for individual autonomy in public, the fact that Hart’s doctrine is not based on individual rights
limits his willingness to allow offensive actions in public. Hart, unlike Dworkin, did not
emphasize individual rights as a safeguard against government encroachment but rather believed
that all actions permitted by the rule of recognition ought to be allowed. While a society cannot
selectively restrict actions which the rule would otherwise allow for, the rule of recognition itself
can restrict individual liberty for the sake of the public good. So while the private sphere should
be free from state interference, governments can restrict public actions which the majority finds
offensive.
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Interest-balancing liberals, while admitting that certain actions can be restricted because
the public finds them offensive, formulate principles for determining which actions qualify as
“offenses.” More broadly, they attempt to balance the individual right to expression with others’
rights not to be offended. One of the most prominent scholars on public offense, Joel Feinberg,
holds this position. Feinberg (briefly mentioned in the previous section,) a disciple of Mill,
aimed to provide a legal rationale for determining which actions should be allowed in public.84
At the core of Feinberg’s legal philosophy lie two principles: the harm principle and (his
addition) the “offense principle.” Feinberg’s offense principle holds that “It is always a good
reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way
of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and
that it is probably a necessary means to that end.” 85 But Feinberg does not believe that all
perceived offenses should fall within the purview of the state. He lays out a complex formula for
determining what counts as an offense, which includes (among other criteria) how important the
action is to the individual and its social value; in such situations, the action’s offensiveness is
trumped by other considerations.86 In order to illustrate the need for his offense principle,
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Feinberg proposes a thought experiment: imagine riding on a bus where others are doing things
ranging from vomit-eating to masturbation to not wearing clothing; he argues that such
universally offensive acts must be illegal because they are offensive to others. But not all
potentially-offensive acts should be restricted. For instance, if interracial hand-holding triggers
offense, “we should be loath to permit their groundless repugnance to outweigh the innocence of
the offending conduct.”87 Through his offense principle, Feinberg aims to provide a more
tailored version of the harm principle as it relates to balancing individuals’ interests in the public
sphere.
Feinberg’s stance on public nudity exemplifies his understanding of public
restrictability.88 Feinberg concedes that the unrestricted harm principle may prevent the
government from proscribing public nudity on the grounds that it “does no one any harm, and the
state has no right to impose standards of dress or undress on private citizens.”89 Nonetheless,
according to Feinberg, that a naked body triggers almost universal embarrassment allows society
to regulate it. Feinberg’s offense principle goes beyond the unrestricted harm principle by
allowing the state to regulate non-harmful offensive actions in public.
Donald Vandeever reviews the debate between Feinberg and Michael Bayles (whom I
later discuss,) evaluating a number of criteria formulated to adjudicate which actions should be

5. Malice and spite. Offensive conduct is unreasonable to the extent that its impelling motive is spiteful or
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and widely known to be common, is less unreasonable than it would be in neighborhoods where it is rare and
unexpected.” Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 44.
87
Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 26.
88
Joel Feinberg “Hard Cases for the Harm Principle.” Social Philosophy, (Prentice-Hall, 1973.)
89
Ibid, 44.

35

permitted in public.90 After evaluating a number of principles laid out by both Feinberg and
Bayles, Vandeever rejects Feinberg’s “standard of universality” (a principle proposed in
Feinberg’s earlier works, which Feinberg later rejects) and his formulated (based on Bayles)
“standard of reasonableness,” where an action’s restrictability is determined by the rationality of
the person performing the action. He does accept a number of standards, however; these include
the (self-explanatory) “standard of permissiveness toward conscientious offenders,” the
“standard of reasonable restraint” (whether individuals can avoid the action,) and the “standard
of reasonable avoidability” (which weighs whether the action being done in public can be done
elsewhere.)
Meital Pinto also contends that certain actions may be restricted if they offend others.
Unlike the first group (all public offenses can be limited,) however, Pinto does not suggest that
an action being offensive for a group of people is sufficient to justify restricting it.91 Pinto,
focusing on group rights, devises a criteria for when a group’s offense can justify restriction; she
calls this principle the “vulnerable cultural identity principle.” Under this principle, which aims
to “avoid the problems of legal moralism,” offensive actions should be prohibited when they
threaten the cultural integrity of a vulnerable group; the more vulnerable a group’s culture is, the
greater its claim to protection from offense. For instance, France’s ban on the burka in public
spaces would fail the test, because it allows a majority to sanction the culturally-significant
actions of a vulnerable minority. Conversely, in “minority against majority” cases, such as the
case of the 2005 Danish controversial cartoon drawing of Mohammed, “members of the minority
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possess a vulnerable cultural identity, thus their claim from integrity of cultural identity is
culturally strong.”92 While Pinto, unlike Feinberg and Vandeever, focuses on offenses directed at
particular groups, she nonetheless agrees that offenses, whether morally-based or not, must
follow some criteria which weighs the interests of the parties involved.
Permissive liberals dissect the moral undertones that guide what is considered an
“offense,” contending that under liberal doctrine, offenses based on morality cannot guide which
actions are restricted. Mostly critiquing Feinberg, these theorists deny that the beliefs or interests
of the public are a suitable guide for determining which actions count as offensive.
Larry Alexander criticizes Feinberg’s offense principle, arguing that it inevitably
collapses into legal moralism.93 Feinberg claims that offensive conduct may not be criminalized
if the value of expressiveness (for the person committing the offense) is greater than the offense
it causes to others. Alexander believes, however, that such value judgments presume that the
majority’s moral convictions supersede individual interests; by weighing interests, Feinberg
accepts the illiberal premise that the majority’s desires can outweigh an individual’s right to selfexpression. Alexander argues that
Even if we deem all correct norms of personal behavior to be norms of correct social
behavior, we have no legitimate interest in enforcing these norms against violators. On a
desert island we would have many things, but we would not have the comfort of knowing
that others, on their desert islands, were living according to norms and ideals we hold.94
Alexander criticizes Feinberg’s delineation of which actions can be restricted, suggesting that
liberal doctrine does not permit value-judgments or legal decisions based on private interests.
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Michael Bayles, who argues that only unreasonable public actions can be regulated,
draws a narrower critique.95 He accepts the offense principle but argues that Feinberg places too
much weight on the nature of the offense caused rather than on the reasonableness of the offense
in question. Specifically, he refutes Feinberg’s assertion that public nudity ought to be prohibited
because of the feeling of shame that it causes others; Feinberg claims that the the offense caused
by “a nude person entering a public bus” may be dictated by the amount of nudists present on the
bus. The issue with this is that in arguing that the beliefs of the riders dictate whether nudity is
offensive, Feinberg admits that the majority’s sentiment may justify restricting otherwisereasonable actions. For Bayles, public nudity is not unreasonable for “It might help people
overcome psychological neuroses about sex.” 96 The interests of the majority should not dictate
which offensive actions should be prohibited; outside of unreasonable actions, offense does not
justify curbing autonomy.
Anthony Ellis also critiques Feinberg’s understanding of which public actions can be
outlawed, arguing that Feinberg allows public morality to guide regulations.97 Discussing what
qualifies as an offense, Ellis argues that “feelings, however un- pleasant, which are the
expression of a moral view, cannot so count either. If they were allowed to, then, again, the
Harm Condition would have no force at all; it would allow the sorts of law which it was centrally
intended to exclude.”98 For Ellis, Feinberg’s contention that public nudity and sex can be
restricted contains ingrained normative judgments, which would proscribe certain actions merely
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because they are taboo. Ellis separates Feinberg’s offenses into two categories: 1. those that are
repulsive in themselves (such as vomit-eating and public defecating) and 2. Those that are
repulsive because they contravene norms of accepted behavior (public sex and public nudity.)
Ellis admits that the first may reasonably be prohibited under a liberal concept of law, seeing as
they “are intrinsically unpleasant to observe, and that is why the standard which prohibits it has
grown up”; this standard resembles Bayles’ “reasonableness” standard (which he adopts from
Feinberg.) In contrast, public nudity and public sex are illegal merely because of the social
understanding that people ought to wear clothes and not display affection in certain places.
Feinberg justifies prohibitions on public indecency on the grounds that they cause shame and
embarrassment to those who observe them, even though not all such actions should be illegal.
Ellis attributes this inconsistency to the cultural taboo placed on sex and the body.
Why single out the embarrassment caused by indecency? There is no reason to think it
more widespread or more intense, or easier to legislate against. In my view, the reason is
that our attitude to indecency has a pronouncedly moral dimension, and that seduces us
into thinking that the embarrassment it causes is of some special significance. Indeed,
perhaps from some points of view it is. But from the point of view of the liberal
conception of the law it cannot be. It is merely embarrassment.99
Ellis argues that under liberal doctrine, actions which cause offense merely because society has
constructed them as such cannot be prohibited. If one accepts Ellis’ criticism, perhaps Feinberg’s
inability or unwillingness to separate his taught cultural biases reveals an element of moralism
present in his philosophy.
While the theoretical position on private autonomy placed liberals and legal moralists in
direct opposition, the issue of mandatory privacy restrictions turns the binary debate into a
spectrum. Restrictive liberals, who’s justification for liberalism is not rooted in individual rights,
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find themselves holding a similar position to moralists: all offensive public actions can be
proscribed (albeit for different reasons.) Nonetheless, the latter two groups, who use individual
rights to justify liberalism, argue that at least some offensive actions cannot be restricted in
public. Interest-balancing liberals deny that all public offensive actions can be restricted but
nonetheless allow restrictions to be based on socially-constructed notions of offense; permissive
liberals, in contrast, argue that a behavior must be intrinsically offensive or unreasonable
(outside of public perception) if it is to be restricted. While scholars’ justification for liberalism
does not define their position on the legal limits of public autonomy, their foundation may
nonetheless impact their understanding of which actions can be prohibited in public; I return to
this issue in Chapter Three.
IV. Question, Case Study, and Chapter Progression
The aforementioned debate triggers questions about how publicness impacts legality. If
we accept that governments can proscribe certain public actions in order to prevent offense, how
do we decide which actions can be restricted? For example, if public nudity can be restricted
because the sight of it is offensive, should interracial hand-holding in 19th Century Alabama
(which would certainly have been universally offensive) also have been illegal?100 Of course,
according to Feinberg, the hand-holding should have been permitted because the expressive
value outweighed the offense; but such a judgment might be shaped by the normative belief that
interracial affection is more expressive than it is offensive. Weighing these various interests
raises questions about where the burden of restriction should lie: when do individuals have to
alter their behavior and when does the public need to be more open-minded? My question for
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this thesis is as follows: How should the public-private distinction, particularly with respect to
the “public sphere,” impact which actions can be proscribed?
As Geoffrey Stone explains, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is far
more in line with the liberal harm principle (in the private sphere) than with legal moralism;
Hart’s philosophy has won.101 Accordingly, I seek to explore the limits of public autonomy under
liberal theory and Constitutional precedent respectively. I address this issue in two cumulative
parts. The first part of the argument concerns the former and will be explored in the third
chapter: I ask when offense is a valid reason for restricting autonomy in the public sphere under
liberal doctrine. After answering this question, we must, in the chapter which follows, see
whether U.S law (the parameters of which are delineated by the Constitution) adheres to liberal
doctrine: I ask whether the current interpretation of the United States Constitution adheres to
liberal doctrine (with respect to the public sphere). Answering these questions will provide a
fuller picture of the relationship between liberal theory, the public sphere, and the Constitution.
In my final chapter I use these answers to assess liberal theorists’ assumptions about power,
autonomy, and the role of law.
In order to examine such wide-sweeping questions, it is necessary to choose a case which
reveals the limits of offense. Since I focus on the legality of non-harmful offensive acts, the
behavior to be examined must be “offensive” solely because of others’ reactions to it; the action
performed must not be intrinsically offensive, and the feeling of offense that others feel must be
the product of a socially-taught morality.
Feinberg’s public nudity example perfectly fits the criteria.102 Feinberg explains that

101

Stone, Sex and the Constitution, 342.
Public nudity refers to being unclothed in public for its own sake. The purpose of this behavior is not to sexually
arouse or sexually harass the public; individuals go about their normal business without covering their bodies. It also
102

41

public nudity --and by this I refer to being unclothed for its own sake (not with the intent of
provoking or harassing others)-- is only harmful because of the offense it causes. If Feinberg is
correct, then the question of whether public nudity can be prohibited would bring out fierce
debate between the liberal theorists discussed in this chapter. Restrictive liberals might argue that
it is irrelevant whether nudity is constructed, since social disapproval is sufficient to outlaw
actions in the public sphere. For interest-balancing liberals, the offense that public nudity causes
would have to be weighed against the individual’s right to autonomy. For permissive liberals,
law cannot enforce social constructs, and consequently, governments cannot outlaw public
nudity. Throughout this thesis, I use the case of public nudity to lead the reader toward larger
questions about individual freedom in the public sphere.
This thesis proceeds accordingly: the second chapter uses a Foucauldian account of
power to explain how the body (in public) is constructed as taboo (as nude.) In exploring how
nudity is constructed, I encounter an account of power which contradicts liberal theorists’ focus
on (negative) law. This helps contextualize the liberal account of power adopted in Chapters
Three and Four, which respectively address the limits of public autonomy under liberal theory
and the U.S Constitutional law (I explore this through the example of public nudity.) In the fifth
chapter, I review the previous two chapters’ findings, addressing the tension between liberals’
assumptions about power and the Foucauldian discourse which constructs the body. Charting the
positions of many critics of liberalism, I raise broader questions about the “liberal conception of
law” and the public-private distinction altogether.
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2: Constructing and Regulating the Body
The previous chapter looked at the debate over the limits of the public sphere,
particularly between liberal theorists. Whereas restrictive liberals believe that actions which the
majority finds offensive can always be restricted in public, interest-balancing liberals attempt to
balance individual expression with public offense. For permissive liberals, the fact that the
majority of society finds an action offensive is irrelevant, given that the majority’s opinion
should not be a factor in determining legality. We also reviewed the Supreme Court’s current
position with regards to liberalism and its application in the public sphere. Whereas in the private
sphere, the Court offense.1
To restrictive liberals, who believe that an action’s offensiveness is sufficient to justify
regulating it in public, it may be irrelevant whether nudity is what Anthony Ellis calls
“intrinsically offensive.”2 For interest-balancing liberals, the fact that nudity is not intrinsically
offensive should be weighed against the public’s interest and adjudicated according to a
formulated principle. But if nudity is merely offensive because it “contravenes some
accepted…standard of appropriate behavior,” permissive liberals would argue that governments
have no right to legally prohibit it.3
The question of whether and when public nudity can be proscribed speaks to the larger
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question of whether actions can be prohibited (in public) based on the offense that they cause.
Consequently, public nudity is a fitting example through which to explore larger questions of the
legal limits of the public sphere. To fully understand public nudity restrictions, we must examine
how nudity is constructed and the relationship between this construct and the laws prohibiting it.
This sets the stage for a theoretical and constitutional assessment of public nudity’s proscription
under liberal doctrine and, ultimately, an assessment of liberal doctrine altogether. This chapter
is divided into two sections (the second of which is composed of two sub-sections): the first
section breaks down the taboos surrounding exposure using sociological literature on the body.
The second section looks at the body through a Foucauldian lens, examining how the body is
constructed as nude; I argue that the nudity’s legal circumscription to the private sphere stems
from and reinforces the social discourse that constructs it as such it. The Foucauldian approach to
power described in this chapter goes beyond that of liberal theorists discussed in the previous
chapter; understanding the operations of Foucauldian power sheds a new light on the relationship
between power, the body, and the law.
I. The Naked/Nude Body
This section explores the nature of nudity and the “body taboo” associated with it; I
argue, as Howard Warren does, that nudity, as opposed to nakedness, is a constructed state
stemming from the body taboo.4 I use sociological literature on the body to better understand
how the unclothed body is constructed in western society. By understanding the role of cultural
perceptions in constructing nudity, one can better see the cultural foundations of legal place
restrictions surrounding it.
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Psychologist Howard Warren discusses the “instinct to cover one’s body, which exists
across most cultures.”5 He understands why modern society might wear clothing as protection
from the elements but questions its necessity in situations where it may be constraining
(activities like sunbathing, swimming or athletics); this drive to wear clothing when not
necessary stems from what he calls “the body taboo.” This taboo is premised on the idea that to
seeing a member of the opposite sex without clothing is necessarily sexual. He explores two
fundamental questions: “1) Is the traditional taboo of the human body an inherent factor in
human nature?” and “2) Is social exposure of the body indecent or obscene, as the general
opinion and laws of most civilized lands insist?”6 In visiting a nudist camp in Denmark, Warren
found that “the body taboo sheds quite easily there, and that there exists a context in which the
exposure of one’s genitals is not lewd. Consequently, Warren concludes, “The most striking
phenomenon in the life at a nudist park is that this taboo disappears almost at once, and without
any detrimental effect to one's world-view or morals. One quickly realizes that the human body
is not indecent.”7 Warren highlights how the body it not intrinsically indecent, it is constructed
as such. Warren subsequently calls for society to abandon clothing, thus working to stripping the
body of its nude construction.
Phillip Garr-Gomm differentiates nakedness from nudity. Nudity refers to being
unclothed for the purpose of being watched; someone is nude if they are unclothed for a protest,
a performance, or to convey an erotic message. Nakedness, in contrast, refers to being unclothed
for its own sake: one is naked when in the bathroom, during intimate relations or when one is
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born; in places where it is acceptable, individuals can even be naked when sunbathing in public
parks.8 Perhaps John Berger put it best when he claimed “To be naked is to be oneself. To be
nude is to be seen by others and yet not recognized for oneself. A naked body has to be seen as
an object in order to become nude.”9 The naked-nude dichotomy hints at the various meanings
that can be assigned to the same state of undress. In situations where one is expected to be
unclothed, such as when one is showering in a locker room or having sex, one is merely naked;
but the same person in the same state of undress would be nude if they walked into a place where
being undressed is not expected. Nudity as such is a relative state, which hinges more on social
perception than one’s absolute state of dress.
The nude-naked distinction is a prominent theme of this chapter, and it is consequently important
to explain how I use these terms throughout. I use the term nude insofar as their body is
perceived as indecent, a state associated with the “body taboo.”10 The term “public nudity” is thus
fitting, given that social taboos governing where and when individuals can be unclothed make
the body nude in the public sphere. Similarly, I refer to nudist communities as such because, as I
argue in Section Two, they continue to be subject to social regulation.11 Understanding the
naked-nude distinction throughout this chapter is crucial if one is to comprehend how the former
is constructed and subsequently legally regulated.
Ruth Barcan argues that nudity “exists only in recognition by others,”12 believing that “it
is best defined as a psychological trait—a state of feeling exposed…”13 In contrast, she sees
nakedness as a symbol of “the raw human being, the human being outside of culture, time, and
artifice.”14 Barcan takes the idea of the unclothed body beyond the traditional dichotomy of dress

8

Philip Carr-Gomm, A Brief History of Nakedness (London: Reaktion Books, 2013), 7.
John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2008). 9.
10
Warren, “Social Nudity and the Body Taboo.”
11
While Berger and Carr-Gomm’s naked-nude distinction plays a key role in this chapter, it is not universal in
nudist scholarship, and a number of the writers that I quote conflate the two terms. When a writer uses both the
terms nakedness and nudity, I will explain their use of the terms in a footnote.
12
Ruth Barcan. Nudity: A Cultural Anatomy (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 23.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, 72.
9

46

(clothed) and undress (nude), arguing that one can be nude without actually being completely
unclothed; nudity, for Barcan, depends more on the way that one’s state of dress is constructed
than on the amount of clothing worn.15 For instance, Barcan notes how it is normal for a woman
to wear a revealing bikini top at the beach or, even in public. Yet wearing a bra, even if less
revealing, is seen as indecent, making a woman nude.16 Similarly, Barcan explains how men may
be unclothed in each other’s presence without stigma (and vice versa), but those men become
nude (their unclothed bodies would become taboo) if women are present in said changing room.
The aforementioned examples portray nudity as a state primarily shaped by socially constructed
notions of decency and indecency, which hinge on where one can be unclothed.
This idea that nudity does not refer to an intrinsically unacceptable physical state—that it
exists in relation to social understandings of decency (it is socially constructed)—is also made
evident by the fact that “nudity” can, in different time periods, refer to different physical states.
Carr-Gomm explains how “In the Victorian age, for a woman to exhibit a naked ankle was
considered immodest, while today on most beaches it is considered acceptable to sunbathe totally
naked apart from the slightest bikini…”17 In Carr-Gomm’s example, the bare ankle was once
considered indecent; but today, a woman wearing a bikini is merely considered naked (as
opposed to nude).18 The fact that the definition of nudity has shifted over time reveals that nudity
is more about the way that one’s state of dress is constructed by society rather than the amount of
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clothing worn; just like the female breast can be sexual today, so was the ankle at one point. The
fact that nudity’s definition can change over time does not in itself prove that the unclothed body
is intrinsically naked, but it does show that nudity depends more on how one is perceived than on
one’s absolute degree of exposure.
Anne Hollander also appeals to history as a means to break down the idea that nudity
refers to an objective physical state. Hollander too holds that nudity is circumstantial—nudity
exists in contrast to clothedness. So much so, in fact, that “At any time, the unadorned self has
more kinship with its own usual dressed aspect than it has with any undressed human selves in
other times and places, who have learned a different visual sense of the clothed body.”19 This
statement is bold not least because it asserts that what society considers nude does not depend on
the absolute amount of clothing worn. Rather, it stems from how an individual’s unclothed or
semi-clothed body is conceived by those around them. Perhaps what is most remarkable is the
magnitude of Hollander’s assertion: states of undress in different time periods have almost
nothing in common, given that nudity is dependent on circumstance.
The aforementioned scholars differ both in their focus and in their understanding of nudity’s
relationship to the unclothed body. While some see nudity as a feeling of shame that exists
irrespective of clothing itself, others focus on the dichotomy between dress (where the body
taboo exists) and undress (where the body taboo fades); others cite changing understandings of
nudity over time as evidence that taboos on exposure are circumstantial. Despite their differing
foci, all agree that the (unclothed) body is not intrinsically sexual or indecent; nakedness is, as
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Carr-Gomm puts it, “the raw,” but nudity stems from social taboos.20 Understanding that the
body (unlike its cousin: the nude body) is, at core, naked is crucial if we are to comprehend how
it is constructed, as well as the relationship between such a construct and public nudity statutes.
The next section focuses on the discursive relationship between nudity and the laws which
prohibit it in certain spaces.
II. Foucauldian Regulation: Constructing the Body
If we accept Barcan’s and Warren’s argument that the unclothed body is not intrinsically
taboo, why is it that the body is constructed as nude? This section uses a Foucauldian account of
modern power to show how the naked body is constructed as such. Foucault not only explains
the larger system of regulation through which nudity develops, his understanding of power helps
explain how discourse regulating the body shapes and is reinforced by laws prohibiting it.
This section is broken up into two sub-sections, which guide the reader through
Foucault’s understanding of regulation, law, and resistance, particularly with respect to the body.
Sub-Section A charts Foucault’s analytics of modern power, explaining how discourse constructs
the body; I also explain the relationship between modern power and law. Sub-Section B provides
a history of nudist groups and movements, raising larger questions the possibility of resistance to
discursive norms. The Foucauldian analytics of body regulation developed in this section clashes
with the focus of liberal theorists discussed in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, Foucault’s
account of how the body is constructed is relevant to the intra-liberal public autonomy debate,
which revolves around whether actions constructed as offensive can be outlawed on such a basis.
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The two contrasting accounts of power do, however, raise larger questions about power,
autonomy, and the role of law, which I explore later in this thesis.
A. Foucault: Regulation, the Body, and Law
Foucault’s understanding of power speaks to the larger system of body regulation which
creates nudity. Foucault argues that power regulates actions through a constructed knowledge.21
Modern power, which he also refers to as “bio-power” (power over life,) is not top-down but
horizontal, and is based primarily on the internalization of discipline rather than adherence to
law.22 Foucault writes that “Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something
that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the
inter-play of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.”23 Modern power is not an external entity that
permits or represses; rather, is the fabric of society itself and structures the individuals and their
conception of the world.
Power does not operate exclusively through explicit prohibition but rather through
“discourse,” which forms knowledge and truth. Chris Weedon writes that “discourses, in
Foucault’s work, are ways of constituting knowledge, together with social practices, forms of
subjectivity and power relations which inhere such knowledges and the relations between
them.”24 Foucault writes that “There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain
economy of discourses of truth which operate through and on the basis of this association. We
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are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except
through the production of truth.”25 Foucault’s understanding of truth encapsulates his account of
how power operates: power does not either permit or deny; it does not work by externally
suppressing desire. Rather, it constructs those desires, the individual, and their knowledge of the
world.
Unlike ancient power, which was essentially negative (Foucault uses the metaphor of
“power of the king” over life and death,) power regulates life itself.26 And bio-power is not
primarily exercised through legal prohibitions. Foucault emphasizes the need to distance
ourselves from a “juridico-discursive” theory of power, which assumes power is wielded by a
sovereign or a legal system.
The aim of the inquiries that will follow is to move less toward a "theory'' of power than
toward an "analytics" of power… However, it seems to me that this analytics can be
constituted only if it frees itself completely from a certain representation of power that I
would term-it will be seen later why- "juridico-discursive." It is this conception that
governs both the thematics of repression and the theory of the law as constitutive of
desire.27
The juridico-discursive model sees power’s effects as binary: it either prohibits or restricts. This
account of law is “…centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of
taboos. All the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an
effect of obedience.”28 For Foucault, however, the juridico-discursive account of law
mischaracterizes how power operates. Seeing power as a “theory” enforces the juridico-
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discursive notion that power is tangible—that it operates on the individual. But power is
positive; it constructs the individual themselves. In this sense, there is no identifiable entity
which is “power” but rather a field of power relations, which work in conjunction with law to
shape desire and lack thereof. Liberal theorists, by portraying law as the main vehicle of
regulation, adopt the “juridico-discursive” theory of power that Foucault argues against. This
seeming tension between two accounts of power raises questions about the liberal understanding
of the public sphere, which I address in later chapters.
How the body is constructed is central to Foucault’s analysis. Foucault explains that power
constructs how individuals make sense of their bodies, particularly with regard to sex and
sexuality. Weedon explains that “[For Foucault,] sex does not exist outside of its realization in
discourses of sexuality”; sex has no intrinsic meaning. In History of Sexuality vol. 1, Foucault
argues that sexuality, that is how one understands sexual attraction and orientation, are wrapped
up in a discourse that regulates sex. But it is not that sexuality gives meaning to a real sexual
desire, sex itself is constructed. Foucault concludes that only bodies and pleasures exist outside
of the realm of power; when one strips sex and sexuality of their construction, one finds only the
physical body and the feeling of sexual pleasure.29 Foucault’s belief in a core, unconstructed
body is one of the building blocks for his analytics of sexual regulation. The body, at core, is
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absent of significance. But while the body exists outside of discourses of sex and sexuality, its
meaning, in modern society, is ascribed by power.30
And this account of sex and sexuality explains how the naked body is constructed as nude:
as sexual and indecent. Foucault alludes that nudity is a product of power in the introduction to
History of Sexuality, where he describes the more relaxed regulation of sex and the body prior to
the 18th century.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a certain frankness was still common, it
would seem. Sexual practices had little need of secrecy; words were said without undue
reticence, and things were done without too much concealment; one had a tolerant
familiarity with the elicit… it was a period where bodies made a display of themselves.31
Foucault contrasts this with the increased regulation of sex and the body in modern times. By
grouping body regulations along with regulations of sex and sexuality, Foucault asserts that the
way in which individuals make sense of their unclothed bodies is a social construct; discourse
constructs the body as nude.32 For Foucault, the body is not inherently sexual. Rather, it is tied
up in discourses of bodily regulation (associated with sex and sexuality) and constructed as such.
By grouping the open display of the body with the more permissive understanding of sex
in pre-modern times, Foucault explains that discourse regulates how we see and use our bodies,
whether sexually or with respect to dress. Just like sex is codified, so too is the display of sexual
organs themselves. The idea that individuals wish to be unclothed for the sake of comfort is
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overruled by the widespread belief that being unclothed in front of others is necessarily sexual.
The fact that taboos on the unclothed body have come to regulate more than just sexuality is also
argued by Brett Lunceford, who explains that “taboos on nakedness do more than reign in
sexuality; controls on nakedness function as controls on the body itself—how one can
appropriately use one’s own body.”33 Foucault’s understanding of sex and sexuality speaks to
how the body is constructed in modern society. How we understand the use of the body sexually
parallels how we comprehend the display of our bodies; power constructs how we understand
our bodies and the act of sex itself. While the unclothed body is, at core, naked, it is constructed
as nude; a discourse of sex and sexuality erects a set of norms around when it is acceptable to be
unclothed. What falls on the acceptable side of the line, we term naked; what is unacceptable,
and often conceived of as “sexual and indecent,” we call nude. To reiterate, the body taboo is not
intrinsic to the publically displayed body, the body is ascribed such an association.
If nudity is constructed, what is the relationship between this body discourse and law?
While Foucault repudiates liberal theorists’ exclusive emphasis on juridico-discursive power, that
is, power that operates primarily through negative law, he does not deny that law can play a
positive regulatory role. Additionally, the unclothed body’s construction as nude forms the basis
for mandatory privacy restrictions on “public nudity,” which is highly relevant to the intra-liberal
public autonomy debate charted in Chapter One. On one hand, laws proscribing the unclothed
body emulate from how nudity is constructed. Simultaneously, such laws reinforce how the body
is constructed.
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Laws that circumscribe the the unclothed body stem from its construction as nude. Given
how the body is constructed, individuals are made to feel offended if others are unclothed in the
wrong place. This social construction is subsequently enforced at the level of law in the same
way as taboos against homosexuality influenced laws prohibiting same-sex sex; the body is
forced to be kept private. Despite not necessarily agreeing that power flows exclusively from
law, Foucault’s account of body construction reveals how the public sphere becomes a place
where the unclothed body is considered indecent; it is a place where the body is nude as opposed
to naked. This construct guides individuals’ understanding of which actions ought to be allowed
in public, leading public nudity to be outlawed. This position is similar to Anthony Ellis, a
permissive liberal who argues that public nudity and public sex are only illegal by virtue of the
fact that they are culturally unacceptable.34
But laws circumscribing the body also create and reinforce the very idea of “public
nudity.” Foucault argues against the focus on negative law held by liberal theorists. But he
clarifies that law is not irrelevant to regulating behavior, he merely argues that it plays an
alternate role.
I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of
justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and
that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses
…whose functions are for the most part regulatory.35
Foucault claims that law’s new function, to regulate, enforces norms at the social level. Isaak
Dore explains that (for Foucault,) law “is not always negative but can be productive” in
instituting norms of behavior.” With regard to the body, laws regulating where one can be
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unclothed officially classify “being unclothed in public” into “public nudity,” officiating and
consequently legitimizing the body’s social classification. To be clear, it is not that the body is
regulated through being illegal; rather, law entrenches normative constructions of the body and
where/how it can manifest itself. Consequently, not only does the fear of legal reprisal prevent
individuals from going about unclothed in public, potentially working to de-stigmatize the body,
but the very idea that individuals cannot legally be unclothed in public works to construct such
actions as taboo. Law’s relationship to the unclothed body is thus cyclical: law not only reflects
the way that the body is constructed, it simultaneously reinforces the construct altogether.
To be concise, Foucault claims that the juridico-discursive understanding of law fails to
capture the entirety of regulation. As a result, he might dispute liberals such as Ellis’ focus on
undoing regulation at the level of law. This seeming tension raises questions over whether
Foucault’s account of law, which explains how nudity is constructed, can be compatible with
liberal theorists’ focus on public nudity’s legal proscription as the primary method of body
regulation. I return to this question later in this thesis, attempting to understand whether these
two conflicting accounts of law can coexist and how we can understand law and the body in light
of this clash.
B. Rebelling Against the Body Taboo
The compilation of social norms through which power operates construct and reinforce
the naked body as nude. But a number of groups have attempted to rebel against such the body
taboo (placed on nudity); in order to fully comprehend the reach of power, it is necessary to
briefly explore the history of nudist movements, with a particular focus on how their attempts to
undermine the body taboo may simultaneously reinforce the systems of power that regulate
56

them.36 Simultaneously, however, it is important to keep in mind the potential starting points for
“reverse discourse” that these groups, by raising the issue of the body taboo, may have opened
up.
Unlike the juridico-discursive conception of power, which holds that power can be
resisted through rebellion and defiance, Foucault claims that power is similarly embedded in
resistance. Foucault explains that “there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case:
resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary,
concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial;
by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.”37 Even if individuals
attempt to rebel against the system of regulation, power is nonetheless present in the way that
those individuals make sense of that resistance. Despite believing that they have cast off power’s
hold, individuals are subject to it in new ways.
Various individuals have attempted to dismantle the body taboo in American society.38
Carr-Gomm discusses the beginning of the American nudist movement in the late 1800’s. He
discusses how poets Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman saw the value in nakedness, the
latter living “the simple life” on a country estate free of clothing. These writers’ work inspired a
string of utopian communities in New England, many of which experimented with nudity. These
groups are believed to be the first nudist communities in the U.S, one of their principles being
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that persons should have the option of whether to clothe their own bodies. Henry David Thoreau
best sums up his ideas on nudity in Journals, when he writes “What a singular fact for an angel
visitant to this earth to carry back in his notebook, that men were forbidden to expose their
bodies under the severest penalties!”39 These late 1800’s writers may not have succeeded in
securing body freedom as a right, but they did demonstrate that living without clothing was a
possibility. By going about unclothed, individuals such as Whitman sought to unravel the body
taboo.
It was not until the 1930’s, however, that “nudism” became a movement. The nudist
movement emerged in the midst of economic depression and anxiety about the dominant social
structure; nudism was part of a larger countercultural call for humans to return to their roots and
build a better society. In this sense, nakedness was a way to “live the simple life.” The movement
started in Germany, when Richard Ungewitter published Nakedness in 1905.40 In the book,
Ungewitter “extolled the health benefits of nudism and proposed a vision of an ideal society in
which men and women could enjoy each other’s company in the nude, while gymnasia trained
their children in physical and moral development similarly free of clothing.”41 Ungewitter’s book
became a bestseller and, for it, he is often considered the “father of nudism.”42
The nudist movement’s popularity in Germany set the stage for its spread to the United
States by German immigrants in the early 1930’s; much like their predecessors in the late 1800’s,
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nudist communities in the 1930’s represented radical a drive to create a better society. CarrGomm describes how
these groups were also breeding-grounds of progressive thinking that attracted socialists,
liberals, pacifists, Marxists and many Jews. The ideas of the reform movements that were
based on a ‘return to nature’ and on natural health methods were carried to the United
States, particularly California, by some of the thousands of German immigrants, many of
whom were Jewish, who arrived in America before the Second World War. They
promoted vegetarianism, raw food diets and nudism, and became prototypal hippies – a
term first used in the 1930s.”43
Nudist movements were tied to a larger drive to redefine the norms by which Americans lived.44
These movements echoed Thoreau and Whitman’s ideas of “returning to nature” in the midst of
a rapidly urbanizing and industrial society.45 The movement, which emphasized the health and
hygienic benefits of exposing the body, inspired many “health enthusiasts, sex reformers, and
immigrants to organize and join nudist groups across the United States.”46 These nudists,
importantly, “sought to redefine the naked body as healthy and rejected the notion of the body as
a source of shame.”47
But nudist communities occupied a status on the periphery of society, and were often the
targets of police raids.48 Amidst fears of these raids, and bad publicity in general, a number of
nudist clubs made a concerted effort to distance themselves from the sexual stigma associated
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with nudity. Sociologist Martin Weinberg explains how early nudist camps constructed a set of
moral rules and social norms surrounding the unclothed body, the most important of which was
the understanding that nudity and sex were unrelated. To secure that individuals were committed
to these rules, many of them excluded single males, “prohibited drinking alcoholic beverages,
discouraged unnecessary body contact, nude dancing, deliberate staring, and sexual jokes.”49
This restrictive atmosphere was a way for nudist communities to distance themselves from their
sexual reputation and ensure that new members remained committed to the movement’s
principles.50
The aforementioned communities may have attempted to cast off the body taboo—to
merely be naked. And while one might argue that they succeeded in calling attention to nudity as
a construct, these communities reinforced nudity’s status as a peripheral private activity. In the
same way as (according to Foucault,) homosexual liberation movements entrench the identity
categories that marginalize those individuals, nudist communities perpetuated the idea that
recreational nudity was something practiced by a specific group of people outside the
mainstream;51 this also enforced the idea that the proper place to be unclothed, if one was a
nudist, was in private. Likewise, establishing overly prudish codes of conduct may have been
necessary in order to protect the movement from associations with sex, but in doing this, nudists
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treated nude recreation as something precarious, which required social norms to be set up to
protect those who wanted to be nude. Such regulations prevented nude individuals from acting as
they regularly would, which prevented nudity from becoming nakedness.
The nudist movement took a turn in the 1960’s, as numerous countercultural movements
began to take force. Much like their predecessors, these movements sought a radical
transformation in the social structure; an increased emphasis on individual freedom and a disdain
for conforming to traditional values set the stage for attempts to undermine the body taboo and
promoting greater cultural openness toward sex and the body. Perhaps John Lennon best
captured the movement’s attitude toward the body when he declared that
The main hang-up in the world today is hypocrisy and insecurity. If people can’t face up
to the fact of other people being naked, or whatever they want to do, then we’re never
going to get anywhere. People have got to become aware that it’s none of their business
and that being nude is not obscene. Being ourselves is what’s important. If everyone
practised being themselves instead of pretending to be what they aren’t, there would be
peace.52
But unlike previous nudist movements, which distanced themselves from sex, many of the young
men and women of the counterculture movement felt alienated by the “secrecy, shame, and
voluntary seclusion that defined organized nudism in the United States.”53 Instead, they saw
removing taboos on the unclothed body as part of a single effort to remove cultural stigmas on
sex and sexuality, fostering a more open community. It seems that nudist movements are often
part of a radical counter-cultural effort to change society. In this sense, defying the body taboo
might be seen as a rebellion against discourse itself, including the idea that society should tell an
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individual how to live their life or whether to dress. But as we have and will continue to see,
power itself limits people’s ability to defy its hold.
The 1960’s also saw the beginning of the “free beach movement,” which called for parts
of public land to be zoned off for nude sunbathing. Jefferson Poland, a San Francisco activist,
founded an organization known as the League for Sexual Freedom, which protested the limits of
sexual expression in the United States and defended “marginal sexualities.”54 Pollard believed
that allowing nudity on public beaches was a way to de-stigmatize the body and promote sexual
freedom; he sent letters to a number of nudist organizations calling for a nude “wade in” protest
at Aquatic Park beach in San Francisco.55 But while some nudist communities were receptive to
Poland’s idea, more conservative ones feared that “public demonstrations would undermine the
respectable character of the movement.”56 The wade-in, and the larger movement it inspired, was
influential in initiating the move toward calls for increased spaces for public nudity. A number of
nudists and California beachgoers began going to secluded beach areas (in California) in order to
socialize in the nude; unlike nudist communities, nude beaches lacked both the tight sexual
regulations and the pressure to take off one’s clothes. Poland wrote that nude beach patrons
disliked “the social cliques, racial barriers, and emotional blocks often found in nudist parks” and
saw “free beaches” as an alternative.57 These spaces also became a place for gays and lesbians to
socialize in the nude outside of urban bathhouses.58

54

The League for Sexual Freedom’s board included notable counter-culture figures like Allen Ginsburg and Peter
Orlovsky.
55
Jefferson Poland and Sam Sloan. “Picketing for Sex.” Sex Marchers, (Ishi Press International, 2006); Hoffman,
Naked, 217-219.
56
Poland and Sloan, ibid.
57
Poland, “Committee for Free Beaches,” 84-85. As cited by Hoffman, Naked, ibid.
58
Hoffman, Naked, 217-219.

62

Even though this movement was more open to nudity in public, it still reinforced the idea
that the body was indecent, and belonged outside the cultural mainstream. First of all, activists
such as Poland advocated for designated sectioned-off areas for nude recreation; even if these
areas were on public land, the fact that they pushed for designated special areas for nudity
entrenched the idea that the open display of the body belongs only belongs in specific spaces.
Moreover, the fact that these groups associated nudity with sex further reinforced the myth that
the unclothed body is intrinsically sexual—a conflation that underlies its cultural and legal
proscription. While 1960’s sexual freedom activists were right that the body was not indecent,
the fact that they saw nude recreation as part of a larger move toward eliminating sexual taboos
reveals the embeddedness of power in language: they continued to see nudity and sex as
intertwined. Activists like Poland reinforced nudity’s association with sex in an effort to break
down taboos that marginalized both behaviors.
Charles Taylor charts Foucault’s belief that 1960’s countercultural groups failed to
“liberate the body.”. Despite the supposed “revolt of the sexual body” from “repressive” sexual
morals, the body continues to be subject to regulation through other points of power, namely
capitalism and images of the ideal body.59
‘The revolt of the sexual body is the reverse effect of this encroachment. What is the
response on the side of power? An economic (and perhaps also ideological) exploitation
of eroticisation, from sun-tan products to pornographic films. Responding precisely to the
revolt of the body, we find a new mode of investment which presents itself no longer in
the form of control by repression but that of control by stimulation. 'Get undressed- but
be slim, good-looking, tanned!’ For each move by one adversary, there is an answering
one by the other.’60
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Taylor explains how “we may think we are gaining some freedom when we throw off sexual
prohibitions, but in fact we continue to be dominated by certain images of what it is to be a full,
healthy, fulfilled being.”61 While individuals believe that they are freeing the body from tight
sexual “repression,” they become subject to power’s horizontal system of regulation; “we live
under a power of the new kind, and this we are not escaping.”62 This ability to create a sense of
false liberation further illustrates Foucault’s regulative understanding of power and its
application to the body; despite attempting to liberate the unclothed body from the sexual norms
which render it taboo, individuals continue to be subject to regulation. This understanding of
resistance explains nudist groups’ inability to shoulder off the body taboo. The body taboo is
embedded in discourse, which shapes how rebelling groups structure their resistance. And the
various nudist movements discussed in this section have similarly found themselves enveloped
by further regulation following their attempts at “liberation.” The sexual revolution sought to
liberate the body from prudish restrictions, but in the process individuals found themselves
bound by the social expectations placed on appearance.63 In attempting to “liberate the body”
from perceived “restrictions,” not only did counterculture activists reinforce the notion that sex is
taboo, they unwittingly allowed power to commoditize this “liberation”; by commercializing sex
and the body, power subjects individuals to different body regulations: instead of being pressured
to de-sexualize and conceal their bodies, individuals are pressed to adopt a certain aesthetic.
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The most recent evolution of the nudist movement may avoid some of the
aforementioned movements’ errors. Carr-Gomm describes recent “body freedom” movements,
which seek to liberate the body from legal restrictions.64
Body freedom activists on the west coast of the United States have…managed to craft
numerous pithy slogans to convey their message: ‘Why hide your appearance?’ ‘Question
Shame.’ ‘The human body: legalize it!’ ‘Don’t arrest me – I was born this way!’ ‘Body
shame is not a family value!’ ‘Government has no business setting dress codes –
period.’65
Stuart Ward also adopts this argument in Strange Days Indeed: Memories of the Old World.
Ward’s novel, which takes place in a utopian future where vegetarianism and nakedness are the
norm, ridicules the body taboo.66 By portraying nudism as part of a utopian vision, Ward invokes
the notion that the body taboo, particularly its enforcement via law, is an impediment to the
flourishing of an ideal society. Essential to these activists’ claims is the notion that legal
restrictions on the natural body violate individual freedom; not only do they deny that the bare
body is indecent, they also reject the idea that the government has a right to force individuals to
cover their natural bodies. Unlike previous movements that portrayed nudism as a private matter,
the movement for body freedom is not focused on becoming more in touch with nature or on the
health benefits that nudity brings. Rather, said movement directly calls for a lifting of legal
restrictions on public nudity. Like their nudist predecessors, these activists reject the body taboo;
but body freedom activists take this idea further: they argue that since the body taboo is arbitrary,
society has no right to legally impose it. This movement may avoid playing into certain aspects
of body discourse. By advocating for “the right to choose” whether to wear clothing in public
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(portraying clothing as a matter of personal choice), body freedom activists might avoid both
reinforcing the idea that nudity belongs in private and associating nudity with sex—both of
which must be avoided if individuals wish to properly break down the body taboo. By
eliminating legal restrictions on where an individual can be unclothed while avoiding the notion
that nudity is sexual, deviant, or characteristic of a particular group, these activists hope to loosen
power’s hold on the body. But the body freedom movement might still fall victim to Foucauldian
power insofar as taboos on the body remain in place. The fact that even the most permissive of
nudist groups are unable to completely dismantle power’s hold speaks to the depth with which
systems of control are entrenched in dominant discourse.
This realization, however, raises more questions than it answers.
Foucault argues that resistance is itself a product of discourse but that it can
simultaneously open up new spaces within which to contest the dominant order; in this case, the
body taboo. While power is present in all relationships and shapes interactions, there are certain
moments where power is exposed—these moments serve as the potential starting point for
“reverse discourse.”67 Foucault says that
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be
both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a
point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and
makes it possible to thwart it.68
While it is true that resistance is itself shaped by power, such discourse can lay the foundations
for a challenge to that power. Resistant discourses, while constructed by power, open up spaces
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which can serve as “a starting point for an opposing strategy.” “Subjugated knowledges” are
brought into circulation, opening up new discursive spaces from which they might ultimately
inspire small-scale resistance to hegemonic norms.69
While nudist movements may entrench certain regulatory understandings of the body
itself, they can also highlight that body regulation exists and raise the possibility that displaying
one’s body is not necessarily taboo; such movements showed that it is possible for individuals to
be unclothed in each other’s presence, potentially opening up a space for a discussion of the
body taboo itself. For instance, early nudist groups were able to make the idea of recreational
nudity more known. Prior to the late 1800’s, the idea of choosing to be unclothed was simply
unheard of. Nudist groups, while certainly outside of the mainstream, nonetheless created
“nudism,” a lifestyle with health and comfort-related benefits. While it is true that these groups
continued to be regulated by discourses which construct and regulate the body, they might also
have snubbed the idea that individuals ought to always be clothed in each other’s presence. But
this merely leads to another question: does this new discursive space lay the groundwork for
future nudist movements, such as the body freedom movement for example, to refine their
resistance in a way that avoids entrenching the body taboo? Or is the individual constructed to
the point where no reverse discourse can free the body from its construction? And if we accept
the latter, that the individual is confined by a set of power relations which construct them (the
individual lacks autonomy,) are the individual’s actions within that field still relevant? For
instance, with regards to the body freedom movement, should we still strive to change laws
regulating the unclothed body even if changing if said law does not increase autonomy? Can
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eliminating mandatory privacy restrictions on the body allow for greater agency even if we
accept the interpretation that the subject is constrained within a set of power relations? Questions
about the relationship between power, law, and the subject become increasingly relevant as we
move through this thesis, exploring the legal limits of constructed offense.
III. Conclusion
To better understand laws proscribing public nudity, it is crucial to understand nudity
itself. To one who has grown up with the body taboo, the idea that individuals should be able to
choose whether to wear clothing in public may sound foreign or even comical. Nonetheless,
when one realizes that nudity is socially constructed, the idea that wearing clothing is essential to
decency (and thus warrants legal regulation) may become less absolute. As I have previously
mentioned, unclothed individuals are, in themselves, naked, but become nude when they are
unclothed in an “improper” place.70 This not only shows that nudity is a constructed state, it also
reveals the role of publicness in constructing that nudity.
Having established that nudity is constructed, I then employed a Foucauldian analytics of
power to explain the development of the body taboo. Foucault’s analytics of power has helped
clarify how nakedness becomes nudity; it helps explain why many people assume that in certain
spaces, individuals ought to be clothed. While nakedness in private or in a changing room is
perfectly legal, the same state of dress in public is illegal; in this sense, it is nudity, not
nakedness, that is legally restricted. And public nudity restrictions reinforce this construction.
Moreover, since power constructs truth, individuals seeking to contest dominant norms
subconsciously uphold the system of regulation. While various nudist groups may have
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“rebelled” against the body taboo, these groups unwittingly reinforced the dominant assumption
that nudity is inherently sexual and/or indecent. The fact that these groups were unable to cast off
the body taboo (and that they even reinforced it) shows how power is infused in discourse; it is
embedded in resistance. Nonetheless, these groups may simultaneously have succeeded in
opening up new discursive spaces for contesting the body taboo.
With respect to the intra-liberal public autonomy debate, even permissive liberals believe
that society reserves the right to prohibit intrinsically offensive acts; acts such as public
defecation and vomit-eating are offensive in themselves and society is justified in keeping these
actions out of the public sphere. But the fact that nudity is not taboo in itself, but rather taboo
because of the Foucauldian system of regulation that frames it as such, raises questions over
whether the offense it causes can be a valid reason to restrict it in the public sphere.
The Foucauldian account of power employed in this chapter presents an alternative
approach to power. While the liberal theorists discussed in Chapter One see law as the main
vehicle of regulation, Foucault holds that individuals are subject to regulatory discourse below
the level of law. But while these two definitions of power differ in their focus, they can
nonetheless temporarily coexist. In this chapter, I use Foucault’s notion of power to understand
how the naked body is made nude, and the subsequent basis for laws circumscribing the
nakedness to the private sphere. While Foucault would disagree with liberals’ focus on the
“cutting the head off of the king,” his account of regulation nonetheless helps explain the
discursive basis (and the normative social effects) of the legal regulations that liberals discuss,
particularly with respect to the body. So far, I have employed Foucault’s notion of regulation to
do just that: to understand the discourse regulating the body and how that discourse is
subsequently reflected in law. While there is a looming tension between Foucuault and liberals’
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understanding of the nature of power, they are not necessarily incompatible; Foucault does not
deny that legal restrictions are a form of power (albeit a surface-level manifestation of it); he
does claim, however, that power goes far beneath law. Given that I seek to explore the status of
legal prohibitions on nudity, we must thus temporarily lay aside the sub-legal implications of
power, and focus on law itself (whether we see it as regulative or or restrictive,) which is often
based on discursive construction.
The alternative account of power presented in this chapter has implications that liberal
theorists must ultimately contend with. It raises questions about the relevance of the juridicodiscursive account of power that they employ as well as about the relevance of the intra-liberal
public autonomy debate altogether. The next two chapters (respectively) explore the liberal
position with regard to public autonomy and whether the U.S Constitution accords with that
position. For the sake of understanding the liberal position on public autonomy, these chapters
adopt a juridico-discursive focus on law as negative. In the fifth chapter, however, I reassess
these chapters’ findings (using public nudity) in light of the Foucauldian analytics of modern
power discussed in this chapter.
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3: Liberal Doctrine and Public Autonomy
This thesis, so far, has two areas of clash. In order to conceptualize this chapter, it is
crucial to review what we have covered thus far. The first of these debates is within liberal
theory itself. Liberal theorists share a commitment to individual autonomy in the private sphere.
But in the public sphere, liberal theorists disagree on the limits of individual autonomy. The
intra-liberal debate on the limits of the public sphere is tripartite, and ranges from most to least
willing to restrict “offensive” actions. It is crucial to review the three groups in order to
contextualize this chapter. John Stewart Mill and H.L.A Hart, whom I term “restrictive liberals,”
wrote against the dominant legal philosophy in their age: legal moralism. They specifically refute
legal moralists’ conception of the relationship between law and the private sphere, believing that
only actions which are harmful to others can be restricted. Nonetheless, both Mill and Hart, who
do not hold individual rights as the foundation for (their conception of) liberalism, would agree
that “there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not
to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly in violation of good manners and, coming
thus within the category of offences against others, may rightly be prohibited.”1 The second
group, interest-balancing liberals, deny that offense necessarily justifies restricting actions in
public, but hold that in certain situations, individual autonomy ought to be restricted in order to
protect the community from offense; typically basing their conception of law on individual
rights, these scholars attempt to balance persons’ right to autonomy with others’ right not to be
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offended.2 The most tolerant group of scholars I call permissive liberals. These writers believe
that under what Anthony Ellis calls a “liberal conception of law,” offense is not a sufficient
reason to restrict autonomy, given that offense often reflects subjective social codes.3 If those
“offensive” actions are “intrinsically unpleasant to observe,” or “unreasonable” society might
rightly prohibit them; but if those offensive actions “simply contravene some accepted non-moral
standard of appropriate behavior,” the law has no right to prohibit them on such grounds.
Essentially, permissive liberals tease out the cultural basis of “offense,” holding that actions that
are offensive merely because they contravene cultural norms are not restrictable.
We also see a clash between two competing accounts of power. Liberal theorists see law
as the main vehicle through which power is exercised, adopting what Michel Foucault calls a
“juridico-discursive” notion of power. In contrast, under Foucault’s “modern power,” or “biopower,” power transcends law. Power is not a permissive or repressive apparatus that acts on
autonomous subjects; rather, power constructs the individual and their knowledge of the world.
The question of public nudity brings together these two competing accounts of power,
simultaneously exposing the tensions between them. On one hand, Foucault’s analytics of power
relations explains how the body is constructed and the source of laws which regulate it (this is
highly relevant to the intra-liberal public autonomy debate, given that liberals differ in their
willingness to prohibit actions based on the offense they cause.) On the other hand, accepting
Foucault’s notion of regulation might make the intra-liberal public autonomy debate less
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relevant, given that power primarily operates below the law. We must, however, put aside this
tension for the time being (I return to it in Chapter Five.) Given that our overarching project
explores the legal limits of public autonomy, we must temporarily “put on our juridico-discursive
hats,” accepting Foucualt’s account of how the body is constructed but focusing on when
governments can enact mandatory privacy restrictions. Consequently, the next two chapters
focus on the relationship between law and public autonomy, both within liberal theory and in
American law.
The three-sided debate over the limits of public autonomy (Restrictive Liberalism,
Interest-Balancing Liberalism, and Permissive Liberalism) leaves the reader wondering which
public actions governments can restrict under a “liberal conception of law”; this query forms the
basis for what I explore in this chapter: when offense is a valid reason for restricting autonomy in
the public sphere under liberal doctrine. Public nudity, a frequently cited case within the intraliberal public autonomy debate, brings out fierce debate with regards to which actions can be
proscribed in public.4 Given that the unclothed body’s construction as nude is the source of and is
reinforced by laws proscribing where one can be unclothed, such laws qualify under Ellis’ latter
category; public nudity is only offensive because “it…contravene(s) some accepted non-moral
standard of appropriate behavior.” Consequently, the debate over public nudity’s legality reveals
a more specific query within liberalism: under liberal doctrine, can an action’s constructed
offensiveness be a sufficient reason to restrict it? Basing my conception of liberalism on the
lowest common denominator of various liberal positions, I explore whether liberal doctrine, as
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laid out by theorists like Mill, Hart, Feinberg, and Ellis, allows governments to restrict public
nudity. Answering this specific question allows us to generalize about the legal limits of the
public sphere under liberal doctrine.
My chapter breaks down into four sections, each of which help further narrow down the
definition of “liberalism,” ultimately using the narrowed definition to understand public nudity’s
restrictability. I begin by reviewing a number of prominent theorists who have shaped liberal
doctrine, seeking to find the “lowest common denominator” of their positions; this will help me
establish a baseline definition of liberal doctrine. I further narrow the definition of liberalism by
eliminating those definitions which do not address the issues faced by late-twentieth century
liberal activists and jurists. In the third section, I examine liberal doctrine in the late twentieth
century through Joel Feinberg’s work, ultimately criticizing what I find to be a rather illiberal
understanding of the public spheres limits. After proving that Permissive Liberalism and InterestBalancing Liberalism are not true manifestations of liberalism in the public sphere, I explain how
permissive liberals are the only group whose ideas hold true to liberal doctrine in Section Four.
I. Defining Liberalism
If we are to understand whether public nudity can be restricted under a liberal conception
of law, it is crucial to define what exactly that legal philosophy entails. In Chapter One, we
reviewed a number of liberal scholars, exploring their justification for liberalism and their
conception of the limits of individual autonomy in the public sphere. In this section, I review the
aforementioned theorists in greater depth, searching for liberalism’s “lowest common
denominator.” Finding this basis will allow me to examine the various liberal positions on public
autonomy.
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John Stewart Mill, often considered the father of liberalism, formulated his famous Harm
Principle, the idea that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” But unlike later
thinkers who championed individual rights, Mill regarded “utility as the ultimate appeal on all
ethical questions.”5 For Mill, individuals ought to be left to their own faculties in order to
promote individual happiness, and consequently, the community’s welfare. And given that utility
is the ultimate justification for individual autonomy, society has the right to restrict actions that
affect others: “As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will
not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.”6 Mill’s utilitarian
justification for individual rights guides his willingness to restrict offensive actions in the public
sphere.
H.L.A Hart, another restrictive liberal, similarly denies individual rights as a justification
for liberalism. Hart believes that laws derive from “secondary rules,” most importantly, the “rule
of recognition,” which is a document or principle that dictates which laws can and cannot be
passed; consequently, society cannot outlaw actions which would otherwise be permitted by the
rule of recognition merely because individuals find them immoral.7 The belief that law derives
from secondary rules, rather than collective morality, differentiates Hart’s legal positivism from
natural law. While the “rule of recognition” might itself be guided by certain norms, it is this
principle, not society’s morality, that guides whether an action can be restricted.
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Ronald Dworkin, who does not write on public autonomy, also holds that an action’s
immorality is not sufficient to justify its proscription. But unlike Hart’s legal positivism,
Dworkin’s philosophy (legal interpretivism) holds that even Hart’s secondary rules are reflective
of a particular morality; securing individual autonomy requires iron-clad individual rights, upon
which governments cannot infringe, in order to protect individual autonomy.8 While Hart and
Dworkin have different understandings of the nature of law and hold separate justifications for
individual autonomy, they nonetheless base their arguments on Mill’s harm principle: actions
can only be restricted in order to prevent harm to others.
In order to ward off critics who argue that the principle is illiberal, Joel Feinberg attempts
to refine the harm principle and apply harm-based arguments to the public sphere. One of these
critics is S.D Smith, who writes that the Ham principle “actually works to obfuscate the deeper
issues, to conceal real injuries, and to marginalize some conceptions of the good life.”9 To Smith,
Mill’s Harm Principle “is not inherently liberal, and indeed…may well be illiberal in its intrinsic
tendencies.”10 By formulating a rights-based harm principle and clarifying which actions can be
restricted, Feinberg attempts to circumvent these illiberal implications.11 In addition, Feinberg
supplements the harm principle with the “offense principle,” which deals with non-harmful
offensive behaviors in the public sphere.12 His concept of the relationship between law and
individual autonomy is shaped by both the harm principle and his offense principle, which states
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that regulating offense is squarely the state’s business. Despite individual autonomy rights not
always trumping the desire to not be offended, Feinberg holds that an action’s immorality does
not necessarily allow it to be restricted; autonomy rights must be weighed against offense.
Anthony Ellis critiques Feinberg’s conception of liberalism, arguing that it lends too
much support to culturally-learned social norms, which is incompatible with a “liberal
conception of law”; Ellis provides two possible definitions of liberalism, both of which hold that
liberal principles derive from the harm principle (even if it needs to be supplemented.)13 Ellis
does not deny that it is necessary to weigh interests in deciding which actions ought to be legal in
public; but he contends that Feinberg allows subjective conceptions of offense to guide which
actions can be restricted. To Ellis, a liberal conception of law requires society to allow all actions
which are not “intrinsically offensive.”
The aforementioned liberals are just a few of many liberal scholars, but have nonetheless
been prominent in shaping contemporary liberalism. While Feinberg, Dworkin, and Ellis hold
individual rights as the ultimate justification for autonomy, Mill and Hart hold alternate
justifications. Given this clash, we can only define liberal doctrine according to the lowest
common denominator of the various scholars’ positions: those principles which all liberals must
hold if they are to qualify under such an umbrella.
So what do all of these liberal positions have in common? All liberals agree (in some
capacity) with Mill’s harm principle: the idea that insofar as an action does not affect others,
governments have no right to restrict it. Moreover, all liberals share an opposition to legal
moralism, the belief that society can outlaw actions on their immorality alone. Although many,
such as Hart, believe that normative moral judgements of the can underlie the way that laws are
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framed, the fact that an action is immoral is not sufficient for governments to restrict it. More
specifically, Anthony Ellis explains that liberals have a shared opposition to certain types of
laws:
1. Strong paternalistic laws
2. Laws prohibiting an activity simply on the ground that it contravenes some moral or
religious code
3. Laws prohibiting an activity simply because the majority wish it to be prohibited
4. Laws requiring an activity simply because it is customary14
Given that they oppose such laws and agree with the harm principle (although it may be
interpreted differently,) liberal ideology can be defined as the belief that laws restricting
autonomy must be based on personal injury alone; society’s disdain for an action is not
sufficient to restrict it. This definition of liberalism puts the question of public nudity in
perspective; and it raises the question of whether laws prohibiting public nudity are meant to
prevent harm to others, or whether they merely reflect the preferences of the majority.
II. Modifying the Harm Principle
We have established that agreeing with the harm principle is central to liberalism. But the
harm principle, taken literally, may be deeply at odds with the agenda of twentieth century
liberalism. This has to do with the fact that the Mill does not define what counts as harm and that
the principle does not apply in the public sphere; I will address both of these issues in turn.
S.D Smith discusses the former issue, arguing that “harm” can be interpreted to allow
almost anything to be regulated. Specifically, the harm principle can and has been taken to
include harms done to the public or unpleasant mental states.15 And “if psychic and communal
harms are allowed to count, then the harm principle would support government's coercive

14

Ellis, “Offense and the Liberal Conception of Law,” 6.
See Bernard Harcourt, "The Collapse of the Harm Principle, " Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 90
(1999): 109-194.
15

78

jurisdiction over virtually any conduct that anyone might be inclined to regulate.”16 Bernard
Harcourt, who blames the harm principle for a number of restrictions on public and private
autonomy, would likely agree with this point. Harcourt argues that the principle has become so
ingrained in American politics that it “is effectively collapsing under the weight of its own
success.”17 He cites bath-houses closings under the guise of “preventing the spread of HIV,”
along with the proliferation of the feminist anti-pornography movement (which argued that
pornography should be banned because of the harms that it does to women) as evidence that
what was originally a liberal principle, has been co-opted by non-liberals. While Smith does not
agree with Harcourt’s assessment of the harm principle, calling it “premature,” both theorists
nonetheless agree that given its potential implications, the unrefined harm principle is not
necessarily the best way to secure a liberal legal framework.
Moreover, the harm principle, taken on its face, is ambiguous about the limits of the
public sphere. Mill himself argued that “as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it.”18 While Mill seems to imply
that all actions which affect others’ interests can be restricted, he is simultaneously skeptical
about society legally imposing a particular moral code through autonomy restrictions. Similarly,
Mill’s goes on to argue that many, but not all, offensive public actions ought to be restricted.
“There are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to
be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and, coming
thus within the category of offences against others, may rightly be prohibited.” Given his use of
the word “many,” it is clear that Mill does not believe that all actions should be regulated in the
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public sphere, even if he believes that they can be. But Mill is vague about how to determine
which actions these are. Consequently, if the harm principle is a formula for deciding whether
certain actions are permitted, it is insufficient to resolve whether acts that are perceived to be
offensive, such as public nudity, can be prohibited under liberal doctrine. We consequently need
some refined version of the principle that deals with the complex implications of the public
sphere if we are to decide whether public nudity can be restricted.
It is especially important to examine the changing liberal debate in order to tease out
what qualifies as harm (in the public sphere.) Given that liberals are jointly opposed to “laws
prohibiting an activity simply on the ground that it contravenes some moral or religious code,”
and “laws prohibiting an activity simply because the majority wish it to be prohibited,”
restrictive liberals’ belief that all public offensive acts can be restricted (even if some should not)
might be considered dated and/or illiberal.19 Mill wrote On Liberty in 1859, in response to the
“tyranny of the majority” that he observed.20 Similarly, Hart, writing in the 1950’s and 1960’s,
wrote in reaction to the consensus of legal moralism. Given that Hart and Mill, the two main
restrictive liberals, write against legal moralism, their failure to take public autonomy seriously
may speak to how they structured their argument; since their opponents did not believe in
autonomy at all, Hart and Mill conceded the public sphere in an effort to conquer the private.
But as we established in Chapter One, liberals have defeated moralists, particularly in
light of the development of a right to privacy: the U.S Supreme Court has established that in
private, individuals have a right to do as they wish insofar as their actions do not affect others;21
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it has also established that laws cannot be based on morality alone.22 Moreover, the Supreme
Court’s narrowing definition of obscenity in the later twentieth century greatly expanded which
forms of speech are covered by the First Amendment. This has changed the context in which
liberals argue for autonomy. While liberals once fought for private autonomy against the
consensus that immoral actions can be restricted, private autonomy is now a given in
constitutional law and (usually) legal theory; moreover, while Mill and Hart did not base their
definition of liberalism on individual rights, the idea of a right to privacy suggests that the
current working definition of liberalism uses rights as its justification for individual autonomy.
In the wake of victory, liberals find themselves faced with another question: whether and
when an action’s offensiveness allows it to be restricted in public. Restrictive liberals write prior
to a consensus over whether an action’s perceived-immorality was sufficient to justify it; their
position on public autonomy is not specifically tailored to this intra-liberal public autonomy
debate. Consequently, their theory of public autonomy can be excluded from our definition of
liberalism in the public sphere. The new narrower debate accepts the premise that there are at
least some actions which ought to be allowed in spite of the fact that they are offensive. And
given Constitutional precedent, which upholds a rights-based notion of liberalism, we accept that
individuals have a right to autonomy in public, even though we might say that such a right can
be restricted if it clashes with others’ right not to be offended. Our definition of liberalism in the
public sphere can be narrowed to a debate (between interest-balancing liberals and permissive
liberals) over which actions can be prohibited.
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Now that we have narrowed our understanding of liberal theory in the public sphere to
one that accepts that some offensive actions cannot be restricted, we are left to adjudicate
between those which can and cannot be restricted. Again, given that the harm principle is
ambiguous about what constitutes harm, and since Mill does not legitimately consider the issue
of public autonomy, we must modify or supplement the principle in order to define the liberal
limits of public autonomy. Our new principle(s) must not only be rights-based, it (they) must
provide a means for adjudicating which actions can be restricted. Modifying the harm principle is
essential to deciphering when liberal governments can enact mandatory privacy restrictions.
III. Feinberg’s Illiberal Offense Principle: A Case Against Interest-Balancing
Liberalism
Thus far, we have narrowed our conception of liberalism to one that opposes legal
moralism, and the more general claim that actions cannot be restricted merely because the
majority finds them immoral. Moreover, we have seen how certain traditions of liberalism,
particularly Permissive Liberalism, do not fit the current intra-liberal debate. Given that (in light
of the right to privacy and the expansion of public autonomy) liberalism is the dominant
ideology in American law, we have resolved the debate over whether individuals should be free
in private and over whether there should be some public autonomy; the contemporary debate
deals with what the limits of public autonomy should be. One answer to this question is that an
individual’s right to autonomy should be balanced against the offense suffered by the public: this
is the position of interest-balancing liberals. In this section, I evaluate this position by looking at
Joel Feinberg’s position toward public nudity and the public sphere more generally.
In The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others, Joel Feinberg aims to clarify
when and which actions can be restricted in public. In order to help the reader understand how
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non-harmful behaviors can nonetheless be offensive, Feinberg contrives a thought experiment:
imagine you ride on a bus where individuals are doing distasteful things such as vomit-eating,
public masturbation, and flag-burning (just to name a few.) Feinberg formulates 31 stories,
classified into six different categories in order to help the reader visualize the unpleasant
behaviors that they would witness. Feinberg uses these stories to show how actions which are not
directly harmful can nonetheless be injurious; many of these actions, he claims, can rightfully be
regulated as offenses.
Feinberg consequently points out an issue with the harm principle: it does not allow for
restrictions on offensive actions.23 He claims that
Passing annoyance, disappointment, disgust, embarrassment, and various other disliked
conditions such as fear, anxiety, and minor (“harmless”) aches and pains, are not in
themselves necessarily harmful. Consequently, no matter how the harm principle is
mediated, it will not certify as legitimate those interferences with the liberty of some
citizens that are made for the sole purpose of preventing such unpleasant states in
others.24
For Feinberg, the harm principle does not allow governments to restrict certain actions
which may be deeply offensive to some. But a number of these actions, although not qualifying
under the harm principle, are nonetheless deeply offensive to the public. Feinberg seeks to
resolve this dilemma of restrictability; his central question in this volume is whether “there are
any human experiences that are harmless in themselves yet so unpleasant that we can rightly
demand legal protection from them even at the cost of other persons' liberties?”
Feinberg answers in the affirmative, but simultaneously aims to differentiate his theory
from legal moralism, under which any action deemed offensive can be restricted. Feinberg
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supplements the harm principle, which he calls the Offense Principle. Feinberg begins by
establishing that “the prevention of offensive conduct is properly the state’s business.”25 Feinberg
does not argue that all actions which individuals may find offensive can or ought to be banned;
but by starting from the axiom that certain actions can be restricted based on the offense caused,
he establishes offense as a form of wrong.26
Similarly, Feinberg clarifies that his definition of offense cannot be construed to include
restrictions on private freedom (he uses the example of sodomy) on the grounds that the action is
offensive to members of society or to its moral fabric. Feinberg dismisses such “offenses,”
claiming that
No one in his right mind could claim that lewd indecencies or even privately performed
sexual deviations that are shocking merely to think about are some sort of menace to
individual or collective interests, a threat from which we all urgently need protection at
any cost to the offenders. Offensive behavior as such is no kind of menace, but at its
worst only severely irritating nuisance.27
In order to be considered an “offense,” the action in question must be a nuisance and be directly
offensive to the individual; an action being offensive “to society” is not sufficient to justify its
proscription. Through this, Feinberg caveats out those constructions of harm and offense which
have been used by non-liberals to justify restricting autonomy.28
So which “affronts to sensibilities” can be restricted? Feinberg certainly does not adopt
the restrictive liberal position that all public actions fall within the purview of the law.29 He finds
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this position problematic, claiming that even though offenses are properly the state’s business,
“there are abundant reasons…for being extremely cautious in applying the offense principle.”
Given that people’s sense of offense can be guided by prejudice, “the offense principle must be
formulated in a very precise way, and supplemented by appropriate standards or mediating
maxims, so as not to open the door to wholesale and intuitively unwarranted legal
interference.”30
Feinberg uses a scale analogy, where the reasonableness of the conduct in question is
weighed against the seriousness of the offense caused by that action, in order to determine what
counts as reasonable behavior.
1. Personal importance. The more important the offending conduct is to the actor, as
measured by his own preferences and the vitality of those of the actor's own interests it is
meant to advance, the more reasonable that conduct is.
2. Social value. The greater the social utility of the kind of conduct of which the actor's is
an instance, the more reasonable is the actor's conduct.
3. Free expression. (A corollary of 1 and 2.) Expressions of opinion, especially about
matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical,
scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions, must be presumed to
have the highest social importance in virtue of the great social utility of free expression
and discussion generally, as well as the vital personal interest most people have in being
able to speak their minds fearlessly. No degree of offensiveness in the expressed opinion
itself is sufficient to override the case for free expression, although the offensiveness of
the manner of expression, as opposed to its substance, may have sufficient weight in
some contexts.
4. Alternative opportunities. The greater the availability of alternative times or places that
would be equally satisfactory to the actor and his partners (if any) but inoffensive to
others, the less reasonable is conduct done in circumstances that render it offensive to
others.
5. Malice and spite. Offensive conduct is unreasonable to the extent that its impelling
motive is spiteful or malicious. Wholly spiteful conduct, done with the intention of
offending and for no other reason, is wholly unreasonable. Especial care is required in the
application of this standard, for spiteful motives are easily confused with conscientious
ones.
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6. Nature of the locality. (A corollary of 4.) Offensive conduct performed in
neighborhoods where it is common, and widely known to be common, is less
unreasonable than it would be in neighborhoods where it is rare and unexpected.31
Feinberg attempts to diagnose the reasonableness of the conduct in question. Understanding
whether an action is reasonable, for Feinberg, is instrumental toward adjudicating whether it can
be restricted. If the action is done merely in order to offend, if said conduct could easily take
place elsewhere, or if the action has limited value to society (it is exclusively offensive,) the
conduct has a low level of “reasonableness.” In contrast, if the public sphere is the only place in
which said individual can express themselves and if their conduct is done with the intent to send
a message, then said conduct might have a high level of reasonableness. But even if an action
qualifies as reasonable, it must be weighed against the degree of offense which it causes.32 This
“weighing” mechanism encapsulates Feinberg’s understanding of which actions can be restricted
in public and of when the offense principle can be applied. In future chapters, Feinberg applies
the offense principle to obscenity and pornography, ultimately arguing against most prohibitions
on the two insofar as direct harms cannot be demonstrated. The following chapters, although
certainly interesting for considering the interest-balancing liberal position on obscenity and
pornography, are roughly irrelevant to understanding the more general limits of public autonomy
under liberal doctrine.
Despite arguing that the offense principle should be cautiously applied (in order to avoid
restricting offenses based on prejudice or restricting free expression,) Feinberg embraces that
offenses can be contextual: “the offense principle…is dependent on cultural standards that vary
greatly from place to place, and within our own nation ‘constantly and rapidly change.’”33 On its
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face, this argument may not seem problematic, given that even permissive liberals believe in
restricting “unreasonable” behaviors34; “vomit-eating” is a good example. But there are a number
of culturally unacceptable actions which individuals may wish to engage in because it brings
them joy, because it contributes to the public good, or because they fit with how they see the
world. Nonetheless, insofar as Feinberg believes that reasonable actions can be restricted on their
offense alone, he supports the principle that individual freedom must, at least sometimes, bow to
cultural norms. For example, the line between restricting public nudity and restricting interracial
hand-holding (which he sees as an implication that the offense principle must be guarded
against) is more fine than Feinberg would like to admit. When one examines Feinberg’s
argument for restricting public nudity, it is evident that his willingness to restrict it speaks to a
larger illiberal willingness to restrict actions solely on the grounds that they contravene an
accepted social code.
Feinberg is clear that public nudity is only offensive because of how it is constructed.
Referring back to his bus scenario, he explains that one of the most contentious of the stories is
“story 13: The passenger who takes the seat directly across from you is entirely naked.”35
Feinberg explains that said passenger’s state of undress “never did any person any harm” and can
be avoided by diverting one’s gaze, but would nonetheless make individuals “vaguely ill at
ease.” Here, Feinberg establishes public nudity as a minor affront to public sensibilities, which is
nonetheless discomforting. He goes on to examine the offense suffered by public nudity and
public sex, the “disquietude” of which he categorizes as “a complicated psychological
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phenomenon.” He explains that our disdain for seeing the unclothed body is tangential to our
reluctance to see sex in public. Both sights cause what he calls “shame,” and emulate from the
fact that they remind us of the same taboo subject: sex. “Our culture,” Feinberg explains, “is far
more uptight about sexual pleasures than about ‘harmless’ pleasures of any other kind, which is
easy enough to understand given the danger in, and harmful consequences of, sexual behavior in
the past.” Feinberg’ understanding of public nudity laws parallels the argument I advance in
Chapter Two: society’s disdain for public nudity stems from how the body is constructed. This is
not to say that public nudity and public sex can necessarily be restricted; recall his claim that
“affronts to public sensibilities” are only “relevant to the permissibility of the conduct in
question,” not that they necessarily justify restricting it.
We must, however, exclude individuals who are unclothed with the intent to provoke
others’ sensibilities from the argument; such an action would clearly be unreasonable, given that
it violates tenet five of the reasonableness criteria. Feinberg claims that “if the whole point of
nudity is to offend others, if one goes bare in the supermarket not despite but because of the
known tendency of nudity to offend, then the legislature must, at the very least, discount the
reasonableness of the offending conduct.”36 For example, if a man walked around in a trenchcoat, opening it periodically to expose himself, one can hardly argue that said conduct is
“reasonable,” and a legislature has the right to prohibit it accordingly. Conversely, in Feinberg’s
example of a “nude housewife in the supermarket,” the woman is merely unclothed for its own
sake.37 Feinberg explains that “if the point of being nude is to facilitate one's movements, get a
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suntan, keep cool, or ‘feel free in the supermarket,’ then the conduct has a certain amount of
reasonableness, despite its tendency to offend (shock, embarrass, inconvenience) others.”38
If actions are to be restricted (for Feinberg), they must be less reasonable than the offense
that they cause. As previously mentioned, Feinberg formulates six standards by which the
reasonableness of an offense is determined: 1. Personal importance, 2. Social value, 3. Free
expression, 4. Alternative opportunities, 5. Malice and spite, and 6. Nature of the locality. I will
demonstrate that nudity qualifies under a number of these standards, arguing that the benefits of
nudism laid out by various nudist groups in Chapter Two make public nudity perfectly
reasonable.
Let us suppose that the nude housewife disdained clothing. Suppose that she, like
Jefferson Poland, Henry David Thoreau, and Stuart Ward, believed that not wearing clothes
(insofar as the weather permits it) is healthy. Suppose that she also sees the nude body as
“natural” and consequently believes that individuals should not need to cover their bodies with
constraining clothing; by going about nude in public, she seeks to normalize the unclothed body,
asserting that there are people who believe that individuals should not hide their bodies. Feinberg
embraces this idea, raising the possibility that individuals may wish to go nude in order “to
habituate the public to the sight of nude bodies so that what she takes to be the unreasonable
susceptibility to offense at the sight of nudity may diminish and eventually disappear along with
various unwholesome attitudes towards sex to which it may be connected.”39 One might call the
the nude housewife’s motivations political. To this woman, who’s perspective on the unclothed
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body is shared by Jefferson Poland and body freedom activists, not wearing clothing on the
public bus is certainly helps assert her political point of view; her conduct is clearly reasonable
under the first standard.40
The nude housewife’s conduct can also be justified under the second standard: social
value. Beyond the intrinsic value in the woman expressing her political opinions, one might
argue that the woman being allowed to go about unclothed creates a social environment that
fosters discussion around the health benefits of being unclothed, or about the body in general.
This might prompt more open conversations about taboo subjects such as sex, bodily functions,
and body image. As Michael Bayles argues in his critique of Feinberg’s balancing claims, public
nudity “…might help people overcome psychological neuroses about sex. There might even be
other benefits.” Consequently, Bayles argues, Feinberg’s focus on the offense brought by public
nudity should not and cannot justify proscribing it, given that it is not unreasonable.41 Moreover,
“legalizing the unclothed body,” as body freedom activists call it, might foster a less restrictive
atmosphere and allow individuals to feel free not only to dress as they see fit but also to have the
option of not doing so.42 Given the potential increases in freedom that the nude housewife’s
behavior might bring, her conduct is reasonable. While for Bayles, this alone is sufficient to
justify its legality, Feinberg insists on weighing it against the nature of the offense caused.
The third standard of reasonableness, free expression, might also be applied to the naked
woman’s conduct. Feinberg argues that “no amount of offensiveness in an expressed opinion
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can counterbalance the vital social value of allowing unfettered personal expression.”43 Perhaps
for this reason nude protests are explicitly covered by the first amendment, despite public nudity
not being so.44 But we might also understand the housewife’s actions as explicitly expressive
insofar as she attempts to undermine the hegemony of the body taboo; she may be making a
political statement by directly defying social norms. This is certainly the opinion of body
freedom activists and Jefferson Poland, who advocate(d) “nude-in’s.” in order to protest
restrictions on the unclothed body.45 And Feinberg himself believes that “no degree of
offensiveness in the expressed opinion itself is sufficient to override the case for free
expression,” even if the time, place, and manner of the speech can be.46
But the time, place, and manner of speech can only be restricted if there are alternative
opportunities for individuals to express their message. Feinberg, citing David Conway, agrees
that “in many cases it is highly inconvenient or virtually impossible to perform the same action
in private, and more importantly, in other cases, the very point or rationale of the action
disappears if one is restricted to privacy.”47 Feinberg agrees with Conway’s application of this
principle to nudity:
Not only is there inconvenience involved in such cases, but presumably the very point of
having long hair or a beard is to “go about looking that way.” The same is true of a
woman wearing a mini-skirt, or a very brief bikini, or only the bottom half of the bikini,
or no bikini at all. One can be nude in private, but again, the point of so doing (a feeling
of freedom in the supermarket, or whatever) may be lost, just as it is if it is demanded that
one wear a beard-cover in public.48
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There are few opportunities for the woman in the supermarket to convey the same message.
While he may choose to be unclothed in private, his behavior would certainly not carry the same
significance or have the same impact as if he were to do it in public; public nudity, in terms of
the message expressed, is wholly different than being naked in one’s own house.49 If one accepts
that the nude housewife’s behavior is expressive and Feinberg and Conway’s argument that there
are few alternative opportunities to express the message, the action is clearly reasonable and
cannot be outlawed no matter the offense it causes.
I have already discussed the fifth standard (malice and spite,) caveating out nudity in
order in order to others’ sensibilities. In this situation, we have narrowed the argument to one
that supposes that the nude housewife does not aim to offend anyone; we assume that she
considers it comfortable to be nude, she wants to make a political statement about the body, or
she wants to normalize the unclothed body. Although Feinberg holds that the nude housewife’s
conduct is reasonable, he nonetheless believes that her behavior can be proscribed, hoping that
she will “be treated fairly” by Courts; but the fact that her behavior can be made illegal in the
first place reveals that to Feinberg, the offense wrought by public nudity outweighs its
reasonableness.50 I have demonstrated that public nudity, insofar as it is not meant to provoke, is
perfectly reasonable behavior—even more reasonable than Feinberg believes it to be.51 This,
combined with Feinberg’s contention that the offense brought by public nudity only makes one
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“vaguely ill at ease” leads one to believe that his balancing mechanism would prevent public
nudity from being restricted (as long as it is not deliberately done with the intent to offend.)
The fact that Feinberg considers public nudity a restrictable offense may thus be due to
his prudential attitude that individuals ought to be clothed in public. While admitting that the
case of public nudity is a difficult one, Feinberg nonetheless supports prohibiting nudity on the
grounds that “the sight of nude bodies in public places is for almost everyone acutely
embarrassing.”52 But perhaps one could make a similar argument about an act that Feinberg is
adamant not to restrict: interracial hand-holding. It can similarly be argued that for persons in the
antebellum south, the sight of interracial affection was acutely offensive; so much so that the
offense outweighed the reasonableness of those people’s expression. The belief that the two
races should be kept separate was so ingrained that seeing a couple that actively defied this might
have been as unacceptable as “public nudity,” and certainly as much of an affront to decency.
Moreover, to individuals raised with the belief that racial integration was unnatural, and to those
who believed that interracial couples should, at most, solely be allowed to be affectionate in
private, that sight would have been incredibly offensive; likewise, to individuals raised with the
belief that individuals ought not be unclothed in each other’s presence, the sight of a bare body in
public is strange and offensive. So why can interracial hand-holding not be restricted while
nudity can? Of course, Feinberg argues that inter-racial hand-holding is reasonable and that,
more generally, “the balancing tests on the whole would still tell against prohibitions of such
natural and spontaneous practices as gestures of affection even among ‘deviant groups.’”53 But
could the idea that interracial couples (and homosexual couples) have a right to public affection
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while nudists do not reveal Feinberg’s normative contention (shaped by contemporary notions of
decency) that interracial hand-holding is acceptable while not wearing clothing is not? The facts
seem to point to the affirmative, given that, as I have demonstrated, nudity, just like interracial
hand-holding is reasonable under five of Feinberg’s six criteria. Feinberg seems to prudentially
exclude interracial hand-holding because he is hesitant to endorse a principle which allows such
an act to be restricted. But if one accepts Feinberg’s interest-balancing position and his claim
that, in the case of public nudity, the offense caused outweighs the reasonableness, I see no
reason to believe that interracial hand-holding cannot be restricted. And if we can take
Feinberg’s argument justify restrictions on interracial hand-holding, Feinberg restricts the very
action that his offense principle was meant to protect.
The larger issue with this is not that Feinberg has balanced offenses incorrectly, it is
Feinberg’s weighing mechanism altogether, particularly his willingness to use public reaction as
a reason to restrict certain actions. Larry Alexander presents this critique, arguing that Feinberg
lends too much weight to cultural norms.
Even if we deem all correct norms of personal behavior to be norms of correct social
behavior, we have no legitimate interest in enforcing those norms against violators. On a
desert island we would have many things, but we would not have the comfort of knowing that
others, on
their desert islands, were living according to norms and ideals that we hold.54
Feinberg’s willingness to weigh the perceived offense of certain actions is, as Alexander later
explains, incompatible with liberalism. Given that he defers to cultural norms of behavior,
Feinberg allows laws to be based on culturally-specific notions of decency; this seems oddly
similar to legal moralism, which holds that actions can be restricted based on the beliefs of the
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majority. One can make a case for restricting interracial hand holding precisely because Feinberg
gives weight to perceived offense, even if that offense stems from cultural norms.
This is not to say that, under liberal doctrine, all actions must be allowed regardless of the
offense that they cause; surely there are “universally revolting sights, sounds, and smells” that
are universally offensive and the offense suffered from them can weigh in deciding what can be
restricted; many of these actions would be reasonable under Feinberg’s standard. But if we
accept that the lowest common denominator of liberal theory, liberal doctrine prohibits “1.
Strong paternalistic laws, 2. Laws prohibiting an activity simply on the ground that it
contravenes some moral or religious code, 3. Laws prohibiting an activity simply because the
majority wish it to be prohibited,” and “4. Laws requiring an activity simply because it is
customary.” Consequently, we should not allow the offense suffered by members of the
community to weigh in our adjudication of what can be restricted.55 With regards to behaviors
which contravene a cultural code, offense is not a legitimate reason to restrict autonomy. More
generally, Interest-Balancing Liberalism violates the central tenets of liberalism, since it allows
the four off-limit types of laws that we have laid out. Our working definition of liberalism must
therefore be more permissive than Interest-Balancing Liberalism; offense cannot outweigh
individual autonomy if the action qualifies as reasonable.
IV. Permissive Liberalism: Liberalism in the Public Sphere
At the beginning of the previous section, I had narrowed the liberal debate down to a
dispute over which behaviors can be restricted in the public sphere: a debate between InterestBalancing Liberalism and Permissive Liberalism. Throughout that section, however, I critiqued
the interest balancing position, showing that it does not hold true to liberal doctrine (as defined in
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Section One). Given that Interest-Balancing Liberalism is illiberal, only Permissive Liberalism
remains a potential manifestation of liberalism in the public sphere. In this section, I argue that
Permissive Liberalism avoids the illiberal pitfalls that plague the other two traditions; to this end,
I will review the positions of a couple of permissive liberals, proving that their conception of
public restrictability is consistent with liberal doctrine.
Michael Bayles criticizes Feinberg’s “scales analogy,” where actions’ reasonableness are
weighed against the offense that they cause.56 Bayles does not argue that Feinberg’s
reasonableness standard is illiberal; quite the contrary, he accepts it as a valuable way of
differentiating actions done in order to deliberately offend from those which exercise a point of
view. The reasonableness standard is a valuable way of distinguishing, for example, individuals
being nude in public for its own sake from nudity done in order to offend. In this respect,
Feinberg admits that the “nude housewife’s” behavior is reasonable. But Bayles opposes
Feinberg’s willingness to balance said reasonableness against the amount of offense caused;
given that the offense suffered by the community reflects individuals’ personal and cultural
beliefs; to allow offense to outweigh reasonableness is to allow moral codes to guide
restrictability —a mode of adjudication that, I also argue, is illiberal. Insofar as an action
qualifies as reasonable, no amount of offense is sufficient to restrict it. Permissive liberalism, by
not lending weight to public sentiment, avoids the illiberal trap of legally promoting certain
social traditions over others.
Anthony Ellis, who has been frequently mentioned thus far, critiques Feinberg’s offense
principle altogether; Ellis separates offenses into two categories: those which are “intrinsically
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unpleasant to observe,” and those which “simply contravene some accepted…standard of
appropriate behavior”; liberal doctrine allows the first sort, but not the second, to be restricted.57
Ellis criticizes Feinberg’s offense principle for allowing restrictions on behaviors which fall
under both the first and second categories; specifically, the fact that Feinberg supports
restrictions on public nudity and public sex reveals a willingness to base restrictions on specific
“standard[s] of appropriate behavior.” In response to Feinberg’s claim that public nudity is
embarrassing, Ellis explains that
There is no reason to think it more widespread or more intense, or easier to legislate
against. In my view, the reason is that our attitude to indecency has a pronouncedly moral
dimension, and that seduces us into thinking that the embarrassment it causes is of some
special significance. Indeed, perhaps from some points of view it is. But from the point of
view of the liberal conception of the law it cannot be. It is merely embarrassment.58
Ellis’ understanding of which actions can be restricted is more permissive than Feinberg’s: Ellis
claims that since a liberal conception of law forbids governments from legislating based on
certain moral codes, laws that enforce social codes are illiberal. Ellis’ definition of liberalism is
roughly in line with its lowest common denominator, which guides his permissive approach to
the public sphere.59 Perhaps some may raise the following concern: is not Ellis’ understanding of
behaviors which are “intrinsically unpleasant to observe” not also culturally specific? My
response would be that even if this is true, there is still a difference between actions such as
public vomit-eating and public nudity. The main difference is that the former is not expressive, is
universally offensive, and is likely done solely with the intent to offend; outlawing such an
action would not preference a certain cultural belief. However, I must concede, that if it can be
proven that vomit-eating, for some individuals, expresses a point of view, or that the belief that it
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is offensive is culturally-specific, then perhaps one would have to re-evaluate its classification.
Nonetheless, there is a line which governments cannot cross when deciding which actions to
restrict. And under Permissive Liberalism, the line stays true to the lowest common denominator
of liberal doctrine.
Bayles and Ellis are just a few of the scholars who support the permissive liberal
conception of the public sphere.60 Nonetheless, reviewing their standards for what should be
allowed has helped us better conceptualize the permissive liberal position altogether. Permissive
liberals do not deny that there are certain behaviors which ought not to be allowed; and
permissive liberals differ on what the criteria of differentiation ought to be. But they deny that
such criteria should reflect those actions which society disapproves of. In this sense, while
permissive liberals differ on which standards ought to guide restrictability, they are united in a
shared disapproval of Interest-Balancing (and Restrictive) Liberalism. Most importantly, given
that Permissive Liberalism avoids the illiberal pitfalls that plague the other schools, we can
consequently conclude that it is the only truly liberal tradition among the three groups.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to find which actions can be prohibited under liberal
doctrine. Since liberal scholars are divided as to how liberalism is formulated, I have located
liberalism’s lowest common denominator, which is that an action being immoral is not sufficient
to restrict it. Similarly, all liberals agree with the harm principle (although many modify it), the
idea that harm to others is the only reason for which societies may restrict individual autonomy.
More specifically, I accept that liberals are opposed to
1. Strong paternalistic laws
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2. Laws prohibiting an activity simply on the ground that it contravenes some moral or
religious code
3. Laws prohibiting an activity simply because the majority wish it to be prohibited
4. Laws requiring an activity simply because it is customary.61
But following the establishment of the right to privacy, the narrowing of obscenity, and
the constitutional expansion of the public sphere, the debate over liberalism changed from one
over whether the harm principle should be applied to how it should be applied, specifically in the
public sphere. Given that restrictive liberals wrote in the context of the liberalism v. moralism
debate, their position does not properly fit the intra-liberal public autonomy debate. In the
contemporary debate over public autonomy, we take as an axiom the idea that there are at least
some offensive actions which must be allowed in the public sphere.
Feinberg’s offense principle aims to balance individuals’ right to autonomy with others’
right not to be offended. His “scales analogy,” where he weighs an action’s reasonableness with
the amount of offense it causes, is meant to prevent offense while excluding prejudice-based
restrictions. But when one more closely examines Feinberg’s weighing standard, it is clear that
public nudity, which is only offensive because of cultural body standards and is perfectly
reasonable, can only be prohibited under a philosophy that would allow us to restrict interracial
hand-holding: the illiberal premise that laws should defer to the majority’s interests. If we accept
a “liberal conception of law,” actions which are “reasonable” under Feinberg’s standard cannot
be restricted merely because they contravene accepted moral codes.
Given that Interest-Balancing Liberalism lends weight to (socially-constructed) offense at
the expense of individual autonomy, we are left with the only remaining school of public
liberalism: Permissive Liberalism. Permissive Liberalism, which does not lend any weight to the
public’s preferences (unless the action is universally or intrinsically offensive,) is the only theory
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of public space which stays true to liberal doctrine. Interest-Balancing Liberalism does not allow
all offensive actions to be restricted, but it does let society preference certain cultural moralities
when adjudicating restrictability; this is evident when one considers the case of public nudity.
Permissive liberal theorists go further: they argue, as I do, that a liberal conception of the law
cannot favor one culturally-learned conception of decency over another. Consequently, we can
only restrict offensive actions using a standard which does not lend weight to the public’s
culturally-learned morality. And with regard to public nudity, permissive liberals hold that there
is no basis, without making moralist claims, to outlaw it.
Given that liberal theorists adopt a juridico-discursive account of law, the question of
whether liberal doctrine has been legally enforced is highly relevant. To this end, we must
examine how the Supreme Court, which (as established in Chapter One) supposedly follows
liberal principles, has dealt with the issue of public autonomy. Exploring the legal limits of
public autonomy in the United States is key to understanding whether liberal theory has
succeeded in enforcing its account of freedom. Essentially, if we take law as the main vehicle of
regulation and see liberal doctrine as guaranteeing individual autonomy, are we already free?
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4: Liberal Doctrine and the U.S Constitution
This chapter, like the last, adopts a juridico-discursive notion of power in order to better
understand liberal’s account of the relationship between individual “autonomy,” publicity, and
the law. In the previous chapter, we found that Permissive Liberalism is the only theory of the
public sphere which accords with liberal doctrine, which, at minimum, holds that actions cannot
be restricted solely because they contravene a certain morality.1 The limits of public autonomy
(given liberal doctrine,) I concluded in my third chapter, cannot be formulated using principles
which lend weight to culturally-based offense. Specifically, with regard to public nudity,
liberalism requires us to permit individuals to be unclothed. But is this theory reflected in
American Constitutional law? As discussed in the first chapter, nineteenth and early twentieth
century American law’s approach to individual autonomy was largely characterized by legal
moralism, which held that protecting “public morals” was a valid function of state police power;
the standing interpretation of the Constitution was that state and local governments could police
actions which the community found immoral.2 In the second half of the twentieth century,
however, such police power was gradually rolled back. Specifically, the Supreme Court
established a right to privacy and narrowed the definition of what counted as “obscene.” While
actions that threatened society’s moral fabric could once be prohibited, the Supreme Court
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limited when and which actions governments could restrict because they were “obscene”3;
essentially, the Supreme Court increasingly rejected legal moralism. But the fact that the U.S
Constitution secures a right to privacy, and that it respects some level of autonomy in public,
does not necessarily mean that it is truly a liberal government.4 This chapter examines the second
part of the liberal public autonomy question; I ask: does American law hold true to permissive
liberal doctrine? Finding whether Constitutional precedent is in line with liberal doctrine is
crucial to liberal theorists, given their belief that power is primarily manifest through (negative)
law. In order for individuals to be free, liberal theorists would argue, they must be free from
unnecessarily constraining laws. If the U.S Constitution (as interpreted by the Supreme Court)
does not adhere to (permissive) liberal principles, then it is not in line with liberal theory; to
liberal theorists, that may suggest that individuals are not autonomous before the law.
I plan to explore this question, as I have throughout this thesis, through the example of
public nudity. As discussed in Chapter Two, nakedness refers to the unconstructed, undressed
body. Nudity, by contrast, is associated with the body taboo; individuals’ state of undress is
constructed as sexual, shameful, and/or lewd in public. The public’s feeling of offense at an
individual’s state of undress hinges on their body’s construction as nude. And public nudity
proscriptions designed to protect “public sensibilities” operate on this assumption. Consequently,
examining how the Supreme Court has ruled on public nudity is crucial to understanding the
relationship between social constructs, public autonomy, and the Constitution.5 In Chapter One,
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Section III, I charted the limits of public autonomy, explaining the seemingly inconsistent
rationale by the Court in public autonomy. In this chapter, I want to explore that contradiction in
greater depth. To this end, I analyze four Supreme-Court cases dealing with the public sphere,
three of which deal with nudity in public (the other regards the limits of public autonomy more
generally and provides relevant precedent for the other cases.)6 Throughout this chapter, I seek to
understand how the Supreme Court has ruled on public nudity, which provides a window into its
position toward public autonomy more generally. In the previous section, I found that Permissive
Liberalism is the only theory of the public sphere which accords with liberal principles. If the
Supreme Court has adhered to permissive liberal principles, we might conclude that American
law follows liberal doctrine, both in public and private. But if the Constitutional “right to
privacy” is not mirrored by a “right to public autonomy,” then perhaps American law does not
adhere to liberal principles. For liberal theorists, whether an individual is free all but completely
hinges on whether they are free from unnecessarily constraining laws; finding whether the
Constitution is in line with liberal principles is thus pivotal.
Four specific cases help us diagnose when governments are Constitutionally justified in
restricting public autonomy. These cases all deal with when governments can restrict
individuals’ freedom to act in the public sphere. While the first deals with the question of public
autonomy and the first amendment more generally, the other three look at the question through
the lens of public nudity. These cases, which concern either the First or Fourteenth Amendment,
are a window into how the legal limits of the public sphere compare to those laid out by liberal
doctrine. While the cases concern disparate Constitutional questions, they provide a window into
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the more general limits of the public sphere when taken as a whole. The first case, (Cohen v.
California,) while not explicitly dealing with public nudity, was a landmark Supreme Court case
which determined whether offense always justified restricting autonomy in the public sphere.7
The precedent established in Cohen was also instrumental in the Court’s future rulings on
publically displayed nude images, specifically in Erzodnik v. Jacksonville.8 Erzodnik, along with
the two remaining cases, deal with whether governments can restrict public nudity; this provides
a window into more general questions of public autonomy. Liberal doctrine, as argued in the
previous chapter, does not permit restrictions on public nudity in order to shelter the public from
offense. So seeing how the Court has ruled on public nudity is pivotal to understanding the
Constitution’s overall approach to the public sphere.
With regard to the Constitution, cases regarding public autonomy might trigger questions
about the first amendment, particularly its free speech guarantee. Moreover, if a government
discriminates against a specific action, while allowing others of similar social impact, cases
dealing with public autonomy might also concern the fourteenth amendment, specifically the
clause which guarantees equal protection under the law.9 While the Court evaluated the cases in
the context of these specific Constitutional amendments, I take the rulings as a whole as a
window into larger questions about the relationship between standing Constitutional
interpretation and liberal doctrine.
I take my cases from a section in Geoffrey Stone’s Sex and the Constitution, in which
Stone charts the Court’s increased permissiveness in the second half of the twentieth century.10
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Stone uses Erzodnik and Cohen as evidence that the Court became increasingly permissive with
respect to the nude body and the public sphere (in the 1960’s and 1970’s,) while explaining that
such increased autonomy was (later) offset by Erie v. Pap’s A.M and Barnes v. Glen Theatre
Inc.; in the latter cases, the Court was highly deferential to local and state governments with
regard to public nudity.11 Stone’s section is useful insofar as it provides a brief historical
overview of the expanding public sphere in the late twentieth century. But Stone does not focus
on the question of public autonomy, using the aforementioned cases as part of a larger story
about the gradually liberalizing Supreme Court. Given that Stone asks a different question, he
reviews a wider amount of cases than I do; for my purposes, I take those cases which are most
relevant to public nudity. Focusing on the Constitutional limits of public autonomy, I analyze a
few of his cases in greater depth within the context of the intra-liberal public autonomy debate
and liberal doctrine more generally.
I. Cohen and Erzodnik: Expanding Public Autonomy
Stone cites two cases which marked a liberal turn toward autonomy in the public sphere:
Cohen v. California and Erzodnik v. Jacksonville.12 In this section, I explain and analyze the
decisions in the two cases, asking whether the restrictability framework laid out in these cases
accords with Permissive Liberalism (as I established in the previous chapter, Permissive
Liberalism is the sole liberal theory which accords with the lowest common denominator of
liberal doctrine.)
In 1968, Paul Robert Cohen, a 19-year-old college student, entered a Los Angeles
courthouse to testify on behalf of an acquaintance. But Cohen never made it into the courtroom
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itself; he was arrested in the corridor for wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft.”
Cohen later recounted in an interview that a woman whom he had met the night before stenciled
the phrase on his jacket, an event which he did not remember when getting dressed that
morning.13 Nonetheless, Cohen was arrested in violation of section 415 of the California Penal
Code, which prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct," and sentenced to 30 days in jail.14
Cohen appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and ultimately to the Supreme Court,
“testifying that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of
informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft."15 Given
that he did not intend to offend, Cohen argued, his act was a valid form of personal expression
and the state of California had no right to prohibit it. The question before the Supreme Court,
consequently, was whether the state of California could prohibit individuals from displaying
potentially-offensive words in public. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. Harlan
began by citing the Appeals Court’s account of the events “‘The defendant did not engage in, nor
threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct that in fact commit or threaten
to commit any act of violence. The defendant did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was
there any evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest.’" So given that Cohen was not
deliberately attempting to harm or offend anyone, could his conduct be restricted on the basis
that some found it offensive?
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The Court answered in the negative, holding that “absent a more particularized and
compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal
offense.”16 Given that Cohen’s conduct was done in order to exercise his opinions on the draft
(or so he claimed,) it qualified as an exercise of speech. While the “fighting words doctrine”
articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire held that foul language directed at someone was not
protected by the First Amendment, the word “fuck,” in this case, was not directed at a particular
person.17 Consequently, Harlan argued, the “Appellant's conviction…rests squarely upon his
exercise of the "freedom of speech" protected from arbitrary governmental interference by the
Constitution, and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner in which he
exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message it
conveys.”18 Harlan here claimed that while the state of California could not restrict Cohen’s antidraft message, it could regulate the time place and manner in which it could be displayed.
Anticipating this argument, the State of California also formulated a second argument: the law
was not a restriction on speech but on where it was expressed; specifically, the state had an
interest in protecting the sensibilities of “sensitive citizens” (such as women and children) in the
Courthouse. But the Court rejected that the California statute was a valid place restriction,
arguing that unlike residents confronted by “raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside
their residences,” the persons in the Courthouse, if they found the word “fuck” to be offensive,
could merely “avert their eyes.” Despite the potential offense felt by persons in the courtroom,
Cohen’s right to display his message how, where, and when he wanted to could not be restricted.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun (joined by Justices Burger and Black)
argued that Cohen’s conduct was an “immature antic” and consequently qualified as mere
“conduct” rather than “speech.” Moreover, the dissenters refuted the majority’s contention that
the case did not qualify under the “fighting words doctrine” established in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, arguing that “this Court's agonizing over First Amendment values seems misplaced
and unnecessary.”19 Given that, according to the dissent, the word “fuck” qualified as a “fighting
word,” Cohen’s display of it was not a form of speech protected under the First Amendment. The
State of California had the right to restrict the word “fuck” to protect public sensibilities.
While Cohen later recounted that wearing the jacket was accidental and symptomatic of
his having a “Ph.D in partying in those days,” his jacket spawned a landmark free speech
decision. The enormity of the Court’s verdict cannot be overstated: insofar as Cohen’s behavior
was not done with the intent to harm or offend, it was unconstitutional for the state of California
to suppress his autonomy, even if others found it offensive. Moreover, the Court ruled that while
governments can regulate the time, place, and manner of certain offensive actions (a premise in
line with Permissive Liberalism,20) the mere offense suffered by the sight of a foul word was not
sufficient to justify restricting Cohen’s autonomy; it was not on Cohen to change his behavior
but rather on the viewer, if they found Cohen’s message disturbing, to look away. This case
redefined when governments could restrict offensive behavior in public. Cohen established that
the offense suffered by a certain action, and a desire to protect community sensibilities, was not
sufficient to curb autonomy.
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But does the principle established in Cohen, that governments cannot always restrict
actions on the basis of their offense alone, have limits? Cohen, after all, concerned an individual
expressing a political message; does such a right also apply to potentially-offensive sights that
are not politically-motivated? Moreover, does the same principle also apply to the display of
offensive images? Stone raises this very question; “suppose above the words ‘fuck the draft’ on
his jacket, Cohen had drawn an image of a naked man with an erect penis ‘fucking’ the director
of the local draft board? Suppose he placed that image on a billboard.”21 The Court considered a
similar issue in Erzodnik v. Jacksonville.22 The issue came to a head when a drive-in movie
theater in Jacksonville, Florida was convicted of violating a local law making it a public nuisance
(a punishable offense) for a drive-in movie theater to showcase films containing nudity if the
screen was visible from the public street. The City of Jacksonville justified the law on the
grounds that it prevented the sensibilities of un-consenting adults and minors. Richard Erzodnik,
the manager of the University Drive-in Theater, was fined for showing a movie displaying
female breasts and buttocks.
The question before the Court was whether the Jacksonville law banning the display of
nude images was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Could the City of Jacksonville
selectively ban the display of nude images on screens seen from the street? The constitutional
stance at the time was that materials deemed obscene could be selectively restricted under state
police power.23 And three years prior to Erzodnik, the Court had redefined the definition of
obscenity. In order for something to be obscene, the Court had to determine three things:
1. whether the average person, applying contemporary "community standards", would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
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2. whether the work depicts or describes, in an offensive way, sexual conduct or
excretory functions, as specifically defined by applicable state law (the syllabus of the
case mentions only sexual conduct, but excretory functions are explicitly mentioned on
page 25 of the majority opinion); and
3. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.24
Mere nudity, the Court held, did not qualify. While the respondents for the City of Jacksonville
acknowledged such a fact, they nonetheless claimed that “any movie containing nudity which is
visible from a public place may be suppressed as a nuisance.”25 Specifically, the City of
Jacksonville attempted to justify the ordinance on the grounds that it protected the public from
the offense felt by the sight of sexual organs. Second, they argued that the law protected minors
on the street from the sight of sexual organs.26 Finally, they argued that the regulation can be
justified as a traffic regulation, since nude images may distract passing motorists. So even if
nudity was not obscene, could the City of Jacksonville restrict the nude images on these
grounds?
The Court ruled in the negative to all three questions. With respect to the first argument,
“that the nude image could be suppressed in order to protect the public from offense, the Court
ruled that since nudity was not obscene, the City of Jacksonville discriminated against the nude
image merely because it considered it more offensive than other images. Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, explained that a number of freedom of speech cases, including Cohen,
had dealt with the issue of when and where governments can restrict speech. As a principle,
cities have a right to exercise time, place, and manner restrictions on particular acts. “But when
the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
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speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly
limits its power.”27 Essentially, the City of Jacksonville applied an inconsistent rationale with
respect to offense, selectively regulating certain offensive displays based on a prudential
judgment. Since nudity itself was not obscene, it could not be prohibited, even to protect the
public (including minors) from offense, merely on the grounds that it may offend some viewers.
Moreover, even if it could, the City of Jacksonville did nothing to restrict other images which
might be offensive to viewers. The law singled out nudity which, since it was not obscene, could
not be restricted in order to protect public sensibilities. Basing their ruling on the precedent
established in Cohen, the Court held that individuals had a limited right to be protected from
offensive images in public; and just like in Cohen, the Court ruled that if an individual felt
offended by the nude image, it was their responsibility to “readily avert [their] eyes.”28
The Court next addressed whether the regulation could nonetheless be upheld to protect
minors from crude sights. The City of Jacksonville argued that “even though it cannot prohibit
the display of films containing nudity to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means of
protecting minors from this type of visual influence.” But the Court rejected this argument.
While the majority conceded that “states and municipalities may adopt more stringent controls
on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults,” there are only
specific circumstances under which governments can bar the public display of protected
materials to them.29 In this case, the Court ruled, the restriction is broader than necessary; the
ordinance did not prohibit sexually explicit nudity but rather all nudity regardless of purpose.
Since mere nudity was not obscene, it could not be restricted merely because the government
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thought it best that children not see it. With respect to the third argument, that the restriction was
justified as a traffic regulation, the majority argued that nothing in the text of the law indicated
that it was designed as such. And even if it was, the ordinance is still unjustified insofar as it
singles out nudity; many other sights displayed on a screen could be just as distracting to a
passing motorist. The Court’s rejection of all three rationales reveals the majority’s argument
that nudity could not be legally singled out.
Erzodnik established that absent a more compelling reason, states could not regulate
where nudity is displayed merely because individuals found it offensive. While the Court
accepted that displays of obscenity were not protected under the First Amendment and could be
restricted under state police power, nudity itself was not obscene. Consequently, there was no
reason to treat nudity as any less valuable than other content (which individuals might find
offensive) displayed on a screen. Just like in Cohen, actions done in public, insofar as they are
not directed at anyone, cannot be restricted in order to protect persons who might incidentally be
offended by them.
Two separate dissenting opinions were filed. The first, written by Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, argued that the restrictions were a valid function of state police power. Explicitly
refuting the majority’s claim that passerby’s could merely “divert their gaze,” Burger wrote that
“the screen of a drive-in movie theater is a unique type of eye-catching display that can be highly
intrusive and distracting.”30 Given that nude images have a unique effect on the viewer and are
difficult to ignore, governments have a legitimate interest in proscribing their display. Justice
White, in his dissent, argued if the Court is willing to prohibit the display of nude images on said

30

Cohen at 222.

112

grounds, then the Court must be prepared to allow public nudity, a step he was not prepared to
take.
The ruling as a whole leaves open the question of whether public nudity is similarly
protected under such a ruling. Perhaps one could such an argument: given that the sight of the
body is not obscene, Feinberg’s housewife in the supermarket’s right to go unclothed cannot be
restricted merely to protect the interests of those who might incidentally be offended.31 The
housewife’s nudity is not aimed to offend anyone and consequently the state may not prohibit the
sight of her body, which is not obscene, merely on the grounds that some might be offended by
it. While one could make such a case, the Court has never applied Erzodnik to public nudity
outright, and restricting public nudity remains a valid function of state police power (as we shall
soon see.) Nonetheless, Justice White, in his dissent, raised the possibility that the precedent
established in Erzodnik, might be interpreted in such a way; frustrated with the majority’s outline
of the public sphere, Justice White protested that “If this broadside is to be taken literally, the
State may not forbid ‘expressive’ nudity on the public streets, in the public parks, or any other
public place, since other persons in those places at that time have a ‘limited privacy interest,’ and
may merely look the other way.” Justice White’s comment speak to the potential implications of
the Court’s rulings in the two aforementioned cases.
Public nudity aside, both Cohen and Erzodnik were massive transformations in the limits
of state police power. While governments could once enact mandatory privacy restrictions in
order to protect the sensibilities of individuals in public, the two cases rolled back the
understanding that individuals always had a right to be protected from sights which they found

31

Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 2: Offense to Others (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987), 40.

113

offensive. The burden of preventing offense to the public was no longer on the actor but on the
viewer, who had the responsibility of “averting their eyes.” This definition of the public sphere’s
limits would qualify under Permissive Liberalism, given that it does not allow actions to be
restricted merely because they cause offense. The Court’s use of “obscenity” as a hard backstop
for what can be restricted might be compared to Ellis’ “intrinsic offensiveness” standard or
Bayles’ “reasonableness” standard. And like permissive liberals, the standard that the Court laid
forth in Cohen in Erzodnik held that preventing offense did not necessarily justify curbing
individual autonomy.
II. Glen Theatre and Erie: Tightening the Loosened Reins
While Cohen and Erzodnik stood for the principle that state police power in the public
sphere was not unlimited, the Court seemingly reaffirmed that power twenty years later. In
Barnes v. Glen Theatre and Erie v. Pap’s A.M, the Court ruled that laws prohibiting public
nudity did not violate the first amendment;32 the Court also ruled that such laws could be applied
to restrict nude dancing in private business establishments like the Kitty Kat Lounge and
Kandyland, which, according to the Court, were “essentially places of public accommodation.”33
In both cases, the Supreme Court attempted to justify the proscriptions using liberal language,
and accepted that there were certain situations in which public expression outweighed offense
and warranted Constitutional protection. Nonetheless, their rulings that public nudity (both in
itself and in the form of nude dancing) could be restricted without violating the First or
Fourteenth Amendment suggests a departure from the more permissive interpretation of the
Constitution laid out in Cohen and Erdodnik.
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In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, the Supreme Court ruled on which actions governments could
prohibit without infringing on free speech. In the case, a statewide Indiana law banning public
nudity was applied to restrict nude dancing in the Kitty Kat Lounge, a club that featured full
nude striptease. The state claimed that the Kitty Kat Lounge qualified as a public place and was
therefore subject to the law; striptease was not prohibited, but dancers would be required to wear,
at least, pasties and G-strings. The primary question before the Court was whether forcing
dancers to wear pasties and G-strings violated the dancers’ First Amendment right to free speech.
The owners of the Kitty Kat Lounge challenged the law, claiming that such a ban violated
the dancers’ First Amendment rights. First, they argued that nude dancing was expressive speech
protected by the First Amendment, as had been established in a number of previous Supreme
Court Cases;34 consequently, the plaintiffs argued, the State of Indiana could not restrict it. The
Court rejected this argument, however, claiming that since the statute was designed to restrict
public nudity (as opposed to nude dancing,) the law was justified. The plaintiff’s claim that the
restrictions violated their right to free expression was dismissed; “This governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since public nudity is the evil the State seeks to
prevent.”35 Ruling on public nudity for the first time, the plurality swiftly declared that since it
was not a form of speech, individuals’ ability to be unclothed could be restricted in order to
protect the public from offense.
With regard to the nude dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge (considered a form of public
nudity,) the Court, while accepting that the act of “erotic dancing” was expressive, argued that
the nude aspect of that dancing was not. They consequently employed the “O’Brien Test,” which
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adjudicated when governments could restrict speech. According to O’Brien, regulations on
speech in public are subject to the following considerations: “The regulation must 1) be within
the constitutional power of the government to enact, 2) further an important or substantial
government interest, 3) that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech (or "content
neutral", as later cases have phrased it), and 4) prohibit no more speech than is essential to
further that interest.” 36 The Court also used the precedent of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, which
established that nude dancing establishments could be subject to time place and manner
restrictions in accordance with O’Brien. First, the restriction was within the government’s
constitutional power, since it prohibited public nudity, not nude dancing. Second, the restriction
was unrelated to suppressing the message conveyed by erotic dancing, since the restriction
served a valid state interest in eliminating the secondary effects associated with such dancing,
such as “prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal activity.”37 Third, that interest was
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, since nudity played no expressive role in the
dancing; to them, the message was “erotic dancing,” and restricting the nude aspect of it did not
change the message expressed. Wearing pasties and G-strings, for the Court, “does not deprive
the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less
graphic.”38 Finally, the law did not prohibit more speech than necessary, given that it still
permitted erotic dancing despite the dancers’ clothing restrictions. Taken together, the State of
Indiana’s public nudity ban, according to the Court, passed the O’Brien test.
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, dissented.
Specifically, White argued that the law did not pass part three of the O’Brien test. For White,
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nudity is an integral aspect of the message expressed in “erotic dancing.” Forcing dancers to
wear pasties and G-strings wholly changes the message and takes away one of its key expressive
aspects. precisely because of nudity’s expressiveness that the state chooses to forbid public
nudity, because the state desires to control the negative secondary effects such as prostitution and
degradation of women. The state’s interest in forcing dancers to wear pasties and G-strings is
clearly related to the suppression of free speech and thus unconstitutional.
Throughout the case, one can see the Court’s illiberal appeals to public morality,
specifically when explaining why public nudity was a valid proscription under the law:
Public indecency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin, and presently exist in at least
47 States. Public indecency, including nudity, was a criminal offense at common law, and
this Court recognized the common law roots of the offense of "gross and open indecency"
in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). Public nudity was considered an act
malum en se. Le Roy v. Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1664). Public
indecency statutes such as the one before us reflect moral disapproval of people
appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.39
The Court here explained that state police power allows governments to restrict actions because
the public disapproves of them. Referring to common law, the Court argued that public nudity
could be made illegal not because of the real harm that it inflicted on others but rather because
there has been a longstanding tradition of prohibiting it. The claim that common law considered
public nudity an “act malum en se” (wrong in itself) reveals that for the Court, proscribing public
nudity did not require there to be a proven tangible harm; rather, public nudity’s tradition as an
immoral, illegal act was sufficient to uphold current laws proscribing it. The Court argued that it
was not unconstitutional for laws to be based on morality, or for them to be designed to protect
the public from offense. With respect to the relationship between law and morality, the Court
cited a precedent established in a case concerning sodomy, in which the Court held that
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‘The law…is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts
will be very busy indeed.’ Thus, the public indecency statute furthers a substantial
government interest in protecting order and morality.40
The Court here justified restrictions on public nudity by claiming that laws which enforced
morality are not necessarily unconstitutional. This is a marked departure from the Court’s claim,
in Erzodnik, that moral offense derived from the sight of the body is not sufficient not justify
restricting non-obscene messages.41
Furthermore, the Court established that the law can restrict when and where individuals
can be nude. Such time, place, and manner restrictions are not necessarily illiberal; Bayles (a
permissive liberal,) by ascribing to Feinberg’s “reasonableness” standard, accepts that actions
can be restricted if there are alternative opportunities for expressing the same message. But what
is illiberal is the Court’s interpretation of the facts in Glen Theatre in a way that fit the criteria of
restrictability set forth in Renton. That the Court could restrict the nudity in nude dancing
(considered a form of speech) without infringing on the dancers’ right to free speech relies on the
claim that being unclothed is itself not a form of speech.
In this respect, the Court appeared to draw the line between what can and cannot be
circumscribed to the private sphere along what qualifies as speech; this raises a question about
how “speech” is defined. It might be argued that being unclothed is expressive, and consequently
that forcing the dancers to wear pasties and G-strings restricts the message expressed by the
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dancers. 42 But the plurality drew a line between “expressive” actions and “speech.” While nudity
was expressive, it did not qualify as speech.
Some may view restricting nudity on moral grounds as necessarily related to expression.
We disagree. It can be argued, of course, that almost limitless types of conduct including appearing in the nude in public - are "expressive," and in one sense of the word
this is true. People who go about in the nude in public may be expressing something
about themselves by so doing. But…‘We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labelled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.43
The plurality here drew a narrow definition of speech. Speech, which cannot be restricted, does
not include all expressive actions; rather, only certain expressive actions are afforded the status
of “speech.” But how is “speech” determined? Why was the message on Cohen’s jacket
considered “speech” while Feinberg’s “nude housewife in the supermarket’s” state of being
would not be? The Court’s statement here is a slippery slope. The Court apparently made the
argument that “expression warrants complete protection except when it doesn’t.” Since the
public would be so greatly offended by public nudity, the court reasoned, nudity cannot be
granted the status of “speech,” which would afford it all-but-complete protection. But if actions’
perception guides whether they can be protected, the logic behind free speech protections is
completely undercut. Unlike permissive liberals, who argue that the law cannot discriminate
between forms of expressive behavior, the Court’s standing definition of what counts as
“speech” in Glen Theatre drew parameters within which free expression could exist.
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While in Cohen and Erzodnik, the Court expanded autonomy in public, in Glen Theatre
the Court clarified that such autonomy has limits. The Court passively addressed Justice White’s
claim that under the decision in Erzodnik, one might similarly argue that public nudity could not
be prohibited; the majority clarified that states could prohibit public nudity not only to protect
community sensibilities but also because it is “wrong in itself.” Moreover, the Court ruled that
nudity itself, although expressive, was not a form of “speech” and could consequently be
restricted in order to moderate the message expressed (speech, as established in Cohen, cannot be
restricted). This distinction between expression and speech seemingly affirmed (in the wake of
Cohen) that only when expressing certain messages are individuals afforded complete autonomy.
The Court’s position on public restrictability, which affords some forms of expression more
legitimacy than others, is certainly narrower than Permissive Liberalism, which holds that
society cannot make value-judgments with regards to which actions can be restricted.
The Court’s conception of the public sphere was affirmed nearly a decade later in Erie v.
Pap’s A.M.44 The case concerned whether Kandyland, a nude dancing establishment in Erie, PA
could be banned from exhibiting totally nude dancing under a local law banning public nudity. In
a case almost identical to Glen Theatre, the Court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of
local police power; neither the statute, nor its application, violated the dancers’ right to speech.
Like in Glen Theatre, the Court evaluated the law under the O’Brien test.45 And like in Glen
Theatre, it found that the law met all four standards for speech restrictions. While the ordinance
was applied to prohibit nude dancing, considered a form of speech, the fact that the law was
designed to suppress public nudity, not nude dancing, showed that the city’s purpose was not to
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restrict speech itself. Rather, the ordinance was designed to combat “crime and other negative
secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments like Kandyland”;
restrictions deemed constitutional nearly twenty years prior.46
Like in Glen Theatre, the Court ruled that “speech” could rarely be restricted. But since
nudity itself was not a form of speech, the restriction on nude dancing was not content-based
(designed to suppress a certain content) but rather content-neutral (designed to suppress the
means by which a message is expressed.) But the argument advanced in City of Erie was slightly
more overt in Glen Theatre. Recall that in Glen Theatre, the Court ruled that pasties and Gstrings did not change the message expressed but rather moderated it; given that nudity itself was
not a form of speech, restricting the nude aspect of the dance did not regulate speech. The ruling
in City of Erie went further: like in Glen Theatre, the majority claimed that nude dancing fell on
the “outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection.” But while the Glen Theater court took
this at face value, the City of Erie court took this to mean that the restriction only warranted lowlevel review.47 Thus, the City of Erie’s desire to regulate the secondary effects associated with
nude dancing, despite the limited proof that such restrictions were tailored to remedy the issue,
justified the regulation (even if it had an incidental effect on speech.)
Even if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting
that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers at
Kandyland and other such establishments are free to perform wearing pasties and Gstrings. Any effect on the overall expression48 is therefore de minimis.49
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While in Glen Theatre, the Court claimed that that forcing dancers to wear pasties and G-strings
did not have any effect on speech, the majority in City of Erie added that even if the restriction
affected speech, the suppression was minimal, given that nude dancing is only marginally a form
of speech.
The dissenting justices (Stevens and Ginsberg) contended that the City of Erie’s
regulation was explicit censorship of nudity in a private establishment. They specifically refuted
the majority’s argument that the statute was content-neutral. “Although nude dancing might be
described as one protected "means" of conveying an erotic message, it does not follow that a
protected message has not been totally banned simply because there are other, similar ways to
convey erotic messages.”50 As a result, the restriction failed part three of the O’Brien test. The
justices referred to Glen Theatre, claiming that “The Court's commendable attempt to replace the
fractured decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991), with a single coherent
rationale is strikingly unsuccessful; it is supported neither by precedent nor by persuasive
reasoning.”51 The dissent’s refutation of the majority’s decision serves as a foundation for my
critique of the majority further on.
In City of Erie, the Court was even more deferent to community norms in determining
what could be restricted. While the Court in Glen Theatre articulated a distinction between
speech and expression, with only the latter warranting protection, the Court in City of Erie held
outright that not even all speech warrants legal protection. Given that nude dancing was not
entitled to the same amount of protection as, say, the message on Cohen’s jacket, the Court was
highly deferential to the City of Erie when considering whether compelling dancers to wear
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pasties and G-strings helped combat the secondary effects associated with nude dancing
establishments. Unlike in Erzodnik, where the Court ruled that nudity, since it was not obscene,
could not be restricted without a valid state interest, the Court in City of Erie held that since nude
dancing was only a marginal form of speech, it could be restricted without the slightest evidence
that the restrictions helped combat crime.
More generally, the Court took for granted that laws regulating public nudity were
justified in order to prevent crime. There is little evidence, or common sense, behind the idea that
making dancers wear pasties and G-strings prevents the secondary effects associated with nude
dancing. The secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments clearly have to do
with the establishment itself, not with how much skin the dancers expose. The fact that the Court
was willing to consider nudity a low-level form of speech and consequently be highly deferential
to the City of Erie (again, because the case only fell under low-level scrutiny) reveals the Court’s
deference to community norms in adjudicating which actions are allowed in public. The Court,
by considering nude dancing to be only “marginally covered by the First Amendment,” asserted
that the dancers’ right to free expression in the public sphere (insofar as the court considered
Kandyland to be public) was trumped by the community’s desire to not have offensive behavior
in their area. This standard is even more deferential than that of Feinberg, who argues that the
offendee must be directly affected by the conduct in question in order for the action to qualify as
a restrictable offense. The Court’s standard cannot be easily classified as legal moralist,
restrictive liberal, or interest-balancing liberal. What is clear, however, is that in City of Erie, and
Glen Theatre, the Court did not adhere to (permissive) liberal doctrine.
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Anita Allen argues that the aforementioned cases reveal the Court’s legal moralist
attitude toward sex. 52 Allen begins by laying out three ways in which society compels sexual
modesty: prohibiting public nudity, enforcing “modest” standards of dress, and circumscribing
sexually explicit plays to certain places. Allen focuses on the third category, particularly nude
dancing. Allen breaks down the decisions in Glen Theatre and City of Erie, revealing that the
Court litigated in a way that enforced the social norms of body modesty, particularly with respect
to women; this, according to Allen, is a form of moralist decision-making. I do not aim to
evaluate Allen’s accusation; I chart her critique as a means of raising questions about the Court’s
rationale in the aforementioned cases. Recall that my purpose in this chapter is not to classify the
Court’s public restrictability standard in the context of the four sides of our debate. Rather, I only
have to evaluate whether their standard adhered to permissive liberal doctrine, the manifestation
of liberalism in the public sphere.
Allen explains that in Glen Theatre, the Supreme Court employed the precedent set forth
in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, which established when governments could enact restrictions on
nude dancing. To Allen, “Renton represents the low standard of proof to which the Supreme
Court holds government when it comes to establishing that nudity is harmful. modesty is of a
piece with vice and crime, or how sexual immodesty is otherwise harmful to society.”53
Essentially, given that nudity is considered “low-level speech,” it can be restricted without the
government having to demonstrate how the regulation is designed to stop crime. But to Allen,
nudity is treated as less than speech due to socially-constructed notions of modesty. Likewise,
Allen criticizes the rulings in Glen Theatre and City of Erie, in which the Court held that having
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dancers wear pasties was a valid fix for the secondary effects caused by nude dancing without
limiting (or having a minimal impact on) the dancers’ right to free expression (recall that nude
dancing is technically considered expressive.) She explains that “City authorities were content to
have partially nude dancing continue, so long as dancers were clad in at least “pasties” covering
the nipples of their breasts and "G-strings” covering their genitals; but how is wearing itsy bitsy
pasties and G-strings supposed to alter the alleged tendency of sexually-oriented dancing to
attract crime and vice?” Given what Allen believes to be an inconsistent argument laid out by the
Court coupled with the low level of speech afforded to nudity, she concludes that the Court used
legal moralist principles in the aforementioned cases.
Allen further explains that despite the Court’s claim that the restrictions in Glen Theatre
and City of Erie were ruled “content-neutral,” that is, they regulated the means by which the
message was expressed (rather than the message itself,) the opposite is true. The laws’
justification as “content-neutral” is merely a guise for paternalism. Allen cites Justice White’s
dissent in Glen Theatre, in which he argues that restrictions on nude dancing are meant to
“protect the viewers from what the State believes is the harmful message that nude dancing
communicates.”54 Agreeing with White’s dissent, Allen adds that “It is not just that the state
thinks nudity is immoral; the state is also trying to protect its citizens from an immoral message
they voluntarily seek out to their own detriment. The state treats adults like children.”55 Allen
criticizes the Court’s decisions in the aforementioned cases, arguing that their belief that
individuals ought to be clothed and their convictions about female decency guided their
willingness to defer to state and local police power in regulating it; more generally, such beliefs
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led them to rule that nudity is not itself expressive and consequently that it only qualifies under
low-level review.
Regardless of whether one believes that the Court in City of Erie and Glen Theatre was
legal moralist, it is clear that in the two aforementioned cases, the Court did not adhere to
permissive liberal doctrine. The Court ruled that nudity is not a form of speech, which makes it
restrictable in nude dancing establishments without any effect on speech; not only that, the
majority’s justified public nudity restrictions on the grounds that they protect community
sensibilities and uphold social decency, which reflects the principle that actions can be restricted
based on the offense that they cause. Regardless of whether one characterizes such a belief as
legal moralist, restrictive liberal, or interest-balancing liberal, it is clear that the precedent set by
the Court is more deferential to governments than Permissive Liberalism.
III. Conclusion
After having laid out which actions liberal doctrine allows societies to restrict in the
public sphere, I sought to analyze whether U.S law, the parameters of which are framed by the
Constitution, holds true to such an ideology. As discussed in Chapter Two, the body is inherently
naked but is made nude by a discourse which regulates the body. The publically displayed body
is seen as sexual and consequently lewd, which makes people feel offended by the publically
displayed body. And given that laws governing public nudity stem from how the body is
constructed (as nude,) exploring the Constitutional status of public nudity provides a window
into whether the Constitution, as it currently stands, embraces liberal ideology with respect to the
public sphere.
Cohen, and Erzodnik suggested that the Court was beginning to embrace Permissive
Liberalism. Both cases established that an action being offensive was not sufficient to restrict it;

126

the language used in Erzodnik also left open the possibility that public nudity, insofar as it was
not done in order to offend, could not be prohibited. In order to restrict actions, they had to be
“obscene,” a firm backstop like Ellis’ “intrinsic offensiveness” standard or Bayles’ “irrationality”
standard. Although such principles were not explicitly overturned in Glen Theatre and City of
Erie, the latter cases clarified the limits of public autonomy under the Constitution. Specifically,
City of Erie and Glen Theatre stood for the fact that public nudity could be restricted merely
because the public found it offensive. Free speech protections did not apply to public nudity,
since, according to the Court, only certain expressive actions qualify as speech (and even among
those which do, some warrant greater protection than others); since nudity did not qualify, it can
easily be restricted if the government presents a remotely reasonable rationale. Moreover, nude
dancing can be restricted (under public nudity statutes) if the government presents a roughly
rational reason. The first set of cases, particularly Erzodnik, established that absent a compelling
reason to restrict a particular action, it had to be permitted; the second set of cases, in contrast,
suggested that absent evidence that an action qualified as “speech,” governments reserved the
right to restrict it.
Given that current Constitutional precedent allows actions to be restricted (in public)
based on how they are perceived by the public, the U.S Constitution’s approach to the public is
not in line with liberal doctrine. Understanding this disconnect sets the stage for a normative
assessment of the limits of the public sphere, and the public-private distinction, in the following
chapter.

127

5. Liberating the Public? Power/Knowledge and the
Public-Private Distinction
Liberal theory has been considered a driving force in expanding individual liberty
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Its successful legal conquest of the private
sphere has seemingly been key in protecting the private autonomy of marginalized individuals
such as women and same-sex couples.1 With respect to the private sphere, American law has
been roughly consistent with liberal doctrine: the Court has ruled that actions cannot be regulated
on the grounds that they contravene social morals; actions deemed harmless cannot be restricted
in the private sphere.
Our topic of investigation throughout this thesis has been the other side of this question:
whether actions can be restricted in public based on their perceived immorality. The first chapter
led us to our question, sub-questions, and case study; so let us recap what we have covered since
then. In the second chapter, I explained how laws regulating the unclothed body stem from how
said body is constructed; the body is inherently naked but is turned nude by a system of power
which regulates the body. Given that nudity is socially-constructed, mandatory privacy
restrictions on “public nudity” enforce and create such a construct. Given that liberalism’s lowest
common denominator prevents us from passing paternalistic laws, laws which enforce customs,
and laws which restrict an action merely because it contravenes a socially-accepted code, liberals
cannot support mandatory privacy restrictions on the (public) nude body (Chapter Three.)
Consequently, only Permissive Liberalism’s conception of the public sphere holds true to liberal
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principles. Having defined the parameters of liberal doctrine in the public sphere, we examined
whether U.S Constitutional law, which holds true to liberal principles in private, has stayed true
to these tenets in the public sphere (Chapter Four.) While Cohen v. California and Erzodnik v.
Jacksonville established that offense was not a sufficient reason to restrict individual autonomy
in public, that autonomy was undercut over two decades later in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M and
Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., where the Court ruled that state police power allowed governments
to constitutionally restrict public nudity and nude dancing. The latter two cases rejected
Permissive Liberalism and easily deferred to state and local governments, often willfully
overlooking their moralist intentions. We can see, thus, that the Constitutional understanding of
the public sphere does not adhere to liberal principles.
Liberal theorists see the private as a space where the individual should be left to their
own volitions. When the individual is in private, no degree of offense (felt by the community)
can warrant government interference; securing private autonomy is crucial to ensuring individual
freedom. This narrative, however, changes with respect to the public sphere. But all liberal
theorists agree that the public sphere is fundamentally different than the private; while private
autonomy is fundamental to freedom, the public sphere is where people act as “citizens,” as
members of a collective. There is an intrinsic difference between the public individual and the
private individual. In order to preserve people’s right not to be offended, a society cannot allow
limitless conduct in the public sphere. If this were the case, then liberalism would collapse under
the force of its own weight; liberal theory would be so permissive that there would be no “right

129

not to be offended”; this certainly runs counter to the harm principle, which declares that actions
can be restricted if they cause harm to others.2
To avoid this issue, liberal theorists, no matter how permissive, advocate a backstop
against public freedom. For instance, Anthony Ellis (a permissive liberal) argues that actions that
are “inherently unpleasant to observe” can be restricted.3 Similarly, Michael Bayles (another
permissive liberal) contends that actions which do not qualify as “reasonable” (by Joel
Feinberg’s standard) can be prohibited.4 Permissive Liberalism, as established in Chapter Three,
is the true manifestation of liberal doctrine in the public sphere. Permissive Liberalism avoids
lending weight to culturally-learned offense, which violates liberal principles. Simultaneously,
its backstop prevents liberal theory from collapsing under its own weight. Liberal theory aims to
secure individual autonomy both in public and private. Through this, liberal theorists argue, we
can secure the maximum amount of personal freedom.
Permissive Liberalism is the theory which best secures individual freedom while
preserving the right not to be offended. Nonetheless, our current legal system is not in line with
such principles. While the U.S Constitution adequately protects private autonomy, it severely
falters with respect to securing public freedom. Finding that the Constitution’s approach to the
public sphere differs from liberal doctrine is not necessarily surprising. After all, theorists often
see issues in abstract, not needing to deal with the practical consequences of their opinions. The
Court, on the other hand, operates in the real world, their rulings having tangible effects; what’s
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more, the Court often has to deal with the issue of public backlash.5 Nonetheless, just like Louis
Henkin criticized the Court in the 1960’s, arguing that it should adhere to liberal doctrine in the
private sphere6, so too liberal theorists (like Anita Allen) might critique the Supreme Court for
not adhering to liberal doctrine in the public sphere.7 If we accept liberal theory’s assumptions
about power and freedom, we might conclude thus: the Supreme Court must adhere to
permissive liberal principles in order to secure individual freedom (in the public sphere); the
Court cannot appeal to the community’s perception of a certain action as a justification for
mandatory privacy restrictions. To this end, the constitutional “right to privacy” must be
supplemented with a “right to public autonomy,” which guarantees individuals public freedom in
line with permissive liberal principles. This constitutional principle will ensure that one’s right to
autonomy does not dissipate when they exit their homes. We have already liberated the private
sphere from government interference, now it is time to free the public.
Under a right to public autonomy, public nudity laws would be illegitimate. The
unclothed body is inherently naked; it is constructed as nude. Laws which circumscribe public
nudity stem from such a construction. The “right to public autonomy” would prevent
governments from restricting public nudity. Individuals are born unclothed; nakedness is our
natural state. Just like the body freedom activists (described in Chapter Two Section 2D) argue,
the government has no right to tell individuals to cover their natural bodies; lifting mandatory
privacy restrictions on public nudity will lead to greater freedom. Individuals are currently
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oppressed by laws which force them to either hide their bodies or face legal sanction. These laws
further reinforce the body taboo and prevent the body from becoming naked. The freedom to
reveal one’s natural body would allow individuals to snub the social expectation that clothing be
worn in front of others. This rebellion, might ultimately lead to us not seeing the body as
something to be ashamed of; allowing “body freedom” might work to normalize the body. More
importantly, however, we will be free from laws which force us to adopt a certain dress code. We
would be outraged if governments set laws banning certain styles of dress or certain colors of
clothing. But why is it any less oppressive for the government to obligate us to wear clothing in
the first place? Individual autonomy means that we have the right to showcase our bodies as we
wish. The fact that certain states of (un)dress are socially unacceptable is not a sufficient reason
to outlaw them.
Such is what I call the “liberal conclusion”: the Constitution should secure a right to
public autonomy (in line with permissive liberal principles) in addition to the right to privacy.
This conclusion might suitably answer our question if we accept liberal assumptions about the
subject and the public-private distinction. But applying our analysis of the body (in Chapter
Two) to the liberal conclusion reveals irreconcilable differences between the two accounts of
power. Looking at public nudity helps take the question of public autonomy beyond these liberal
assumptions, using Foucault and other postmodern liberal-critics to push us toward a more
profound understanding of autonomy, the subject, and the public sphere.
I. The Liberal Conclusion: Two Problems
The liberal conclusion, that the Supreme Court must adhere to permissive liberal
principles, may suffice if we accept the liberal assumption of an autonomous subject and their
belief that power is manifest through law, which either permits or suppresses (what Foucault
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calls a “juridico-discursive account of power.) Throughout this thesis, we have accepted certain
liberal premises with respect to individual autonomy and the public-private distinction. Given
that mandatory privacy restrictions on the unclothed body (as well as on other sociallyconstructed offenses) are unjustified under Permissive Liberalism, we might say that Permissive
Liberalism will pave the way for greater freedom. But when we look at the unclothed body, a
number of issues with liberalism’s account of the subject become evident. In this section, I
present two separate but related issues that come with this supposed “liberation of the body.”
A. Problem One: The Liberal Subject
The first problem with the liberal account of the public sphere is that it presumes that the
subject is autonomous and that law is the primary mechanism of regulation. Thus, if mandatory
privacy restrictions on the unclothed body are limited, individuals will have greater autonomy.
But when one cross-applies Foucault’s analytics of power to the unclothed body (as we did in
Chapter Two,) it is evident that liberals mischaracterize how power operates, placing too much
emphasis on negative law and autonomy.
Michel Foucault claims that modern power is primarily positive. Unlike liberals’ negative
account of power, which he terms “juridico-discursive,” Foucault’s “bio-power” is primarily
positive and regulates individuals by constructing knowledge. Foucault explains the difference
between ancient power and modern bio-power. “Power would no longer be dealing simply with
legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the
mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself;
it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to
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the body.”8 Modern power (bio-power) does not regulate through the “threat of death” but rather
holds control over “life itself”; that is, it does not allow or deny but rather controls. As a result,
greater freedom of action under the law does not liberate individuals from power; people
continue to be regulated below the level of law.
Foucault explains that “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”9 Since power constructs truth, the
individual is not autonomous in the way that liberal theorists presume. Liberal theorists assume
that the individual is able to exercise their will freely insofar as they are not constrained by law.
But Foucault argues that even in areas where the law permits certain actions, individuals
continue to be regulated by power. Bio-power, or power over the subject, goes beyond negative
law.
Foucault’s critique of juridico-discursive power becomes apparent when one considers
public nudity. Even if we embrace Permissive Liberalism as a guide for determining which
actions can be circumscribed to the private sphere, we continue to be subject to the body taboo;
that is, erasing mandatory privacy restrictions on the body will not make unclothed individuals
naked. Insofar as the body is stigmatized (it is nude rather than naked,) individuals continue to be
subject to the body taboo. In Section D of Chapter Two, I explained how various groups which
attempted to rebel against the body taboo reinforced it; for instance, they entrenched the idea that
nudists were inherently different from the norm or portrayed that nudism is only to be done in
private. These groups’ experiences reveal how the body’s construction as nude, that which
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regulates it, is eternally present even when individuals may think otherwise. Changing the laws
surrounding public nudity (although potentially allowing for greater agency) will not free the
subject from the power that regulates their state of undress.
That the public body would still be nude despite being legal reveals Foucault’s hostility
to the idea of the autonomous subject who is primarily controlled by prohibitive law. Central to
the juridico-discursive account of law is the notion that there exists an autonomous subject free
from external factors which shape him; the individual is completely in control of themselves and
their actions. But the example of nudity-- that is, that it exists despite a lack of laws proscribing it
-- reveals that power continues to control the subject beneath the level of law. In this sense, there
is no autonomous subject; rather, the subject is constantly subject to the discourse which shapes
them. Embracing Permissive Liberalism may free the subject from legal proscription, but it
leaves them victim to the stigma of nudity.
Foucault rejects the idea of an autonomous subject. But that is not to say that the subject
lacks agency. Below the level of law, Foucault is open to the idea that the subject has choice. In
“Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency Against Autonomy,” Mark Bevir articulates a
difference between autonomy and agency.10 Bevir explains that “a hostility to the subject runs
throughout Foucault's oeuvre.”11 Detailing how the subject is constructed by power, Bevir claims
that “If we take Foucault's hostility to the subject to be a critique of autonomy, it seems to me to
be reasonable.”12 But, unlike certain scholars, who understand the Foucauldian subject as
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passive, Bevir argues that rejecting autonomy does not necessarily entail a rejection of agency.13
Under Foucault’s analytics of power, it is wholly possible for the subject to have choice despite
those choices existing within a field of power relations. “Different people adopt different beliefs
and perform different actions against the background of the same social structure, so there must
be at least an undecided space in front of these structures where individuals decide what beliefs
to hold and what actions to perform.”14 Bevir’s interpretation of Foucault, which is open to the
subject as agent, is quite fitting. After all, insofar as there is disagreement among members of
society, individuals must have some ability to choose one idea over another. To say that the
subject’s actions exist within a limited context is not to say that the they have no ability to act
within that context, and that there cannot be real disagreement among constituted subjects.
Bevir’s definition of autonomy as “freedom from relations of power” follows liberals’ emphasis
on the autonomous subject outside of the scope of law.15 Unlike James Wong, who interprets
autonomy as “self-rule” rather than “self-formation,” Bevir’s interpretation of Foucault holds
that the French philosopher adopted liberal theorists’ definition of autonomy, a concept which he
rejected. Bevir and Wong’s positions are not wholly different; their main point of contention is
not over whether Foucault believes that the subject can act freely within the power relations
which constitute them (they both believe that they can) but rather whether this ability to act
constitutes “autonomy.” But embracing Wong’s definition of autonomy as “self-rule” would
require rejecting the liberal conception of autonomy, or at the very least, differentiating it from
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Wong’s conception of autonomy (as self-rule.) If we are to do this, however, then we find
ourselves with an imprecise definition of autonomy insofar we have to distinguish between
autonomy as “self-rule” and autonomy as “freedom from relations of power.” Bevir’s autonomyagency distinction allows us to better understand the difference between two different definitions
of freedom and, more generally, two separate conceptions of power. And Bevir’s agencyautonomy distinction clarifies that despite the liberal mischaracterization of the subject
(according to Foucault,) they are not completely without the ability to act.
Neve Gordon has a similar understanding of the Foucauldian subject.16 Gordon, like most
Foucauldian theorists, agrees that “power makes human beings into objects by giving them
identities to which a set of categories are attached…The categories or attributes are concatenated
to the subject and are conceived of as natural, normal and/or essential.”17 But Foucault’s later
work, Gordon argues, is more open to the idea of the subject as an agent, which can freely act
within the boundaries of power. Gordon uses Heidegger and Sartre’s ontological accounts of
freedom to make the case that such a freedom can have a place within the web of constraints
imposed by power.18 In this sense, while power defines the parameters within which individuals
can act, they can be radically free within such a web of constraints. Gordon’s embrace of the
autonomy-agency distinction reveals that the subject is not completely tied within power.
Contemporary Foucauldian thinkers, such as Judith Butler, have also embraced the
autonomy-agency distinction. In response to the argument that Foucault’s account of power
leaves no room for action, Butler claims that “To perform this kind of Foucauldian critique of the
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subject is not to do away with the subject or pronounce its death, but merely to claim that certain
visions of the subject are politically insidious.”19 While Butler holds that the idea of a liberal
autonomous subject is “politically insidious,” she does not embrace the view that the subject is
“dead”; “to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the
contrary, the constituted subject is the very precondition of its agency.”20 While Butler agrees
that the subject retains agency despite being determined, she makes clear that agency cannot
exist a priori: agency requires that we presume the subject is constituted by power. Nonetheless,
Butler’s account of the subject as a possible agent reveals that contemporary Foucauldian
thinkers have adopted the agency-autonomy distinction.
Foucault’s account of the subject reveals a flaw in the liberal account of power. While
liberal theorists presume that the subject is autonomous--and consequently emphasize law as the
primary (mostly negative) mechanism of social control-- the subject is controlled by discourse
beneath the level of law; such positive power shapes the subject and their knowledge. In this
sense, embracing Permissive Liberalism fails to completely liberate the unclothed body insofar
as the body continues to be subject to social systems of control--the naked body is still perceived
as nude. But the fact that the subject is not autonomous does not mean that they lack choice.
Power lays out the parameters within which individuals can act, but within those parameters the
individual is a free agent. And given that the subject can act as an agent, lifting laws proscribing
the unclothed body might have real effects on expanding agency. In Chapter Two, I mentioned
that laws control the unclothed body in two ways: 1. they construct the body as taboo, and 2.
they prevent individuals seeking to normalize the unclothed body from legally being able to do
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so (I discuss the first sense in the next sub-section.) With respect to the second point, lifting laws
proscribing the unclothed body may allow individuals to go about unclothed and potentially
work to normalize the body; such might be the sort of small scale resistance that Foucault
envisaged.21 To be fair, these individuals will lack autonomy insofar as their bodies are still
nude. But within the scope of power, legalizing the body would allow more individuals to
actively defy the body taboo, even if their actions are still perceived as indecent by most of
society. Lifting mandatory privacy restrictions does not liberate the body, but it can have
tangible effects on individuals’ ability to express their view within power and perhaps even be a
starting point for resistance against the body taboo. Permissive Liberalism, which seeks to “free
the public sphere” and in the process legalize public nudity, does the right thing for the wrong
reasons.
B. Problem Two: Permissive Liberalism and the Public-Private Distinction
The previous sub-section criticized liberal theorists’ presumption of an autonomous
subject. Even if laws proscribing the unclothed body are lifted, the body’s construction as nude
will remain, even if such a legal change might allow for greater agency. Permissive Liberalism,
given the boundaries that it lays out, is also faced with another problem. By rejecting the other
two traditions, Permissive Liberalism aims to allow for greater autonomy in the public sphere.
But Permissive Liberalism does not allow for limitless conduct in public. Recall that various
permissive liberals formulate their own standards for which actions can be proscribed in public.
For instance, Anthony Ellis holds that liberalism allows governments to restrict actions which are
“intrinsically offensive,” and claims that “It should not be thought, of course, that the liberal
approach has no place for the weighing of interests. Any sensible approach must have a place for
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that.”22 Similarly, Michael Bayles, in adopting Feinberg’s “reasonableness standard,” accepts
that actions which are unreasonable can justly be proscribed.23 The permissive liberal position
carries a hard backstop; while offense is not a sufficient reason to restrict actions, governments
can restrict actions based on other criteria (such actions might include public vomit-eating or
public defecation.)
But insofar as there is a distinction between what is allowed in the public sphere and what
is allowed in private, certain actions will continue to be constructed in line with society’s
understandings of what belongs in public and private. Recall that in Chapter Two, I used a
Foucauldian analytics of power to argue that mandatory privacy restrictions on the unclothed
body reinforce its construction as taboo. I particularly relied on a passage in History of Sexuality,
vol. 1, in which Foucault explains how law, in contemporary society, “…operates more and more
as a norm, and…the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of
apparatuses…whose functions are for the most part regulatory.”24 Foucault argues that law plays
a normalizing role and works to construct and reinforce a certain knowledge. In this case, the
public-private distinction itself normalizes certain actions as acceptable while shunning others. If
we accept the Foucauldian claim that the subject and knowledge are constructed, then we might
similarly argue that circumscribing certain actions (such as vomit-eating, and public defecation)
to the private sphere reinforces their construction as taboo and consequently private.
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Foucault is not the only critic of liberal doctrine to make this argument. Alan Freeman
and Elizabeth Mensch analyze the liberal public-private distinction:
We consistently take for granted that there is both a public realm and a private realm. In
the private realm we assume that we operate within a protected sphere of autonomy, free
to make self-willed individual choices and to feel secure against the encroachment of
others… In contrast, the public realm is a world of government institutions, obliged to
serve the public interest rather than private aims.25
This liberal public-private distinction presumes a difference between those actions which ought
to be allowed in public and those which should be permitted in private. Freeman and Mensch
further argue that the understanding that actions can be classified into two separate realms shapes
how we perceive those actions themselves.
It is part of our lived reality to know that the public realm is different from the private,
that they both exist, but are separate from each other, with different things happening in
each one. That knowledge, in turn, molds our relationships even to our closest friends.26
Freeman and Mensch argue that law plays a normative role in shaping how actions are
constructed. We might perceive actions differently depending on whether we understand them to
belong in the public or private realm. But actions are not inherently “public” or “private.” Rather,
the idea of separate public and private spheres, according to Freeman and Mensch, is a “product
of cultural contingency, not objective reality,” which is created and perpetuated by the legal
distinctions that enforce it.27 And such a worldview may have dangerous consequences. For
instance, abused women might find that the state fails to punish their abusers since such an
action occurred in the private sphere. While the liberal response to these harmful implications is
to “move the line,” arguing, for example, that one’s body is a private sphere which others cannot

25

Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch “The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life” The Buffalo
Law Review, vol. 36, no. 237 (1987): 237.
26
Ibid, 238
27
Ibid.

141

intrude on, this is problematic insofar as liberals fail to see that the distinction is itself arbitrary.
It is not that Freeman and Mensch believe that we cannot use the public-private distinction in
law, but they do highlight the importance of understanding that such a distinction is a construct
and stems largely from the laws enforcing it; this understanding might allow for a “strategic” use
of the public-private distinction, viewing it as an adaptable legal distinction rather than an
intrinsic difference.
If in modern power, law (and the public-private distinction more specifically) plays a
normative role in constructing knowledge, we can hardly say that accepting permissive liberal
doctrine frees us from the hold of power in public. Although embracing Permissive Liberalism
may allow for greater agency, the public-private distinction continues to marginalize those
actions which it does not protect. Insofar as we presume a public-private distinction at all, we
continue to uphold the idea that individual freedom ought to be limited in certain places. What’s
more, we reinforce the taboos surrounding actions which are labeled as “private,” by enforcing
the idea that those actions not protected by Permissive Liberalism are not of public concern. This
is problematic because, according to Foucault, the significance of an action is assigned by power.
If power constructs discourse, protecting certain actions (public nudity, public sex) while not
covering others (public defecation, public vomit eating) plays into the normative system of
power which marginalizes certain actions in the first place.28 What we can see, thus, is that
Permissive Liberalism, by assuming a juridico-discursive notion of power, neglects the
regulatory tendencies infused in its liberatory discourse.
Examining the two problems associated with Permissive Liberalism reveals the extent to
which the individual is constructed by power. While Foucault criticizes the liberal emphasis on
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“law as prohibitive,” he does not completely shun the idea that law plays an active role in
shaping the subject and their knowledge. Foucault sees law in modern society as another
manifestation of bio-power, a positive power which regulates. And given that law has a
normative effect, changing laws might impact on the (constructed) individual’s ability to act.
While it is important to note that embracing Permissive Liberalism will not, in itself, make the
body naked, it is possible that legalizing the unclothed body might eliminate one element in
constructing and perpetuating the body taboo. Moreover, legalizing the body might allow for
greater agency insofar as individuals can be nude without fear of legal reprisal; while their state
of undress would still be taboo, they will be free from the constraining influence of law. We can
conclude this section, thus, by saying that while eliminating mandatory privacy restrictions on
the unclothed body might pave the way for greater agency, legalizing the body as part of a
permissive liberal opposition to certain regulations perpetuates the idea of a real public-private
distinction, which, as Grossman and Herschel argue, has a regulatory effect on the subject; as
previously mentioned, Permissive Liberalism does the right thing for the wrong reasons.
II. Autonomy, Agency, and the Public-Private Distinction
While the two problems associated with embracing Permissive Liberalism appear
separate, they are in fact two sides of the same coin. The first problem, that liberal theory
presumes an autonomous subject, shows that many of liberalism’s assumptions about law being
essentially negative and the ultimate source of regulation might be ill-founded; if the subject is
not autonomous, we cannot assume that law is the primary mechanism of domination over them.
The other problem is that in embracing Permissive Liberalism, we presume a real public-private
distinction. And insofar as law serves a normalizing function in society and power produces
knowledge, we conceive of actions in line with the laws surrounding them. For instance, if an
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action is legally restricted to the private sphere, we see it as something personal. These two
issues, as I mentioned, are in fact part of the same critique of liberal doctrine. In this section, I
explain the joint critique: that the public-private distinction itself depends on the presumption of
an autonomous subject; it requires that an assumed split between a private sphere free from
power and a public sphere where the subject acts as a public citizen (free from their privatelyheld beliefs.) I go on to situate this critique within a wider analysis of the public-private
distinction. Understanding the futility of this split will ultimately lead us to re-evaluate how we
have framed our research question and our assumptions throughout this thesis.
The liberal juridico-discursive account of power presumes a clear distinction between the
public and private subject. To illustrate, this entire thesis has revolved around the distinct
question of public autonomy, (having resolved the question of whether there should be private
autonomy in the affirmative.) For instance, the very idea of a “right to privacy,” established by
the Supreme Court and advocated for (albeit not using the language of rights) by H.L.A Hart in
his debate with Patrick Devlin, presumes that the private sphere is fundamentally different than
the public sphere. This distinction takes as its starting point, as Freeman and Mensch explain,
that while the private sphere is a space for individuals to act as they wish, the public sphere is
where an individual acts as a citizen, a member of a community.29 The idea that the public sphere
is subject to different regulations, in which societies have to balance the right not to be offended
with the right to autonomy, relies on this idea of a two-sided individual. But this concept of the
subject only holds insofar as one presumes that power operates exclusively through law; that is,
it is only if we presume that law (in its prohibitive form) is the primary means of power (there is
an autonomous subject) that we can see the private sphere as a space outside of it. But if we
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reject the juridico-discursive account of power, this distinction appears arbitrary. If the subject is
constructed and lacks autonomy in the first place, then we can hardly say that being free from
(prohibitive) legal imposition makes the subject “free.” The individual, constituted by power,
remains subject to its hold in both the public and private spheres. While we can say, perhaps, that
one has greater agency in the private sphere (insofar as they are not subject to laws that prohibit
certain types of conduct,) the subject similarly lacks autonomy in the public and private spheres.
The fundamental assumptions behind the liberal public-private distinction are undercut once we
move past the juridico-discursive account of law.
The Foucauldian critique of the public-private distinction is situated within a theoretical
camp which criticizes the liberal public-private distinction. Larry Alexander, a permissive
liberal, explains that this camp formulates “conceptual attacks associated with postmodern
thought.”30 The postmodern attack criticizes the fundamental assumptions underlying the liberal
public sphere. Alexander describes the postmodern critique as two-sided: one which he calls
“perspectivalism” and the other which he describes as “the postmodernist claim that the private
subject is a social construction.” “The first attack asserts the conceptual primacy of the private
sphere, while the second asserts the conceptual primacy of the public sphere.”31 The Foucauldian
critique is situated, most likely, within the latter “attack”; but in order to contextualize the
Foucauldian critique, it is important to review the postmodern perspective altogether.
Alexander cites Pierre Schlag as one proponent of the first attack, which again,
Alexander describes as “the postmodernist claim that the private subject is a social construction.”
I will refer to this perspective as the “social-construction perspective.” Schlag explains that
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“contemporary legal thought establish, depend upon and eclipse a quintessentially liberal
individual subject”32 But such an assumption is problematic when “each school recognizes that
its own intellectual architecture, its own normative ambitions rest upon the presupposition of a
subject—a subject whose epistemic, ontological, and normative status is now very much in
question.”33 Liberal theory, once one acknowledges the “problem of the subject,” reveals itself as
confined to a realm of power; that is, it cannot make independent normative judgments about
power because such critiques also exist within the scope of power. This larger critique of liberal
theory can be cross-applied to the public-private distinction. The liberal subject, in the private
sphere, is not outside of power. The public-private distinction, once we acknowledge that the
subject is not autonomous, reveals itself as arbitrary; operating on its basis will, as Schlag (and
Freeman and Mensch) argues, reproduce “a false aesthetic of social life.” Insofar as liberalism
presumes an autonomous subject, all normative legal claims that operate on the basis of such an
assumption fail to carry normative weight. With respect to the private sphere, liberal doctrine
assumes that the private subject can be free from power. Given that this assumption rests on a
juridico-discursive notion of power, the assumption that the private sphere is inherently different
from the public for this reason lacks foundation. The “social-construction” perspective, thus,
undermines the liberal view that the private sphere is outside of power.
The other side of the postmodern liberal critique is what Alexander calls
“perspectivalism.” This view holds not that the public sphere is not a place where individuals act
as “citizens” but rather a place where individuals manifest their “private” identities constructed
by a regime of power/knowledge; in this sense, the public individual does not operate as a citizen
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but as a subject. Once one acknowledges that so-called private identities carry into the public
sphere, the logic behind the separation of the two spheres becomes arbitrary. Martha Minow is a
notable proponent of this view.34 Minow explains the “dilemma of difference”: the problem
associated with how we understand difference itself. Minow claims that “legal treatment of
difference…tends to treat as unproblematic the point of view from which difference is seen,
assigned, or ignored, rather than acknowledging that the problem of difference can be described
and understood from multiple points of view.”35 By presuming difference rather than examining
how “power influences knowledge,” legal theory presents alternate perspectives as “different”
rather than understanding the social factors which positioned that perspective outside of the
norm; moreover, such a treatment of difference neglects the experiences of individuals who may
not fit within recognized categories of difference. Minow explains, however that “once we see
that any point of view, including one's own, is a point of view, we will realize that every
difference we see is seen in relation to something already assumed as the starting point.”36
Justice, then, is not the rights afforded to pre-determined special groups but rather “the quality of
human engagement with multiple perspectives framed by, but not limited to, the relationships of
power in which they are formed.”37 For the perspectivalist, the public sphere is a construct; it
reflects a particular perspective. There is no such thing as a neutral “public sphere,” where only
certain actions belong. Rather, there can only be, for instance, a “male public sphere” or an
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“able-bodied public sphere.” Once one acknowledges that there is no such thing as an objective,
neutral public sphere, one undercuts the entire logic behind keeping the two realms separate.
Alexander denounces both sides of the postmodern critique, writing that
Both of these conceptual attacks on the public/private distinction, carried to the extreme,
completely collapse the public and private spheres into one another…Both the relativism
of perspectivalism and the determinism of postmodernism [the social construction
perspective] are skeptical claims that, like all strong forms of skepticism, are ultimately
self-undermining and normatively impotent. Relativism and social construction leave
everything unchanged. There is a public/private distinction. We perceive matters as
appropriately assigned to one or the other of these domains in part because we are
socially constructed to do so.38
Alexander argues that the postmodern critiques of the public-private distinction end in extreme
relativism and collapse the public-private distinction into each other. But, Alexander argues, the
public-private distinction is real insofar as we see things as public or private, even if that is a
result of how we are conditioned.39 Consequently, the differences between public and private
continue to be legally relevant. But Alexander misses the point of the postmodernist critiques. It
is not that realizing that the public-private distinction is arbitrary necessarily requires us to
abolish it; none of the theorists we have covered advocate such a solution. Rather, what the
postmodern critiques teach us is that it is necessary to first acknowledge that the public/private
distinction is constructed (much like we might acknowledge that power regulates us beyond
law), even if, for our purposes, it is necessary to employ it.40 Once we acknowledge this, we can
discuss the legal implications.
III. The Wider Debate
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The liberal conclusion, that the Supreme Court should adopt permissive liberal principles,
encounters two related problems: liberal theory mistakenly presumes an autonomous subject, and
the public-private distinction itself limits freedom insofar as it constructs and codifies certain
actions as “public,” meaning for the collective good, or “private,” meaning personal. Those
constructs reveal themselves as arbitrary once we acknowledge how power operates. Both
critiques come together in the two-sided “postmodern” critique of the liberal public-private
distinction. The postmodern critique holds that since the subject is not autonomous--that is,
power constructs the individual and their knowledge of the world—the designation of actions as
“public” or “private” is ill-founded. But the postmodern critique is situated within a wider web of
criticism of the liberal public-private distinction. In this section, I contextualize the postmodern
critique by reviewing Marxist and Feminist attacks on the public-private split.
A number of second-wave feminists took issue with the liberal public-private distinction,
particularly its conception of the household as a space free from government intrusion.
Moreover, liberal theory often presumes that its subjects are “heads of households,” neglecting
the interests of “dependents,” such as women and children. One such critic is Catharine
MacKinnon. MacKinnon, a radical feminist, argues that presuming a public-private distinction is
instrumental for the liberal state in enforcing male supremacy.41 In particular, the liberal notion
of an impenetrable private sphere constructs marital rape and abuse as “private matters.”
MacKinnon writes that “private means consent can be presumed unless disproven. To contain a
systematic inequality contradicts the notion itself.”42 Liberalism sees privacy from a male point
of view; the very notion of a “private sphere” presumes that there is a level beneath which
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inequalities do not exist. Consequently, the very notion of a public-private split promotes
systemic gender inequality. MacKinnon’s slogan: “the personal is political,” claims that such
inequalities are not outside of the political realm (public sphere); they are part of it. And
addressing such inequalities, MacKinnon believes, requires dissolving the public-private divide
altogether.
Liberal feminists also criticize the liberal public-private distinction. But unlike radical
feminists, liberal feminists do not necessarily support doing away with the public-private
distinction altogether. Rather, many believe that doing justice to women requires that liberal
theorists acknowledge gendered hierarchies when deciding where the public-private line ought to
be. Susan Moller Okin, for example, criticizes liberal theorist John Rawls, who in Justice as
Fairness, presents a theory of justice in which individuals choose social principles under a “veil
of ignorance.”43 Rawls presumes that gender is one of those categories covered by his veil (under
which individuals do not know where in society they will be placed when making decisions
about that society.)44 Nonetheless, in placing the household outside of the state’s control, Rawls
(whom she uses to take issue with liberal theorists more generally) portrays the subjugated role
of women as a natural hierarchy. That is, Rawls does not take issue with hierarchies which exist
within the household. Consequently, Okin argues that it is necessary to understand intrahousehold gender relations as an unequal relationship which, like economic and social
inequality, falls under Rawls’ principles of justice; if we presume that household relationships
are outside of the scope of justice, then Rawls’ liberal promise of equality operates “on shaky
ground.”
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Marxist theorists have also criticized the liberal public-private distinction for legitimizing
inequality. Gerald Turkel sums up Marx’s opposition to the public-private dichotomy. He divides
these critiques into three parts.45 First, Marx argued that the public-private dichotomy leads leads
individuals to understand actions in terms of their legal status rather than on their effects.
“Owning property, buying and selling on the market, and engaging in household consumption
have their social significance established through a universalizing legal discourse rather than
through the practical meaning they have for actors.”46 Consequently, an action being labeled as
“private” presents it as a personal matter—something outside of the community’s consideration.
Marx’s second critique builds upon the first: insofar as the public-private distinction leads
individuals to place emphasis on actions’ legality, it similarly legitimizes private property. Marx
argues (according to Turkel) that the dichotomy portrays private property as a legal, and
consequently moral, right. Whereas society may otherwise be able to allocate resources as it sees
fit, the public-private legitimizes private ownership as a right outside of the state’s
consideration.47 Marx’s third critique presents a “more concrete, empirical approach to the
public/private distinction.”48 This is less a critique and more of how Marx sought to use the
concept to the advantage of the worker; Marx hoped that “the formation of a progressive public
sphere, which led to increased private rights of workers to control their time, would generate
conditions both for the enhancement of workers' private lives and, also, for their fuller
enlightenment and participation in public life.”49 The third critique is less relevant for our
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illustration of the public-private critiques. The first two, however, present a socio-economic
critique of the public-private distinction. While Marx certainly did not write in response to 20th
century liberalism, his ideas are nonetheless useful in conceptualizing how the public-private
distinction impacts how individuals see the world and can consequently obstruct necessary social
restructuring. More generally, understanding that scholars of other theoretical camps similarly
critique the liberal public-private distinction is important in grasping the countless issues
associated with such a divide. Understanding these difficulties allows us to re-evaluate our
approach toward the public-private distinction altogether.
IV. Conclusion
There are two possible conclusions to this thesis. The first, which I call the “liberal
conclusion,” is discussed in the first section of this chapter. In Chapters Three and Four, we
found that Permissive Liberalism is the only theory of the public sphere which accords with
liberal doctrine, but that the U.S Constitution is not in line with this theory. Since liberal theorists
see “freedom” as “freedom from unnecessarily constraining laws,” a “juridico-discursive” theory
of power might lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court needs to interpret the Constitution
in line with permissive liberal doctrine. Supplementing the right to privacy with what I call a
“right to public autonomy” would ensure that an individual’s freedom is not compromised when
they enter the public sphere.
But such a conclusion only follows if we accept a juridico-discursive theory of power.
Chapters Three and Four employed this understanding of power in order to better understand
liberal theorists’ and U.S Law’s understanding of the public sphere; but liberal theorists, given
their conception of power, have a flawed approach to the public-private distinction. Given their
overwhelming focus on law, liberal theorists entrench certain social constructs through the laws
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that they promote. Moreover, liberal theorists neglect to consider how individuals and actions are
constructed by a web of power relations. This superficial understanding of power has grave
implications for law. Even permissive liberals presume that there ought to be a backstop against
public autonomy—they presume that the public sphere must be a space for as much “individual
autonomy” as possible while preserving the public-private distinction; actions which are
universally offensive, for instance, can be restricted without issue. But if society finds law to be
indicative of right and wrong, then the law works to construct “universally offensive” actions as
taboo. In this sense, law does not act on independent subjects; rather, law plays a role in
constructing those subjects themselves.
This understanding of power raises questions about liberals’ presumption of an intrinsic
divide between the public and private spheres. Liberal theorists presume that the individual in
private is and should be fundamentally different from the individual in public; while in private,
the individual is completely autonomous, the public individual acts as a citizen, as a member of
society. Consequently, restrictions on public “autonomy” are more justified than on private ones.
But when one takes into account Foucault’s analytics of modern power, it is clear that this
“intrinsic divide” constructs how individuals see the world. This Foucauldian critique forms part
of a larger “postmodern” critique of the liberal public-private distinction.50 This general school
of thought criticizes liberals’ presumption that the subject is autonomous; since they are not,
these scholars argue, the public-private distinction operates on a faulty assumption. Feminist and
Marxist theorists have also criticized the public private distinction, arguing that it normalizes and
entrenches gender and economic inequalities.
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The broader debate about the liberal public-private distinction raises questions about
how, if at all, we might restructure our understanding of the public sphere (if we believe there
should even be one) to allow for greater “freedom.” If we accept that the subject is not
autonomous, but can act as an agent, how might we work to maximize that agency through a set
of laws. If we deny liberals’ understanding of power, believing that the subject is constructed
below the level of law, and that law plays a positive role in constructing the subject, how might
we factor these issues into our assessment of the public sphere? Liberals ask the right question
but pursue the answer by the wrong means; the question for us is how to formulate a theory of
the public sphere while avoiding liberal theorists’ faulty assumptions.
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Conclusion
Let me briefly review what I have covered thus far: Chapter One charted the historical
development of liberal autonomy, both in the public and private spheres. Moreover, I reviewed
the liberal literature on public autonomy, which breaks down into three groups: I call these
groups “Restrictive Liberalism,” “Interest-Balancing Liberalism,” and “Permissive Liberalism.”
I located my case study, public nudity, as a frequently debated example within this literature. In
Chapter Two, I explored how nudity is constructed using a Foucauldian analytics of power. The
body’s construction as nude not only explains laws proscribing public nudity, it also raises
questions about the subject, power, and autonomy. Chapters Three and Four employed a liberal
account of power (as opposed to the Foucauldian one discussed in Chapter Two) to explore how
liberals approach the question of public autonomy. Chapter Three finds that only Permissive
Liberalism accords with what I call the “lowest-common denominator” of liberal doctrine, which
prohibits restrictions based on social conventions. Chapter Four finds that the U.S Constitution’s
approach to the public sphere, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not accord
with Permissive Liberalism (and consequently does not follow liberal doctrine.) In Chapter Five,
I explain how liberal theorists might conclude this thesis: in order to maximize freedom, the
Supreme Court must supplement the “right to privacy” with what I call a “right to public
autonomy,” which follows permissive liberal principles. This right would maximize individual
freedom in the public sphere. But I take this conclusion further, arguing that since liberal
theorists neglect how power constructs the subject, their presumptions about the public-private
distinction rest on a shaky foundation. So given this newfound understanding of the publicprivate distinction, what can we say about the role of law?

The bulk of this thesis has focused on analyzing the limits of the public sphere under
liberal theory; the case of public nudity was intended to test whether actions which are socially
constructed as offensive can be restricted. Across the spectrum, the liberal literature on public
autonomy suggests that there ought to be a hard backstop against what governments must allow.
Even Permissive Liberalism, the most laissez-faire of the three positions, presumes an intrinsic
difference between actions which are restrictable and those which are not, even if that difference
does not follow the line of “offense.”
I was initially convinced by this backstop. There was no way, I figured, that all actions
must be allowed in the public sphere; working backwards from my constructed notions of
decency, I didn’t want to admit that, for instance, public vomit-eating deserved the same
protection as public nudity. At the same time, however, I did not want to concede that morality
could in fact guide restrictability (even if I was willing to admit, as Hart argues, that the “rule of
recognition” reflects a certain morality.)1 I was thus convinced that Permissive Liberalism was a
way to legalize public nudity, and other socially-constructed offenses, while avoiding
backsliding into a position which forces us to allow all non-harmful actions irrespective of
offense.
But as I progressed throughout the thesis, I found myself trying to understand the liberal
public-private distinction in light of Foucault’s conception of power. The more I understood the
implications of Foucault’s “bio-power,” the more disenchanted I grew with Permissive
Liberalism. Permissive Liberalism, like liberal doctrine in general, presumes that the subject is
autonomous; it also assumes that there are real, non-constructed differences between the public
and private realms. Embracing Permissive Liberalism does not change the fact that the public-
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private distinction constructs the difference which it presumes.2 Similarly, there is no guarantee
that changing the legal limits of the public sphere brings greater autonomy. Understanding that
the autonomous subject is a liberal myth led me to push beyond Permissive Liberalism; people,
knowledge, and institutions exist within and are constructed by discursive norms.
Liberal theorists, notably Larry Alexander, might reject this critique, presuming such a
distinction is necessary in order to represent the way that individuals see the world.3 But this
view neglects to consider that individuals are not constructed equally; it takes, as Minow argues,
a certain point of view for granted.4 To accept that people see actions in terms of public or
private is to neglect that the public-private distinction legislates and constructs social relations in
a way that benefit certain individuals.5 On the other hand, seeing the public-private distinction as
a construct does not require us to collapse the legal divide altogether. If we operated on the
premise that social constructs cannot influence law, we would be unable to have any laws at all.
Rather, we must factor our understanding of power/knowledge into our lawmaking in a way that
allows individuals maximum agency within the bounds of power/knowedge. We must stop
presuming that agency must be restricted in the service of securing a concrete notion of
decency—one that assumes, for instance, that there is an intrinsic difference between public
nudity and vomit eating—rather, we must acknowledge the role of power in shaping that
distinction.
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Formulating a normative legal theory is not my goal in this thesis, although there are
certain considerations that such a theory must take into account. It is crucial that we allow
individuals maximum agency in the public sphere. With respect to public nudity, people ought to
be able to go about unclothed in public regardless of whether it effects autonomy. In this purely
legal sense, I agree with the liberal conclusion. But my normative inclinations go deeper than
liberal theory. I reject the liberal premise that the public and private spheres should be subject to
different regulations because they are fundamentally different. Such a distinction might be
necessary, but only if justified for alternate reasons. While the law ought to allow for maximum
agency, legislators must take into account that law universalizes the perspective of a particular
group; the law takes a certain perspective for granted and normalizes that perspective as a
cultural norm. This thesis, by neglecting how the subject’s positioning (due to race, culture, age,
class etc.) shapes how their bodies are constructed, has passively illustrated this universalization;
I, like liberal theorists, have been blind to how the subject’s construction shapes their experience.
While I explore how the body is constructed in Chapter Two, briefly touching on the impact of
gender, I subconsciously neglect how individuals’ disparate positions impact the construction
and social perception of their bodies. My failure to acknowledge how my experience (as a
Caucasian, cisgender, college-educated, wealthy male—a person with a dominant social
position) is specific to my social position may have led me to universalize the norms surrounding
my body. My subconscious error highlights the importance of acknowledging the disparate ways
in which subjects are constructed, specifically when making legal decisions. This is not to say
that we must reject liberals’ normative theories altogether; but we must reject the assumptions
about power, law, and the subject that got them to those conclusions.
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Rethinking the public private distinction requires us to legislate in light of the
considerations laid out in this chapter. While those considerations are crucial, it is for future
theorists to decide how to apply them. My aim in this thesis is to take us thus far; it is to point
toward a new way of thinking about our question. Liberal theorists presume that there is an
autonomous subject and a concrete knowledge; given this, they argue, we must find a way to
preserve society’s structure while allowing that individual maximum autonomy; they conclude
that a moral dislike of a certain action is not sufficient to shape the laws surrounding it. But what
happens when such an assumption is undercut? What happens when we realize that everything is
constructed and that, as a result, law always takes a certain point of view for granted? How
should we understand the role of law then? What ought to be its limits? More specifically, how
might we reconceive the public-private distinction in a way that allows subjugated knowledges
to come to fruition and allows individuals greater agency?6 Asking such questions is the first step
toward working toward a more accurate and just theory of power, agency, and the role of law.
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